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CHAPTER ONE: THE MOLELEKI EXECUTION, A RADICAL PROBLEM OF 
UNDERSTANDING 
 
Introduction 
 
“A Finishing Off” 
The Moleleki Execution, Moleleki Extension 2, 9am, Tuesday 7 December 1993 
 
They took us out of the shack and they were kicking us and hitting us. 
And when we reached the veld…Mr Buthelezi then said we should 
pray and we prayed…they then untied Sepo…one SDU member gave 
Sepo a firearm. They then said we should sit down with our backs 
turned towards them…and then he said to Sepo: shoot your mates and 
then I heard the sound of gunfire and when the gunfire started 
everyone of us wanted to shield himself by another one on the ground. 
And after they stopped firing I heard someone say: finish them off.  
 
We were screaming and I was lying folded on top of another man. I 
was not injured and just kept quiet. And after the word was given: 
finish them off, I then heard the sound of chopping and I was also 
chopped, I think four or five times on my head. And after the chopping 
I heard their footsteps moving away from us. I think they had walked 
for a distance of about one metre when I heard one of them say: hey 
there is one of them still alive. And I heard one of them say: take the 
spear and put the spear through him. I thought that I was being referred 
to as the one who was still alive and I thought of jumping up but I 
desisted and decided to just lay there…but then I heard the sound of 
the spear further to my side. And after they stabbed that person they 
then walked away… 
 
And while I was still there I was lying on top of a certain boy and I 
saw him lifting his leg time and again. I then untied my hand and 
untied that boy as well…he could not walk properly. I lifted him up, 
and walked away with him…And then I ran, I ran and ran and I then 
became dizzy and it appeared as if I was dreaming…and from then on 
I don‟t know what happened. (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, pp. 
220-222)  
 
Vuyani Tshabalala, breaking down in the courtroom while giving this account of what 
subsequently came to be known as the “Katlehong massacre”4, was one of only two young 
survivors of an atrocity of violence in which seven ANC Youth League (ANCYL) members 
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ranging in age between 14 and 18 and one adult ANC member, 35 year old Alfred Buthelezi, 
were killed, execution style, on the morning of 7 December 1993 following a night of 
retaliatory violence. ANCYL leader Isaac Mbitjana Motloung (known as“Wips”) was captured 
with other ANCYL members but was drowned separately in a nearby stream. The execution 
took place in the bushveld adjoining the most recently constructed block, Block F, of the still 
incomplete informal settlement, Moleleki Section Extension 2, recently established on the 
south east side of Katlehong township on the East Rand in the Witwatersrand region of what is 
now the Gauteng province. The area of unoccupied land in which the execution took place 
formed a “no-man‟s” land, a barrier against the adjacent informal settlement of Zonkezizwe, 
which was by then the almost exclusive political domain of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP).   
 
The eight executed were among a group of 14 young Moleleki residents who were forcibly 
abducted during the early hours of the morning of 7 December by adult ANC members, who 
had organised themselves in a self-defence unit (SDU) operating in Moleleki Extension 2. This 
SDU was one of many informal defensive structures established in townships on the 
Witwatersrand following the upsurge of violent political conflict after the deprohibition of 
political organisations in 1990. Youth League members had initially participated in SDU patrols 
but after bodies were “inexplicably” found in the township after night time patrols by adult SDU 
members, divisions between the SDU and ANC Youth League members deepened to overt 
hostility.  
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Before the Execution 
“Death Has Arrived” 
Killing of Civic Activist Bulelwa Zwane 
The execution itself was the culmination of a series of events which occurred during a 24-
hour period after 26-year-old Theodora Bulelwa Zwane, local ANC party official and 
secretary of the civic association in Block F of Moleleki Extension 2, was shot and killed at 
about 7.30pm as she and a companion walked in a street in Block F of Moleleki Extension 2  
(The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 1766). Bulelwa was claimed as “friend” and associate 
by both the ANC Youth League and the SDU in Moleleki. However, the night before 
Bulelwa‟s death, she had attended a meeting in Block F called by Alfred Philemon Buthelezi 
(who would later die in the execution with his son, Thokazani), to discuss setting up a rival 
SDU in this block. Witnesses recall Bulelwa questioning the necessity for a “new” SDU in 
Block F when an SDU had already been established, which was patrolling the block. Friend 
Nombuniso Ndwane recalls: “Bulelwa said or asked if it was necessary to form a new SDU, 
she asked if this was not going to cause conflict” (TRC, 1998a, p. 558). According to SDU 
member Zola Sonti, who also attended the meeting: “It was concluded that because she was a 
woman she should just remain silent” (TRC, 1998a, p. 289). 
 
Bulelwa‟s murder, the following evening, sealed her silence forever and precipitated the 
chain of events, an unravelling of time and order, that would indeed, as she predicted, 
culminate not only in conflict but in the horror of the execution. As Njebe Ndondolo, 
Moleleki Extension 2 SDU commander, told SDU “operator”5 Michael Armoed before taking 
him to the site of Bulelwa‟s body, “death has arrived”  (TRC, 1998a, p. 384).  
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It took the police until 8am the following morning to come and collect Bulelwa‟s bullet-
riddled body, which lay for almost thirteen hours on the streets of Block F. During this 
thirteen hour period, through the night and the early hours of the morning, a series of events 
unfolded in the sleepless township that would eventually culminate in the Moleleki execution 
shortly after the removal of Bulelwa‟s corpse by the police.  
 
Police photographs of the scene show a young woman lying on her back half-covered by a 
blanket, spent cartridges scattered around her and a crowd of what SDU member Themba 
Mtshali estimated to be approximately 100 people still gathered several feet from the body. 
Themba recalls the mood of the crowd around Bulelwa‟s body as “tense” and remembers that 
“the community was discussing crime and violence” (TRC, 1998a, p. 545). Themba was one 
of several SDU members who arrived at Bulelwa‟s body at approximately 9.30pm after being 
informed of her killing.  
 
The SDU members were joined by ANCYL leader 18-year-old Isaac Mbitjana Motloung 
(known as “Wips”), who arrived with a group of ANCYL members whom he had informed 
of Bulelwa‟s death. In his prior conversations with ANCYL members as he escorted them to 
the site of the killing he had already implicated SDU operator Oscar Motlokwa in the killing 
of Bulelwa (Mokoena, 1995; Moloi, 1995). Also at the scene of Bulelwa‟s death were two 
Block F civic association members, George Samson Mokwena, who had chaired the meeting 
the previous evening where Bulelwa had been told to keep quiet, and Alfred Buthelezi, who 
had initiated the meeting to establish a new SDU structure in Block F. Tensions between the 
groupings were already evident at the site of Bulelwa‟s killing, as Alfred Buthelezi told SDU 
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member Temba Mtshali, when he arrived at Bulelwa‟s body: “We don‟t want a person 
wearing a blanket here”6 (TRC, 1998a, p. 544). 
 
The Call of Bulelwa’s Death, a Lacuna at the Centre of Power 
What Bulelwa‟s death made explicit was a lacuna at the centre of power in the township, 
which created the context in which, within 12 hours, the execution could take place. On the 
one hand there was a complete juridico-institutional absence, as the apartheid state had 
substantively retreated from violence-racked townships, merely arriving to collect the corpses 
of this conflict. In the absence of the institutional ordering of the state, the township had 
sought to establish its own forms of governance through the structures of the African 
National Congress (ANC), the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) and the 
ANC Youth League (ANCYL). An ostensibly politically “neutral” SDU was established to 
defend the township against the violence that “infested” (TRC, 1998a, p. 11) the trouble-torn 
townships of the East Rand. However, Moleleki was a new township, only established in 
November 1992, one year before the execution, and its structures of internal governance 
remained fragile, fluid, its leadership contested. The modernist vision of the ANCYL and the 
civic association, which foresaw a representative, juridical political authority, clashed with 
the biopolitical conception of political authority of the SDU, a conception of the political in 
which authority is embodied, invested in the person rather than in formal office (Agamben, 
2005, p. 82). Tensions rose as the SDU and the ANCYL, allied with adult civic leaders, 
struggled for the terms on which political authority would operate in Moleleki, clashing 
around these two visions of the “political”, which evoked disputations in terms of gender, 
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generation and ethnicity and manifested themselves in conflicts around a range of issues, that 
formed the backdrop to the violence that eventually led to the execution.  
 
It was in this lacuna of juridico-political authority and in the environment of political 
extremis which ensued after Bulelwa‟s death that the “community”, organised not as 
representative political authority, but simply “embodied” in gatherings at sites of violence, 
which became the source of political authority in Moleleki. This political authority, however, 
in its constant fluidity of embodiment at various sites of death, contained an intrinsic 
ambiguity and constituted a deeply unstable political referent. Who in fact was the 
“community” who could authorise action in response to the violence of that terrible night? 
Where was it located in the porous boundaries between public and private space evoked as 
residents gathered on the streets of Moleleki in response to the deaths of that night?  
 
Residents Gather at Block C 
The chaos of the events which were to unfold after Bulelwa‟s death evidenced this deep 
ambiguity at the heart of power and the fluidity of the transformations that took place in this 
context, marking some citizens as life which deserved to be killed, or tenuously retrieving 
them from this threshold of death (Agamben, 1998, p. 82). Members of the Moleleki 
community came out onto the streets of the township throughout the course of the night to 
gather primarily at the body of Bulelwa in Block F and subsequently at the body of Moleleki 
Extension 2 deputy SDU commander Malusi Jackson Kiyana (known as Blanko), who was 
shot dead by ANCYL members in retaliation for Bulelwa‟s death. According to civic and 
youth leader Lethusang Rikaba, the source of authority for this latter killing was a 
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spontaneous gathering of people at approximately 9pm at a Spaza
7
 shop in Block C of the 
township, as local residents were alerted to Bulelwa‟s death by the cries of her friend and 
fellow civic member, Alfred Buthelezi.  
 
The gathering was addressed by Lethusang: 
The residents gathered there because of Buthelezi‟s scream. They asked me of saying 
“why do we hear the scream?”…That is why I addressed them…. I tried to calm down 
Mr Buthelezi first so that we‟ll be able to hear directly from him about the screaming. 
That is when Mr Buthelezi, after he‟s been calmed down, he said Bulelwa has been 
killed (TRC, 1998a, p. 685).  
 
It was in this context, which was “not a meeting, a formal meeting, it was because of the call, 
we met because of the call of Bulelwa‟s death” (TRC, 1998a, p. 668) that a group of fifty to 
seventy residents who were “emotionally charged – within those members of the community, 
the directive came that enough is enough, that we should apprehend these people” (p. 681) 
and “bring them to the community” (p. 668). 
 
Killing of SDU leader Blanko 
No alleged perpetrators were in fact “brought to the community”. In the early hours of the 
morning, approximately seven hours after Bulelwa‟s death, a group of approximately 40 
ANCYL members, accompanied by residents of Moleleki Extension 2, some of whom were 
armed (TRC, 1998a, p. 671), sought to “hunt down” (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 
1766) the perpetrators of Bulelwa‟s killing, purportedly SDU members operating in Block E 
of the township. Lethusang Rikaba emphasises: “As the community, we left, we searched for 
members of the SDU, we did not find some of them until we arrived at Blanko” (TRC, 1998a, 
p. 572, own emphasis). 
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Approximately seventy or eighty (TRC, 1998a, p. 677) residents gathered outside Blanko‟s 
home in Block E of the township as ANCYL chairperson “Wips” Motloung and Lethusang 
Rikaba, as well as several other armed ANCYL members, forcibly entered his house at 
approximately 2am. They purportedly intended to take Blanko to “account to the community” 
at a local meeting place in Moleleki but encountered resistance from Blanko. Lethusang took 
an AK-47 from a Youth League member accompanying him and fired two shots at Blanko. 
Two other Youth League members opened fire with 9mm pistols. Blanko died instantly 
(TRC, 1998a, p. 675). 
 
Goods from the Spaza shop that Blanko operated from his home were taken by some younger 
Youth League members, which when later found in their possession by SDU members 
provided “evidence” of their criminality and involvement in Blanko‟s death and became the 
basis for their later abduction and execution. After the Spaza shop was looted, Blanko‟s shack 
was set alight. The remains of his charred body were found in a sitting position on a chair, 
propped outside against the ruins of his shack.  
 
SDU members guarding Bulelwa‟s body in the adjacent Block F heard the gunfire in Block E 
and saw the flames rising from Blanko‟s burning shack. They rushed to the scene. “We found 
Blanko‟s shack burning fiercely. We were quite many in number and we tried to extinguish 
the fire” (TRC, 1998a, p. 553). SDU members arriving on the scene were informed by 
Blanko‟s neighbour and fellow SDU member Oscar Motlokwa that he had identified ANCYL 
leader Wips Motloung and Lethusang Rikaba as Blanko‟s killers. His identification would 
later lead to the abduction and killing of Wips Motloung and the attempted abduction of 
Lethusang Rikaba.   
 9 
 
“Those people must be attacked”, retaliation for Blanko’s death 
The site of Blanko‟s death was to create the context in which Katlehong deputy SDU 
commander Moeketsi William Ramabele (known as “Sugar”) would issue the instructions 
that would lead to the forcible abduction of 14 ANCYL members who were then incarcerated 
in a shack on the edge of the township in Block F. It was in this context too, that Njebe 
Ndondolo, Moleleki Extension 2 SDU commander, would later issue the final “order” for the 
killing of youth in the bushveld adjoining the township.  
 
An Order is Issued for Attack by SDU Commander Sugar Ramabele  
As SDU members congregated at the scene of Blanko‟s death to extinguish the flames of his 
burning shack they were joined by senior SDU member Sugar Ramabele, who told them: 
 
“Those people must be attacked”….We went out hunting them…That decision was 
taken by Sugar. He had powers…and if a shootout ensues, fine. We went to them 
through C block, then we met them, then we fought until the early hours of the 
morning. (TRC, 1998a, p. 153) 
 
According to Oscar Motlokwa, “Now the members of the community even helped with 
catching some of these people” (TRC, 1998a, p. 157). 
 
Abduction of 14 ANCYL members  
During the following hours, between 3am and 8am, a total of 14 young Moleleki residents, 
some of whom, like the SDU, had been patrolling the streets of the dark township through the 
night and some of whom were sleeping together in an ANCYL “base” in Block A, were 
abducted by two groups of SDU members who left the site of Blanko‟s body in search of the 
perpetrators of this killing. Most of those abducted and later executed, with the exception of 
Youth League leader Wips Motloung, had not in fact been involved in the killing of Blanko, 
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as they were either sleeping in the ANCYL base in Block A, or like Vuyani Tshabalala, the 
survivor whose quote began this chapter, were patrolling in the area.  
 
Lethusang Rikaba, who was directly responsible for the shooting of Blanko, was briefly 
apprehended by SDU members but was released because, according to SDU member Zola 
Sonti, “I felt that because the community was still there, we wanted an explanation as to what 
the origin of this is and where it is headed” (TRC, 1998a, p. 297). Lethusang would never in 
fact “account to the community” but would later give his account of the events leading to the 
execution and his role in the killing of Blanko within the institutional context of the TRC and 
the courtroom processes, in which five SDU members were finally sentenced to life terms of 
imprisonment in 1999, six years after the execution took place.  
 
“Parents, What Should We Do If People Are Killing People In This Fashion”? 
“Presentation” of the abducted youth to the community  
Throughout the night and as dawn broke, the abducted youths were openly marched across 
the township and were taken “back to the community”, in fact briefly made visible to two 
large groups of Moleleki residents who remained gathered on the streets of the township 
throughout the night.   
 
One group at the site of Blanko‟s killing in Block E had swelled to a gathering of 
approximately 500 people by 7am, when they were addressed by civic leader “Machinini”. 
Most of the youths however were taken to a smaller group of approximately 100 people 
gathered at the site of Bulelwa‟s body in Block F, before being incarcerated from about 
5.30am onwards in a shack approximately 100 metres away. The number of youths held in 
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the shack would eventually reach 14 as various groups of armed SDU members arrived with 
captured youth.  
 
Elphina Mugadi, mother of Isaac Mugadi who would die in the execution little more than an 
hour and a half later, was one of the residents standing at the site of Bulelwa‟s body after 
leaving her home at approximately 6.30am to look for her son who had not returned home the 
previous evening. A friend had woken her to tell her, “The children are finished” (Mugadi, 
1995, p. 1). She later told the Truth and Reconciliation Commission that “I understand by the 
„term‟ finished that they had been killed” (Mugadi, 1998).  
 
As she stood at Bulelwa‟s body among approximately 100 men, women and children, 
Elphina saw a group of about 20 men, among them SDU members armed with pangas8 and 
spears, approaching the crowd gathered around Bulelwa‟s body. Walking unarmed with the 
group of men were a number of young ANCYL members, including her 17-year-old son 
Isaac Mugadi, 18-year-old Mile Simelana, 16-year-old Ditaba Mthembu and 18-year-old Buti 
Hlatshwayo, who would all soon die in the execution. Fourteen-year-old Jacob Moloi and 15-
year-old Charles Matebang Mokoena were also among this group forcibly brought to the site 
of Bulelwa‟s death but were released prior to the execution.  
  
SDU leader Njebe Ndondolo rhetorically addressed the gathered crowd, publicly accusing the 
captured youth of the killing of Bulelwa and Blanko: “Parents what should we do, you of 
Moleleki, if people are killing people in this manner or fashion?” According to Elphina, 
“nobody answered” (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 1088). ANCYL member Vuyani 
Tshabalala, one of only two survivors of the execution who was also “presented” at the site of 
                                            
 
8
 A type of axe. 
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Bulelwa‟s body, elucidates: “We were also not allowed to speak”9 (Tshabalala, 1995, p. 3). 
The youths were then escorted to a shack 100 metres away from Bulelwa‟s body where they 
were tied to each other with their hands bound behind their backs and their feet bound 
together.  
“Hey, You Boys, What Have You Done”? 
Fourteen Young Boys are Incarcerated in a Shack in Block F 
The shack, 100 metres from Bulelwa‟s body, was open as it did not have doors nor window 
glass installed yet, which meant that the boys tied up inside in it were visible to residents 
gathered around Bulelwa‟s body, “people were arriving and peeping through the [opening 
for] windows and asking: „Hey, you boys, what have you done?‟” (TRC, 1998a, p. 693). 
Eighteen-year-old Jabulani Nxumalo managed to untie himself and was beginning to untie 
some of the youths incarcerated with him when he was betrayed by a community onlooker: 
“One woman stood by the door, came towards the door and said: „here, the thugs are trying to 
escape‟”  (TRC, 1998a, p. 693). 
 
Other members of the Moleleki community who came to the shack where the boys were held 
were the parents of two children incarcerated there, Tina Mootsi, mother of 15-year-old 
Itumeleng Edward Mootsi, and Alfred Buthelezi, whose attempts to intervene on behalf of 
Thokazani, his 14-year-old son, would lead to his own capture and execution.  
 
Jabulani Nxumalo, who was released immediately prior to the execution, witnessed Alfred 
Buthelezi‟s attempts to intervene on his son‟s behalf:  
Buthelezi…wanted to know what was going on with his child. There were allegations 
that he was an Inkatha member and two people in the group grabbed [him]…one of 
                                            
 
9
 The statement to the police was recorded in Afrikaans. The original read: Ons was ook nie toegelaat om te 
praat nie. 
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the people chopped Buthelezi on his head with an axe…then Buthelezi and his son 
were tied together by the neck with a strong rope
10
 (Nxumalo, 1995, p. 3). 
 
 
Tina Mootsi arrived at the shack where the boys were incarcerated and asked her son what 
had happened. He replied, “Mama, I‟ve done nothing wrong” (T. Mootsi, personal interview, 
2001). However, Tina was not allowed to talk further: 
his men when he saw me he inquired what are these women doing here…I tried to 
talk to him, they pushed him away that I don‟t talk to him. I left to go and phone his 
father thinking that as a man they will allow him to talk to him. (Mootsi, 1997, pp. 20-
21)  
 
But it was too late. As Tina left she was told she would “find the children in the veld” (T. 
Mootsi, personal interview, 2001). Later that day she found her son‟s decapitated body 
among the eight executed. 
 
At approximately 8am the Internal Stability Division (ISD)11 arrived to collect the body of 
Bulelwa and then moved on to collect the body of SDU commander Blanko. While Moleleki 
residents stood watching the collection of bodies at these two sites, they knew of the 
incarcerated youths held just metres way, but as Elphina explained, “some of the parents were 
afraid [of the police]” (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 1094). 
 
However, SDU members became concerned that the youth would be discovered by the ISD, 
so they were moved to a second shack slightly further from Bulelwa‟s body. This shack was 
also incompletely built and the inside was visible to residents.  
                                            
 
10
 Buthelezi…wou keer wat gaande is rakende sy kind. Daar was bewerings dat hy n Inkatha lid is en het twee 
persone in die groep vasgegryp waarop een van die persone vir Buthelezi met n byl oor sy hoor gekap het... 
Daarop was Buthelezi en sy seun met n sterk tou aanmekaar se nekke vasgemaak.  
 
11
 The ISD, a specialised police unit, was established in 1992 and was tasked by the outgoing apartheid state 
with policing the rising levels of politicised violence which accompanied South Africa‟s negotiation process 
between 1990 and 1994. 
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While the youth cowered in the shack, SDU commander Njebe Ndondolo arrived with a list 
of names of the youth who were to be executed, comprising members of the ANCYL who 
patrolled the township rather those instrumentally involved in Blanko‟s killing. Jabulani 
Nxumalo was released on this threshold of death when SDU member Michael Armoed 
looked into the shack and recognised him as his son‟s “playmate” (TRC, 1998a, p. 386). 
Fourteen-year-old Jacob Moloi and 15-year-old Charles Matebang Mokoena were also 
released, apparently because their names did not appear on Njebe Ndondolo‟s “list” 
(Mokoena, 1995, p. 3).  
 
Gathering Addressed by Civic Leader Machinini  
As the crowd of approximately 100 people remained gathered around Bulelwa‟s body in 
Block F throughout the night, another group of people gathered at the site of Blanko‟s killing 
in Block E from 2am onwards. This group of concerned residents grew through the night. By 
7am when the gathering was addressed by the civic leader, Machinini, the crowd had swelled 
to approximately 500 people congregated at the site of Blanko‟s still uncollected body. Oscar 
Motlokwa explains: “It was a community meeting because the vice chairperson of the zonal 
civic addressed them, after he arrived many people came” (TRC, 1998a, p. 178). “He was 
addressing the issue of Bulelwa and Blanko. He was addressing crime in general in Moleleki 
section” (TRC, 1998a, p. 179). “He [Machinini] was addressing the meeting as the leader, he 
did not take out…an order [to kill the youths] at the meeting” (TRC, 1998a, p. 157). 
 
Nevertheless the “confession” of Alfred Buthelezi‟s son, Thokozani, at the meeting regarding 
the ANCYL‟s purported involvement in Bulelwa and Blanko‟s deaths, was critical in creating 
the context in which, according to Oscar, “the community lost control and…said these 
children must be killed” (TRC, 1998a, p. 154). After a visibly beaten Thokozani was brought 
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into the meeting, following his violent interrogation by Njebe Ndondolo, he publically cried 
out to his father Alfred who stood amongst the gathered crowd “Dad, tell me what you 
ordered me to do, you sent me” (TRC, 1998a, p. 155). It was in this environment that 
Moleleki Extension SDU commander, Njebe Ndondolo, acting on the instructions of 
Katlehong SDU commander, Mzaapindile Ntsingola (known as Manyala12), “during the 
process of the meeting” “but not in the meeting”, “called us aside as members of the SDU. It 
is there where he took out an order” (TRC, 1998a, p. 178).  
 
As residents flowed in and out of Blanko‟s small backyard, SDU members congregated in a 
small group. “Ntjebe called the members of the SDU aside and he said Manyala commanded 
him that these people must be killed and then we were going to fetch them from a shack and 
then we were going to kill them in an open veld…Ntjebe13 and Manyala14 and Majola15 
ordered the death of these people, these criminals” (TRC, 1998a, p. 156, own emphasis). 
 
Soon after this order was issued, SDU members returned to the shack where most of the 
ANCYL members were now incarcerated, on the edge of Block F adjoining the bushveld on the 
boundary of the township.  
 
By this time residents had retreated in fear. “When we drove them to the veld, there were no 
people around” (TRC, 1998a, p. 407) and the group were compelled to take their last walk 
                                            
 
12
 Variously meaning, badness, nastiness, worthlessness, or claw as in clawing at an opponent. (Manyala. 2006. 
In Merriam-Webster  Online dictionary.  Retrieved from: http://www.websters-online-
dictionary.org/translation/zulu/manyala). Elphina Mugadi describes her encounter with the SDU commander 
Mzaapindile during the events leading up to the execution where he used the term manyala as both an adjective 
to describe himself and a verb to describ his actions, “This man said: „I am Manyala and everything that I do 
[are] bad things‟...[he]used the word that I am Manyala and what I do is manyala, literally speaking  my lord 
manyala would mean doing just bad things, anything, not caring about what someone is doing”(The State v. 
Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 1089). 
13
 Njebe Ndondolo, Moleleki Extension 2 commander. 
14
 Mzaapindile Ntsingola, Katlehong township SDU commander. 
15
 Nkosi Kona Majola, Katlehong township deputy SDU commander. 
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accompanied only by their captors, who beat and kicked them as they stumbled along, tied 
together, while parents, residents and ANCYL members watched furtively from the tall grass 
and empty shacks adjoining the veld. At the site of the execution those captured were unbound 
from each other and were told to kneel, as if in prayer, facing away from their executioners. 
Among the captured was civic leader Tshepo Baloyi. The rope around his neck was untied and 
he was ordered to start shooting at the abductees. He was later “released” by SDU commander 
Njebe Ndondolo and fled the scene to report the execution to a local violence monitoring 
organisation, Peace Action.  
 
The murder charges eventually brought by the Attorney General in 1997 listed the eight dead as: 
 Alfred Philemon Buthelezi @ [aka]Alie, 35 years old, residing at Moleleki  
 Extension 2      
 Itumeleng Edward Mootsi, 15 years old, residing at 8183 Moleleki  
 Thokozani Buthelezi, 14 years old, residing at Moleleki Extension 2 
 Lucas Hlatswayo @ Buti, 18 years old, residing at 7208 Moleleki 
 Isaac Mugadi, 17 years old, residing at 7400 Moleleki 
 Ditaba Joseph Mthembu, 16 years old, residing at 6938 Moleleki 
 Peter Mavuso Mdishwa, 15 years old, residing at 8155 Moleleki 
 Mile Simon Semela (sic), 18 years old, residing at 7215 Moleleki. 
(The State v. Michael Sonti, 1997, p. 1) 
 
The first photograph of the crime scene shows approximately seven policemen standing talking 
to each other over a number of heaped bodies, lying in the tall bushveld grass. It had taken 
police more than 24 hours to collect the corpses of the executed boys, by which time their 
already mutilated bodies had been further maimed by roaming dogs who ate their flesh as they 
lay piled on top of each other, rapidly decomposing in the summer heat. One of the police‟s first 
actions at the crime scene was to bring drivers from a company that delivered paraffin in 
Moleleki, who had been repeatedly robbed during deliveries, to “identify” these now rotting 
corpses as the “perpetrators” of the robberies.  
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Close up photographs show a group of young boys still bound together, lying crumpled 
together at various angles in the tall grass. One boy lies face forwards, his identity obscured, 
another boy lies curled in a foetal position, another lies on his back, his knees drawn up and 
his arms twisted upwards, one fist clenched, the other hand reaching toward the sky, other 
boys lie disturbingly vulnerable, flung upon their backs, their faces a parody of sleep. In the 
horrible intimacy of a collective death lies another boy, cradled against the shoulder of the 
headless body of 15-year-old Edward Mootsi, who had been decapitated, his head smashed 
into several pieces and scattered at some distance from his torso (Dwane-Alpman, 1998, p. 
1).  
 
Alfred Buthelezi lies separately, a thick rope still tied around his neck, his stomach gaping 
open, his intestines falling out. In his judgement at the conclusion of the court trial of the 
SDU members charged with involvement in the execution, Justice Boruchowitz noted the 
extremity of violence evidenced by these frozen moments of horror captured in the 
photographs of the crime scene: 
The depth of the brutality involved in the massacre is evident from the photographs that 
were handed in as a bundle marked exhibit D2. All of the deceased had been shot and 
hacked to death and several were disembowelled. One was decapitated. (The State v. 
Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 1768) 
 
A Radical Problem of Understanding 
How are we to make sense of this extraordinary horror? This litany of death, its “excess” and 
it‟s heartbreaking wastage of human life? How can its terrible enigma be understood? 
 
The Moleleki execution, despite its extraordinary horror, was not an isolated incident of 
atrocity. During the four years between the opening up of the South African political process 
in 1990 and the country‟s first popular elections in 1994, violent political conflict, frequently 
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profoundly transgressive in character, claimed the lives of approximately 16 000 people. 
During the preceding five years, between1984-1989, at the height of national uprisings 
against the apartheid state, no more than a quarter of this number died as a result of political 
conflict (Coleman, 1998, p. 243). The Moleleki execution itself was one of 35 “massacres”16 
recorded on the East Rand between 1990 and 1994 (Shaw, 1997, p. 33), where approximately 
3 000 people lost their lives over a period of four years after the opening up of the South 
African political process in 1990 (Shaw, 1997, p. 30). The majority of these deaths, including 
the deaths in Moleleki Extension 2 on the boundary of the township of Katlehong, took place 
within the Kathorus17 sub-region of the East Rand. 
 
Not only did the violence of the 1990s claim more lives than the struggle against the 
apartheid state during the 1980s but there was a dramatic qualitative change in the forms of 
violence during this period, forms which appeared both transgressive and excessive, 
shattering normative boundaries between public and private spaces, including within its orbit 
women, children, the elderly, the unarmed, the defenceless and the “innocent”. People were 
attacked in public places of recreation, transport and worship. Gunmen opened fire on train 
                                            
 
16
 There were some definitional debates regarding what constituted a “massacre” in the post-1990 context, with 
the Human Sciences Research Council defining a massacre as “an incident in which five or more people are 
killed in a single attack perpetrated by one group of attackers only” (Minnaar, Keith & Pretorius, 1994). 
Shaw, in his analysis of violence on the East Rand uses this definition, describing a massacre as “the killing of 
five or more people in a single incident” (Shaw, 1997, pp. 32-33). The Human Rights Committee (HRC), 
another key violence monitoring organisation, simply defined a massacre as “an incident in which 10 or more 
people were killed” (Coleman, 1998, p. 262). Clearly such quantitative definitions are infinitely contestable; 
however, with regard to the Moleleki killings, both the TRC and the court unquestioningly used the term 
massacre, which was the manner in which residents of Moleleki themselves had defined the incident.  
 
17
 Kathorus refers to a collection of three townships, Katlehong, Thokoza and Vosloorus, located in the former 
sub-region of the East Rand adjacent to the greater metropolitan area of Johannesburg, which have now been 
incorporated into the municipality of Ekurhuleni, which means “Place of Peace”. Ekurhuleni is one of South 
Africa‟s most highly industrialised areas and was the site of some of the most extraordinary levels of politicised 
violence during the four year period preceding South Africa‟s first democratic elections. 
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and taxi commuters, people drinking in shebeens
18
 or gathered at meetings. Residents were 
violated in the “ordinary” spaces of their everyday lives, in their homes as they slept, ate or 
watched television, in the playgrounds of schools, in the neighbourhood street. The violence 
perpetrated was often extreme in its bodily mutilations. South Africans were shot, stabbed, 
strangled and burned, their skulls were crushed, babies were hacked to death on mothers‟ 
backs, pregnant women were disembowelled (Moser & Clark, 2001, p. 209).  
 
Within the South African context, the politicised violence of the pre-election period appeared 
to constitute what social analyst Andre du Toit framed at the time as “a radical problem of 
understanding” (A. du Toit, 1993, p. 2). Contemporary social analysts struggled to articulate 
the meanings of the violence, to grasp its significations, its rationalities, its forms of intention. 
Why were people turning to violence at the very moment when a democratic political process 
appeared for the first time imminent; why were the forms that violence was taking so 
profoundly transgressive, so spectacularly “excessive”? 
 
The four years between 1990 and 1994 were marked by an apparent paradox at the heart of 
power, a profound dichotomy between the co-operation and compromise taking place at a 
national level in the negotiation process, which began in 1990, and the increasingly 
internalised conflict ravaging many townships. The brutality and desperation of local politics 
often seemed far removed from the negotiations being held between national political parties. 
The neat binaries of conflict between the apartheid state and the political opposition now 
fractured into a diffusion of conflicts between a variety of groupings (initially most visibly 
                                            
 
18
 Shebeen [she·been ],n, an unlicensed drinking establishment, especially in Ireland, Scotland, and South 
Africa. (Shebeen. Retrieved from The Free Dictionary: http://www.thefreedictionary.com/shebeen) 
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between the recently de-prohibited ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), which entered 
the national arena as a formal political party for the first time after 1990), but as the conflict 
continued over the next four years these early political oppositions diffused and fractured 
further, the boundaries of conflict becoming more parochial, unstable, unpredictable. What 
was the nature of the power that emerged in this context of democratic transition? What was 
the nature of the power in Moleleki where the lines of conflict fractured the boundaries of 
political party opposition, pitting ANC members against each other and producing the horror 
of the execution and the mutilation of children? 
 
A Mutable Truth 
This thesis addresses itself to these struggles of comprehension, not in pursuit of an original 
immutable truth, a secret meaning lying buried with the corpses of the Moleleki atrocity, but 
instead to attempt to understand the ways in which meaning was made of the execution. 
Hence it becomes possible to interrogate the construction of knowledge about the execution 
in terms of a conceptual paradigm in which violence remained an implacable exception to the 
“proper” functioning of juridical power. This conception was an understanding of power and 
of the political, which “takes law as its model and its code” (Agamben, 1998, p. 5). It was a 
notion of power where the site of the material enactment of power and the representation of 
power are conceptually distinct, making possible an “idealised” juridical realm of power, 
separate from its site of violent instantiation (Feldman, 1991, p. 235). The interrogation of the 
construction of knowledge about the Moleleki execution within this juridical conception of 
power makes it possible to make explicit this construction of knowledge about the execution 
in terms of a conceptualisation of power, which made possible only a limited field of 
knowledge about power. This conceptualisation of power, critically, could only conceive of 
violence in an instrumental relation to a juridical power, as a strategic tool used in the pursuit 
of “rationally” conceptualised and articulated political objectives. The violence of the 1990s 
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could not be understood in such terms, its objectives were opaque, its violence 
disproportionate and its targets random.  
 
Therefore the interrogation of the construction of knowledge about the execution, which 
produced and delimited the “truth” that could be known about it, makes possible a wider 
interrogation of the “truth” about power. In the unpacking of this construction of “truth” 
about the execution within a particular “truth” about power, it becomes possible to “re-read” 
the execution in terms of a significantly different conceptualisation of power, a 
conceptualisation of power which incorporates not only the juridical, but also what Foucault 
first conceived of as the “biopolitical”, “the concrete ways in which power penetrates 
subjects‟ very bodies and forms of life” (Foucault cited in Agamben, 1998, p. 5). The 
biopolitical nature of power has, nonetheless, as Agamben argues, remained concealed and 
implicit, as was evidenced in the South African context by the struggles of comprehension 
around the violent conflicts of the 1990s, conflicts which made the biopolitical rather than the 
juridical nature of power so explicit. Agamben concludes: “The „enigmas‟ that our century 
has proposed to historical reason and that remain with us (Nazism is only the most 
disquieting among them) will be solved only on the terrain – biopolitics – on which they were 
formed” (Agamben, 1998, p. 4).  
 
The Articulation of Biopolitical and Juridico-Institutional Power, the “Hidden Nucleus” of 
Sovereign Power 
 
While the “enigmas” posed to historical reason by events such as the Moleleki execution can 
only be grasped through a biopolitical understanding of power, this in itself is not enough. In 
order to function as a whole the juridico-political “machine” requires an articulation between 
the two faces of power, the juridico-institutional and the biopolitical, which occurs through 
what Agamben (1998) calls the structure of exception, which is the mechanism of the relation 
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between “life” and law. If politics is in fact about the ways in which power penetrates 
subjects‟ bodies and lives, and is not simply a juridical politics, then life is in fact the realm 
of the political and this point of articulation between the biopolitical and juridico-institutional 
is about establishing a relationship between the juridico-institutional, the sphere we 
conventionally assume is the domain of the political, and biopolitical life.  
 
This point of articulation between juridical and biopolitical power, between life (biopolitical 
power) and law (juridical power), is also a point of irrevocable ambiguity where what is 
inside or outside the juridico-political order remains unclear, the boundaries between the two 
dissolving into each other and the edges of the juridico-institutional order always ambiguous 
and fragile, neither completely excluding or including the biopolitical life that forms its 
border. It is this uncertain articulation between juridico-institutional and biopolitical power, 
through the relation of exception, that Agamben argues is the “hidden nucleus” (Agamben, 
1998, p. 6) of sovereign power. This realm of exception on the boundaries of the juridico-
political order is also a space of anomie, a realm of what Benjamin calls “pure violence”, 
violence without any relation to law (Benjamin cited in Agamben, 2005, p. 61), violence 
whose very “excess”, its normative violations, its “exceeding” of law and of norm, are in fact 
the mechanism of the relation of sovereign power.  
 
Critical though the articulation between biopolitical and juridico-institutional power through 
the relation of exception may be, particularly for an exploration of violence, it appears as a 
“vanishing point” in the “entire Western reflection on power” (Agamben, 1998, p. 6). The 
two faces of power, whose articulation is, for Agamben, the real locus of sovereignty, are 
instead conflated and obscured within the modern juridical concept of sovereignty in which 
biopolitical power remains hidden and implicit.  
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This thesis takes its cue from Agamben‟s central theoretical problematic, namely to 
investigate, through the event of the Moleleki execution, this intersection of biopolitical and 
juridico-institutional power, this ambiguous “how” of the exception, the “how” of sovereign 
power in the exception over two critical historical conjunctures, the moment immediately 
prior to South Africa‟s first popular elections, a significant period of biopolitical power, and 
the moment of post-apartheid political reconstruction, a period of juridico-institutional power 
that sought to usurp and contain the biopolitics of the past.  
 
The Moleleki execution, an expression of biopolitical power 
The execution itself was an unequivocal expression of biopolitical power, an inscription of 
sovereign violence on the bodies of Moleleki citizens that took place in a moment of national 
juridico-political exception, of suspension of the juridico-political order during the 
negotiation process, a moment of exception, which signalled, not a “paradox” in the 
“dichotomy” of violence and negotiations, but a condition of exception in which, as Schmitt 
argues, “Order must be established for juridical order to make sense” (Agamben, 1998, p. 
16). It was this condition of exception, in which the Moleleki execution took place, which 
created the very conditions of possibility for the juridico-political order of post-apartheid 
South Africa. At operation in the struggles of juridico-political ordering in Moleleki township 
during the year after it was established was what Schmitt defines as “the essence of state 
sovereignty” (p. 16), namely the sovereign monopoly over the decision on the exception, 
which makes possible “the creation and definition of the very space in which the juridico-
political order can have validity” (p. 19, own emphasis). 
 
If, as Schmitt argues, the essence of sovereign authority is the decision on the exception, it 
was in the decision on this ambiguous margin, which attempts to trace a threshold, a 
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boundary between inside and outside the juridico-political order, that formed the frontier of 
conflict between the ANCYL and the SDU in the township of Moleleki Extension 2. The 
struggle around these boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, boundaries inscribed in territory 
and bodies, and the struggle to fix these boundaries against the irreducible ambiguity of the 
exception, shaped the conflict which unfolded in the year after Moleleki Extension 2 was 
established and finally materialised in the horror of the execution.  
 
However, as Agamben argues, the exception, is in fact, “unlocalizable” “When our age tried 
to grant the unlocalizable a permanent and visible localization, the result was the 
concentration camp” (Agamben, 1998, p. 20). Critically, in Moleleki, which was established 
in 1992 as a political party homogeneity, an “ANC township”, the localisation of the 
exception became not only about a struggle to tie land to juridical order but, as the conflict 
intensified, became a struggle around the transformation of “life” itself, if the political is, as 
Agamben argues, not about a supplement or an attribute to life, but is about life itself. Thus 
the struggle in Moleleki to define the boundaries of the political community also concerned a 
struggle around the right of the sovereign to define what was political life with the rights to 
the protection of this political community, and what was “bare life”, “simple natural life”, 
which falls outside the political community. It is the ambiguous figure of “homo sacer” 
(sacred life), “who may be killed and yet not sacrificed” (Agamben, 1998, p. 8) and who is 
“included in the juridical order...solely in the form of its exclusion (that is, of its capacity to 
be killed)” (Agamben, 1998, p. 8), that embodies the relation of exception that defines the 
boundaries of the political community. The attempt to irrevocably define the boundaries of 
the political community in Moleleki, and grant the exception at the boundaries of the political 
community a permanent and visible location, led ultimately to the atrocity of the execution 
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and the localisation of the exception in the bodies of the Moleleki executed, produced as 
homo sacer, biopolitical artifacts of sovereign power. 
 
A Juridico-Political Adjudication of the Moleleki Execution 
The 1993 Moleleki execution provides a unique opportunity to explore the intersection of 
biopolitical and juridico-institutional power as the biopolitical power of the execution became 
the object of investigation within two separate post-apartheid institutional contexts, the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the South African court, in the five 
years following the country‟s first popular elections in 1994.  
 
In 1997, four years after the execution had taken place, murder and kidnapping charges were 
brought by the state against seven Moleleki SDU members allegedly involved in the 
execution. A year later, after the establishment of the TRC, 13 SDU members applied to the 
Commission for amnesty for their involvement in the execution on the grounds of political 
motive. The legal proceedings against the seven facing charges compiled by the Attorney 
General were suspended while the amnesty application of the SDU members was being 
heard.  
 
However the SDU members were eventually denied amnesty on the grounds that the 
execution had not been politically motivated, but was a criminally motivated act of revenge 
for the killing of Moleleki Extension 2 SDU leader Malusi Jackson Keyana in the hours 
preceding the execution.  
 
The legal process around the Moleleki execution then continued in court, with seven SDU 
members standing trial for their part in the execution. In August 1998, five of the accused 
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were found guilty of participation in the execution on the grounds of a “common purpose” to 
“associate” with a “common plan” to commit the killings and were given life terms of 
imprisonment.  
These processes of juridico-political inscription around the execution reflected another 
critical struggle of exception, the struggle to establish a relation between anomie and law, to 
inscribe within the post-apartheid juridico-political order this anomic violence through a 
relation of exception, ultimately to capture “pure violence as the extreme political object, as 
the „thing‟ of politics”, a struggle which, Agamben argues, “is as decisive for Western 
politics as the struggle for „pure being‟ of Western metaphysics” (Agamben, 2005, pp. 59-
60).  
 
However, these processes of inscription, both within the TRC and the courtroom proceedings, 
were structured by an explicitly instrumental understanding of power, an instrumentality 
which sought to “capture” violence by making it an instrumental object, a tool of juridico-
institutional power, a project which was however confounded by the ambiguity of the relation 
of exception, through which the juridico-political order implicitly, attempted to effect a 
relation between juridico-institutional power and the anomic violence of the execution.  
 
Instead, the violence of the execution and the adjudication of its biopolitical power by 
juridical power made explicit a fiction at the heart of the juridico-institutional system, 
namely, the mythological separation of the origin of power from its effects (Feldman, 1991), 
which makes possible a conception of an instrumental relation between the cause (of power) 
that is external to the effects of power.  
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The juridico-institutional order is premised on establishing these instrumental relations 
between cause and effect. Because they are grounded in a “mythological” separation between 
the origin and effect of power and the relation between the two is not merely a logical 
operation, i.e. an “internal nexus that allows one to be derived immediately from the other” 
(Agamben, 2005, p. 40), the tracing of this relation requires in each instance, a practical 
process. Thus the juridico-institutional order provides, through a process of institutional 
investigation, an institutional guarantee of the reality of this relation between cause and 
effect, where the biopolitical act is merely a “derivative symptom” (Feldman, 1991, p. 3) of 
an originary source of power.   
 
Implicit in these assumed instrumental relations of cause and effect, which the juridico-
institutional order attempts to practically establish and adjudicate, is, however, a wholly 
different and more complex relation, the relation of exception, the point of articulation 
between biopolitical and juridico-institutional power, a point of infinite mutability and 
enormous ambiguity.  
 
The processes of juridico-political inscription around the Moleleki execution evidenced these 
systematic institutional processes, which sought and struggled to trace this relation between 
cause and effect through a relation of exception, when such a relation of ambiguity could in 
fact only render an inevitably mutable conclusion. This process of inscription began from the 
moment the bodies of the Moleleki dead were first laid on the tables of mortuary pathologists 
where they were inscribed in a medical hermeneutics. This medical hermeneutics attempted 
to translate these wounds into a linguistic narrative of cause and effect, through the reading of 
the traumata of the body. This enabled the pathologist to “ventriloquise” for the mute body in 
order to produce a medico-legal conclusion on the “cause of death” (Pugliese, 2002, 369). 
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These “causes”, however, would later be extensively contested in the court room processes 
around the Moleleki execution.  
 
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Moleleki execution, an act 
associated with a political objective 
 
The subsequent processes of the TRC similarly sought to inscribe the Moleleki execution in a 
relation of instrumentality as the Commission, established in 1996, sought to inaugurate and 
institutionalise a new juridico-political order in South Africa. The Commission endeavoured 
to institutionally effect an instrumental relation between acts associated with a political 
objective, in order to conjure a relation between a juridically defined political motive 
(essentially a party political motive), and the bloody violence which had been committed in 
strategic pursuit of these “political” objectives during the conflicts of the past. In the 
institutional evocation and adjudication of this instrumental relation, the TRC sought, 
paradoxically, to sever this relation, to make of this relation an exception, explicitly 
constituting this violence of the “past” in an instrumental relation to the “politics” of the 
“past” as a strategic tool used by rational actors in pursuit of “proportional” ends. However, 
this relation implicitly indicated a far more complex relation with this past of violent 
biopolitical power. This was a past that would in fact remain ever present, as an exception 
that could make possible the constitution and continuation of the present political, critically, a 
juridico-political present, a relation that is “cosubstantial”, as Agamben argues, “with 
Western politics” (Agamben, 1998, p. 7).  
 
If the relation between cause and effect, origin and source of power, is in fact “mythological” 
and a practical activity is required to establish this relation, the processes of the TRC and the 
courtroom each adjudicated the actions of the protagonists of the Moleleki execution on 
different terms; however, both established the relation between cause and effect through an 
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adjudication of the juridical subjecthood of the Moleleki protagonists, specifically an 
interrogation of their “intent” to carry out the actions for which they stood before the 
juridico-institutional apparatus of the post-apartheid state. The nature of this “intent” 
appeared significantly different within the two institutional contexts, namely, the assertion of 
a political motive in the context of the TRC and a refutation of criminal intent or mens rea in 
the legal proceedings which followed. However, while the processes appeared different, they 
were in fact critically co-ordinated, together forming the boundaries of post-apartheid power, 
for “the outlaw, the Friedlos, or the convict, [is] historically the symbol of the outside upon 
whose body and life the boundaries of the political community could be built” (Hansen & 
Stepputat, 2005, p. 15). 
 
In the context of the TRC, the grounds of the adjudication of the Moleleki execution were an 
interrogation of the political motive of the protagonists of the execution in terms of a 
conception of the political in which the act, the gross violation of human rights, was merely a 
derivative symptom of this political motive, an act associated with a political objective, 
which required an instrumental legitimation of power. In this juridical conception of the 
political, the strategic interests of the political party form the basis of the political motive, and 
derived logically from this is the political intent of the subject, whose actions, when 
adjudicated, merely represent a reflection of this “external” origin of power. The Moleleki 
protagonists‟ failure to demonstrate this instrumental relation between their actions and a 
juridically conceived political motive, led the TRC to conclude:  
On the evidence as a whole, we are satisfied that members of the SDU and the 
ANCYL, who both belonged to the ANC, were embroiled in a conflict over control of 
Moleleki section. They accused one another of being involved in criminal activities 
under the pretext of protecting the community. 
 
Having regard to the motive for the massacre, the context in which it occurred, in 
particular, the fact that the attack was not directed at a political opponent, we are 
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satisfied that the killing of the deceased was not an act associated with a political 
objective as contemplated in the Act. (TRC, 1998c, own emphasis) 
 
Thus the Moleleki execution failed the test of political exceptionality, which could have 
released the Moleleki protagonists from criminal liability for their actions. In their assertions 
of the “spontaneity” of their actions and the “criminality” of their opponents, they were 
unable to articulate an instrumental relation between their actions and a prior juridically-
conceived political intent. Critically, they failed the test of exception because in the paradigm 
of juridico-political power in terms of which the TRC conducted its processes, “the political” 
was the party political. SDU members‟ evocation of a notion of “community” in whose 
defence they purportedly acted, and their articulation of the threat to this “community” as the 
figure of the criminal, rather than the party political opponent, meant that the biopolitical 
nature of power and the sovereign conflict over the territory of Moleleki remained hidden and 
implicit. This was, however, a conflict, which as Schmitt argues, creates the very conditions 
of possibility for the juridico-political order (Schmitt cited in Agamben, 1998). 
 
However, this boundary of criminality, which, as Buur (2006) has argued, gives voice to 
polyvalent concerns of social disorder  (p. 2), articulated by both the SDU and ANCYL in the 
proceedings of the TRC and the court trial, was actually an attempt to articulate and 
materially instantiate the boundaries of sovereign power in Moleleki. The body of the 
criminal, as the Comaroffs have argued in relation to the post-apartheid state, becomes the 
“alibi” against which the integrity of the political “community” can be substantiated 
(Comaroff & Comaroff, 2004, p. 4).  
  
Inherent in this one decision on the Moleleki execution was an ongoing process of definition 
of power and the construction of knowledge about power in the immediate post-apartheid 
 31 
 
period, which sought to circumscribe the boundaries of the post-apartheid political as the 
juridical political, but which remained implicitly co-ordinated with the biopolitical. 
Therefore, the struggle of articulation between life and law remained hidden, law‟s fragile 
hold on life assumed, its sovereign violences once again “inexplicable” in this new context of 
constitutional power.  
 
What then was the nature of this act that took place in a context of exception, of juridical 
suspension, “the nature of the human praxis that is wholly delivered over to a juridical void?” 
(Agamben, 2005, p. 49). The process of adjudication of this human praxis in the context of 
the TRC had concluded that this action could not be defined in terms of the exception of 
political violence, which could have exempted the protagonists from legal accountability. 
How then could its violence now be properly adjudicated?  
 
The trial of the Moleleki accused, an association with a common purpose 
The subsequent legal adjudication of the actions of the Moleleki accused revealed the 
complexity of the articulation of life to law, the difficulties of welding norm and reality 
together through a relation of exception. The Moleleki execution exposed the difficulties of 
the application of the juridical norm established by the processes of the TRC in a trial which 
attempted to apply this norm to a particular case. As each case “always involves a plurality of 
subjects” that requires the pronunciation of a sentence which institutionally guarantees law‟s 
reference to life (Agamben, 2005, p. 40). 
 
This struggle to articulate life to law was revealed in particular with regard to the actions of 
the Moleleki protagonists, which “betray[ed] the impossibility…of clearly defining the legal 
consequences” (Agamben, 2005, p. 49) of those acts committed during a context of 
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exception, which Agamben argues, is in fact the context of the political. During the final 
decade of apartheid this difficulty of welding the law to life became increasingly explicit as 
the momentum of political resistance to the state rapidly escalated and the apartheid state 
intensified its efforts to use the law to adjudicate “the political”, more correctly, to foreclose 
“the political” by criminalising it. As Parker argues:  
Where the threat to the ruler‟s law and order is collectively based, it is society itself 
that needs to be deterred. Western criminal law is inadequate to the task of 
subjugating a people, because it demands responsibility to be individually determined 
before the guilty can be punished. Punishing individuals, however, deters individuals, 
not societies, which is why the security needs of the colonial state everywhere corrupt 
the values of the rule of law. (Parker, 1996, pp. 101-102) 
 
The difficulty of the articulation of this political to law, within a relation of instrumental 
causality, by providing legal evidence of a causal connection between the death of each of the 
victims and the actions of each of the accused (a causal requirement usually necessary for 
criminal liability for murder) was particularly acute in relation to the Moleleki execution as 
the only “witnesses” to the actual acts of murder involved in the execution were the young 
survivors Vuyani Tshabalala and Albert Mangane, who both had their backs towards the 
accused and hence could not provide reliable identificatory evidence.  
 
This meant that Judge Boruchowitz abandoned the attempt to establish this relation of 
causality in favour of the application of the “doctrine of common purpose”, which required 
evidence merely of “an association” with a “common purpose” to commit a crime in order to 
secure a conviction. He found therefore that: 
there is some evidence that certain of the accused contributed causally to the deaths of 
the deceased, but that evidence is insufficient to render all of the accused criminally 
responsible. For that reason the state relies heavily on the doctrine of common 
purpose as enunciated in S v Mgedezi and others 1989 1 SA 687A at 705F-706B. 
(The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 1773)  
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The S v Mgedzi judgement was essentially an elaboration of what became an infamous court 
judgement, in which six people, who later became internationally known as the “Sharpeville 
Six”, who formed part of a large crowd that had marched to the home of the deputy mayor of 
Lekoa in Sharpeville township
19
 in 1984 during uprisings in the area at the time, were 
convicted and eventually sentenced to death in terms of the doctrine of “common purpose”. 
There was in fact no evidence linking the accused to the deputy mayor‟s death, as Judge 
Botha of the South African appellate division himself stated – “It has not been proved in the 
case of any of the six accused convicted of murder that their conduct had contributed causally 
to the death of the deceased” (Parker, 1996, pp. 96-97) – but the decision was upheld by the 
Appellate Division
20
 of the South African courts, which in the face of rising incidents of 
crowd violence in the context of political resistance to the state simply abandoned the notion 
of causation in favour of the concept of an “active association” with a common purpose to 
commit a crime.  
 
In the case of the Moleleki execution, as in many other instances of collective political 
violence which were adjudicated by the South African courts, the impossibility of applying 
the critical precepts of Western law, namely a relation of individual causality to a particular 
crime in the context of the exception, the context of the political, was evidenced in the 
acknowledgement by Justice Boruchowitz at the conclusion of the trial of SDU members that 
“there is evidence that not all offenders have been brought to book” (Sindane, 1999).  
 
                                            
 
19
 In the Vaal region of the former Witwatersrand. 
20
 The Appellate Division, which was renamed the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa in 1996, was the 
highest court of appeal in South Africa at the time of the Sharpeville judgement. (Retrieved from Supreme Court 
of Appeal of South Africa: http://www.justice.gov.za/sca/index.htm) 
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Although not all the offenders involved in the Moleleki execution were brought to trial and 
the principle of a causal relation had effectively been suspended through the use of the 
doctrine of common purpose, in order to make it possible to weld law to life, the final 
conviction of five of the Moleleki accused (however imperfectly achieved) made it possible 
for Justice Boruchowitz to publicly reiterate the norm of law: “This sentence will send a 
message to the perpetrators to discontinue committing careless, savage and brutal actions” 
(Sindane, 1999), a “message” that sought to re-affirm law‟s hold on “savage and brutal” life, 
a capturing of anomie critically decisive for the Western juridico-political order.  
 
Despite the ambiguities of the articulation of the juridico-political to the biopolitical through 
the relation of exception which the Moleleki execution demonstrated, an articulation which, 
according to Agamben is, “founded on an essential fiction” (Agamben, 2005, p. 86) that 
maintains law in a relation to life, this articulation is critically important, “as long as the two 
elements [the juridico-institutional and biopolitical] remain correlated yet conceptually, 
temporally, and subjectively distinct their dialectic – though founded on a fiction – can 
nevertheless function in some way” (Agamben, 2005, p. 86).  
 
Methodology 
Introduction 
While one brutal incident of violence stands at the centre of this thesis, the nature of the 
investigation undertaken here is not primarily an empirical one that seeks to uncover new 
“facts” about the Moleleki execution. It is rather an investigation of the construction of 
knowledge around the “fact” of violence, the bloody corpses of the Moleleki dead. In this 
unpacking of the construction of knowledge about the execution within a juridical discourse 
on power, it becomes possible to re-read the Moleleki execution within a different discourse 
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on power, as an exposure of sovereign exception at the boundaries of the juridico-political 
order.  
 
Thus this dissertation seeks to understand the construction of knowledge around the Moleleki 
execution as part of a particular construction of knowledge about power in both the period of 
negotiated transition and the immediate post-apartheid period. During the post-apartheid 
period this construction of knowledge about power sought to found the sovereignty of the 
post-apartheid state in terms of a new norm, a norm of human rights, in which violence would 
be an implacable exception to the proper functioning of juridical power. Within this context, 
the Moleleki execution was produced as a malleable object in the institutional contexts of the 
TRC and the courtroom. 
 
This thesis, therefore, not only seeks to expose a particular construction of knowledge about 
power, but is also concerned with the way in which this construction of knowledge about 
power has produced power in the institutional matrices of the TRC and the courtroom. In this 
concern, this thesis is informed by a line of investigation articulated by Michel Foucault as 
pouvoir-savoir, “power/knowledge” (Gordon, 1980, p. 233), i.e. a refusal “to separate off 
knowledge from power” (Rabinow, 1991, p. 7), which led Foucault to explore the way in 
which this power/ knowledge nexus has led, since the 18th century, to the creation of “new 
„technologies‟ for the governance of people”, as “Man” becomes simultaneously a “subject 
and object of knowledge” (Gordon, 1980, p. 234). We can see these processes of 
objectification and subjectification at work in the juridico-political inscription of the Moleleki 
execution.  
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Genealogy/Archaeology 
The unpacking of the construction of knowledge about an object of investigation, rather than 
a direct investigation of the object itself, clearly requires a specific methodological approach. 
In this line of investigation, this dissertation draws on the genealogical/archaeological 
methodologies proposed by Foucault, which seek not an “originary truth” but “a form of 
history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects, 
etc.” (Foucault, 1977a, p. 59).  
 
While genealogy seeks the external conditions of the constitution of knowledge, archaeology 
seeks to expose the internal “rules of formation” of discourse that constitute the conceptual 
terrain in which knowledge is formed and produced (Young, 1981, p. 48). Both 
methodologies work in close association with each other. Critically, in his genealogical 
method, Foucault opposes himself to a metaphysical conception of “truth” and instead seeks 
to historicize the development of the concept of “truth”, our “will to truth”, and the various 
discursive and social practices that have accompanied this pursuit of “truth” in different 
historical periods. For Foucault, “truth” is both a product of power and itself produces 
“effects” of power:  
Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of 
constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of 
truth, its “general politics” of truth: that is the types of discourse which it accepts and 
makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish 
true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and 
procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are 
charged with saying what counts as true. (Foucault, 1977a, pp. 72-73) 
 
In order to expose this “regime of truth”, Foucault proposes a genealogical method which 
recovers two types of “subjugated knowledges” that have been “disqualified” by “global 
totalitarian theories” (Foucault, 1976, p. 80). These subjugated knowledges include 
“historical knowledge of struggles” as well as “popular knowledge”. Archaeology, according 
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to Foucault, provides a method for analysing “local discursivities”, and “genealogy” is the 
“tactics whereby, on the basis of the descriptions of these local discursivities, the subjected 
knowledges which were thus released would be brought into play” (Foucault, 1976, p. 85). 
 
This dissertation takes its cue from Foucault‟s methodology in seeking to locate the 
production of “truth” about the Moleleki execution within a particular historical conjuncture, 
namely the transition to democratic governance, which created the conditions of possibility 
for the “truth” about power that the TRC as an institution was established to fix and delineate, 
and the limits of this “truth about power”, which were fixed at the boundaries of the law in 
the courtroom processes where the Moleleki execution was finally adjudicated.  
 
This endeavour has been made possible by the deployment of “subjugated knowledges”, 
namely an attention to the “singularity of the event” (Foucault, 1971, p. 76) against assumed 
teleologies of history and the recovery of the body as the “inscribed surface of events”, a 
genealogy that is “thus situated with the articulation of the body and history” (Foucault, 1971, 
p. 83). In addition, in recovering “popular knowledge” of this event through attention to the 
voices of the various protagonists in the struggles that led to the Moleleki execution, this 
dissertation has sought not a “primitive empiricism” (Foucault, 1976, p. 81) but an attention 
to the dispersion and diffusion of these voices, which refuted the totalising discourses within 
the institutional contexts of the TRC and the courtroom.   
 
Thus this dissertation seeks to utilise these “subjugated knowledges” to investigate the ways 
in which the discourse on power within the TRC and the courtroom processes that followed, 
constrained and produced what could be known about the Moleleki execution, to investigate 
what Foucault called the “order of discourse”, the conceptual terrain in which knowledge is 
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formed and produced. (Young, 1981, p. 48) and in this process to make explicit a juridical 
discourse on power, whose “discursive rules and categories” were a priori an assumed part of 
knowledge, “so fundamental that they remained unvoiced and unthought” (Young, 1981, p. 
48). In making explicit what was “unthought” and assumed, this dissertation seeks to make it 
possible to think beyond the juridical categories, which have so far constrained our 
knowledge about power, in order to make explicit the biopolitical nature of the power the 
Moleleki execution represented. However, this “biopolitical” nature of power, which fell 
outside juridical conceptions of power, appeared “beyond comprehension” in the institutional 
contexts of the TRC and the courtroom when articulated by SDU members. Both institutions 
consequently struggled to produce a coherent institutional “truth” about this incident, its 
violence remaining essentially an enigma, “a radical problem of understanding”. 
 
An Encounter with the Moleleki Execution 
I first encountered the incident of violence which is explored here, namely the Moleleki 
execution, while working as a researcher at a small non-governmental organisation called 
Peace Action, which was established to monitor and respond to the dramatic escalation of 
violence in the country during the lead-up to South Africa‟s first democratic elections. Unlike 
other monitoring organisations operating at the time, Peace Action did not primarily rely on 
press reports of violence, but employed fieldworkers to record first-hand accounts from 
people who had experienced violence. It also set up a contact line, which was operated by 
volunteers 24 hours a day, for residents from affected areas to call and request assistance or 
intervention. In addition, the organisation did a considerable amount of monitoring of the 
weekly funerals of those who had died during the ongoing conflict. As a researcher at the 
organisation, I participated in these activities and was, like my co-workers, exposed to a 
considerable amount of violence and the trauma of those who had lost family, relatives or 
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friends or who had been directly attacked. However, among the welter of violence we all 
worked with on a daily basis, the Moleleki execution, coming on the eve of the country‟s first 
democratic elections, and so explicitly contesting the primary patterns of violence at the time, 
namely the fault line of conflict between the IFP and ANC, evoked for me a “a radical 
problem of understanding”. This was no doubt produced by the horror of the incident itself 
and its spectacular brutality. Peace Action had previously worked with the SDU and civic 
association in Moleleki Extension 2. It was a civic leader from Moleleki that Peace Action 
had worked with previously, who “escaped” the execution and first came to report the 
incident to the organisation. I took his statement.  
 
While a researcher at the TRC, I encountered the Moleleki execution again. Here five 
mothers of the young boys who had died in the execution made statements to the TRC‟s 
Human Rights Committee. Recounting the events surrounding the death of their sons, these 
mothers clearly understood that the violence had occurred in a “political context” and they 
were consequently found by the Human Rights Committee to be victims of “gross violations 
of human rights”, i.e. the violations they had suffered had been “political” in nature. 
However, when a group of 13 SDU members later applied to the TRC for amnesty, where a 
more rigid and quasi-legal set of criteria were applied to adjudicate the “political” nature of 
their acts, they were denied amnesty, primarily on the basis that their actions had not been 
“politically motivated” and therefore were not political in nature. Five of the protagonists 
were later sentenced to life terms of imprisonment for their role in the execution.  
 
Documentary material 
Because the Moleleki execution has been the subject of adjudication in two institutional 
contexts, namely the TRC and the courtroom, it has generated a particularly rich body of 
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documentary material for analysis. While the amnesty hearing of the SDU applicants heard 
evidence from 13 SDU members over seven days and generated more than 700 pages of 
transcripts, the court proceedings generated approximately 2000 pages of transcript. Read 
against each other, these transcripts made it possible to trace the successive processes of 
juridical inscription around the Moleleki execution and the way in which these institutional 
contexts both constrained and produced what could be known about the execution. In the 
context of the TRC, the success of SDU members‟ applications depended on their “full 
disclosure” of the incidents of violence in which they had been involved, which meant that 
that these applicants gave significant amounts of detail about the execution and the 
circumstances in which it occurred.  
 
However, in the context of the court case, the strictly legal nature of the process significantly 
constrained what could be said about the execution and how it could be said. The fact that 
admitting involvement in violence could lead the SDU members to be sentenced to jail terms 
meant that all the SDU members who stood trial denied their involvement in the execution. It 
was less the falsehood of SDU members‟ testimony in the courtroom that was of interest, 
than the way in which the legal discourses utilised in this context, and the alibi defences used 
by the Moleleki protagonists, both limited and produced a particular construction of 
knowledge around the execution, which was different to the knowledge produced about the 
execution, and the way it was constituted as an object, within the context of the TRC.  
 
The amnesty processes around the execution were less constrained by a rigid juridical 
discourse. The TRC Committee‟s desire to understand the “context” in which the Moleleki 
execution took place, created the opportunity for a more detailed picture of the events 
surrounding the execution to emerge. On the one hand this provided useful information to 
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build an outline of the details and sequences of events in Moleleki, which made it possible to 
describe the incident and the struggles around it coherently. However, the primary focus of 
the analysis of these transcripts was to understand the construction of knowledge around 
these “facts” of the execution within this particular institutional context. While the analytic 
approach adopted was not a traditional “discourse analysis”, seeking to unpack hidden 
meaning within the texts, the interactions between the TRC Committee and the SDU 
members, and the mutual incomprehension which many of these interactions evoked, was 
particularly valuable in exposing the contradictions and ambiguities created by the attempt to 
inscribe the Moleleki execution within a juridical discourse on power. Reading the responses 
of the Moleleki applicants against this dominant discourse made it possible to free this 
“subjugated knowledge”, as a tactical strategy to understand the construction of knowledge 
around the Moleleki execution in terms of a particular genealogy of power. 
 
In-depth interviewing and focus group 
In addition to the analysis of the documentary evidence around the execution, a further 
research strategy involved in-depth interviews and a focus group conducted with various 
actors, in an effort to free “subjugated knowledges” around the execution, in particular the 
“popular knowledge” of protagonists in the conflict, which had been constrained by the 
institutional contexts in which this knowledge had previously been articulated. To this end I 
held in-depth interviews with four of the SDU members who had been imprisoned for their 
involvement in the execution during August 2001 at Leeuwkop prison maximum security 
prison north of Johannesburg.  I received permission from the Department of Correctional 
Services to interview the five SDU members jailed for life terms for the execution. The 
interviews were conducted after receiving the informed consent of the men to participate in 
the research process. One SDU member did not give his consent and was consequently 
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excluded. However, what was notable was the willingness of the other four SDU members to 
participate in the interview process and engage in wide-ranging discussions during protracted 
interviews of at least two hours, as well as a readiness to show a considerable level of 
vulnerability and complexity of emotion regarding their actions. Oscar Motlokwa, for 
instance, while willingly admitting to the killing of young ANCYL members, shed tears of 
shame and anger regarding his conviction for the murder of his neighbour and colleague, the 
young civic activist Bulelwa Zwane, for which he denies responsibility.  
 
I conducted interviews using a semi-structured interview protocol. During the interview 
process I was accompanied by a former Peace Action fieldworker, Jabu Dlamini, who was 
familiar with the Moleleki execution and who has worked for many years on the East Rand. 
She administered the questionnaire on my behalf in the language respondents felt they were 
most comfortable with. I sat with Jabu, listening and contributing to the interview process. 
After most questions, Jabu would translate the responses of the interviewees and I would ask 
further questions if necessary. There is no doubt that in these processes of translation and 
retranslation nuances were lost and meaning in some cases may even have been distorted. 
The problem was further exacerbated by the fact that prison authorities did not allow me to 
carry a digital recorder into the interviews so that the interviewees‟ responses could be 
directly recorded and then translated. Despite these limitations, Jabu Dlamini‟s intimate 
knowledge of the conflict on the East Rand and of the Moleleki incident in particular, helped 
mitigate these problems, as she was able to probe and develop the themes in the questionnaire 
based on her own knowledge, in interaction with myself.  
 
Basic biographical details of the interviewees revealed that these four SDU members were 
men in their thirties and forties with established families, who had been engaged in long-term 
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employment prior to the execution, and were not the “alienated” youth portrayed in most 
literature portrayed SDU members as. It appeared that is was their social “rootedness” rather 
than their social dislocation, as posited by many commentators, which had propelled them to 
participate in the defensive structures established in South African townships during the 
1990s. Other questions elicited information about the township of Moleleki itself, as well as 
the political conflict in South Africa and within Moleleki at the time of the execution. Further 
interview questions inquired about the SDU structure in Moleleki, as well as these members‟ 
own motivations for participation in SDUs. Questions also sought to elicit a more detailed 
understanding of the sources of division and contention in Moleleki and interviewees‟ 
understandings of violence within this context.  
 
Interestingly, what the SDU members said in these interviews did not differ significantly 
from what had been said in the institutional contexts of the TRC and to a lesser extent, the 
courtroom process, particularly in terms of their articulation of their role in Moleleki in terms 
of a concept of “community defence”. Thus, rather than articulating their role in terms of a 
party political division, they evoked the biopolitical fracture between bare life and “political 
life”, which is substantiated against the boundary of homo sacer, the “criminal”. However, 
these discourses on power remained as disqualified knowledge within the institutional 
contexts in which they had been articulated. In their repetition during the in-depth interviews, 
it became evident that attention needed to be paid to this “subjugated knowledge” in pursuit 
of an understanding of the nature of the conflict in Moleleki and the construction of 
knowledge about it.  
 
In addition to interviews with the SDU members themselves, during 2001 I also held in-depth 
semi-structured interviews with the mothers of three of the victims of the execution. Two of 
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these interviews took place at the homes of the mothers who still lived in Moleleki Extension 
2, while another mother was interviewed at her place of employment as a domestic worker on 
the East Rand. I was again accompanied by Jabu Dlamini who assisted with translation where 
this was required. The interviews were recorded and later transcribed. It was clear that these 
mothers, nearly eight years after the death of their children, were still severely traumatised. 
We interviewed Edward Mootsi‟s mother, Tina Mootsi, at the home where she was employed 
as a domestic worker. Tina broke down in uncontrollable tears while recounting the events 
surrounding the death of her fifteen-year-old son, who had been shot and decapitated during 
the execution. She had received psychological counselling but still struggled to manage the 
grief of this loss.  
 
In general, besides eliciting the mothers‟ experiences around the loss of their children, these 
interviews also focused on the women‟s perceptions of the sources of conflict in Moleleki, 
their experience of SDU members in Moleleki prior to the execution as well as their 
perception of the subsequent amnesty and criminal judicial processes. Particularly significant 
information to emerge from these interviews was the close ties between some of the relatives 
of the Moleleki dead and SDU members. Elphina Mugadi, the mother of one of the deceased 
victims, Isaac Mugadi, described a particularly close association with SDU member Zola 
Sonti on the basis of a common geographical origin, the Eastern Cape, and a common 
language, Xhosa, denoting in this closeness the ambiguity of the biopolitical fracture that 
mediated the boundaries of the “community” in Moleleki.  
 
Finally I also held a focus group interview with members of the ANCYL in Moleleki during 
2001, in order to elicit information about the contest for sovereign authority in Moleleki from 
the perspective of ANCYL members, a perspective which had emerged in a limited fashion 
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within the context of the TRC and the courtroom largely through the testimony of ANCYL 
and civic leader Lethusang Rikaba. Jabu Dhlamini assisted with translation. The focus group 
took place in Moleleki Extension 2 where most of the interviewees were still living. The 
interview was recorded and transcribed. In contrast to the SDU members whom I had 
interviewed, who presented themselves as mature, articulate, and grounded adults with a firm 
grasp of their identity and role within the Moleleki community, the group of ANCYL 
members I met were notable for their youthful appearance and demeanour, hesitant 
articulation, withdrawn manner and still evident signs of trauma. They appeared to embody 
marginalisation as young people literally living on the boundaries of the community. They 
relied significantly on ANCYL leader Lethusang Rikaba for the articulation of their concerns. 
The intention of the focus group was to acquire basic biographical information about the 
ANCYL members and explanations as to why they had joined the Youth League. The focus 
group was also directed to acquiring the perspective of the ANCYL members on the 
processes that had led to the execution, the division between the ANCYL and the SDU, and 
the role they believed the SDU had played in Moleleki. It was through this process that it was 
possible to read against the SDU testimony a different discourse around the conflict, 
primarily centred on the notion of rights, drawn from the discourse of the ANC and allied 
organisations.  
Chapter Outline 
 Chapter 2, “Analysing a Condition of Exception” seeks to explore the “radical problem of 
understanding” posed by incidents of violence such as the Moleleki execution that took place 
in a context of exception and suspension of juridico-political order. The chapter does this by 
locating the Moleleki execution within a broader investigation of the juridical terms in which 
South African analysts attempted to understand the “exceptionality” of the conflict of the 
1990s. These analysts assumed that this state of exception was a consequence of a breakdown 
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of juridico-political order and the political sovereignty of the state, a lacuna in law, rather 
than an exposure of sovereign exception, at the boundaries of the juridico-political order. The 
chapter reviews the extensive literature, which the conflict of the period generated, in order to 
expose the aporia of these analyses, which struggled to recognise the nature of the exception 
that lay before them as something outside, rather than inside the juridical order. It was these 
conceptual aporiae which were reproduced in the subsequent institutional contexts of the 
TRC and the courtroom which formally adjudicated the Moleleki execution, replicating in 
these contexts the “radical problem of understanding” encountered by South African analysts 
who had earlier attempted to interpret the nature of the conflict of the 1990s.  
 
Having re-read the violence of the 1990s as an exposure of sovereignty at the boundaries of 
the juridico-political order, Chapter 3, “A Struggle of Juridico-Political Ordering”, 
empirically investigates this “exposure” of sovereignty during the negotiation period prior to 
South Africa‟s first democratic election in terms of the originary struggles of sovereign 
exception between the ANCYL and the SDU in Moleleki Extension 2. This struggle which 
took place during the year preceding the Moleleki execution, sought to tie the land of this 
newly established township to irrevocable forms of juridico-political ordering, which could 
putatively form a boundary against the anomie of violence sweeping across the East Rand at 
the time. However, the boundary which could exclude anomie proved elusive, unlocalisable. 
It was around this space of exception, which could not be annexed to the juridico-political 
order of the township that the contest for sovereign authority in Moleleki turned, leading 
finally to the Moleleki execution as SDU members attempted to localise the exception in the 
bodies of ANCYL members. The chapter briefly begins to explore the subsequent struggles 
around the transcription of these bodies, which the SDU had attempted to produce as 
definitive signs of sovereign exception,  in the efforts by the parents of the Moleleki dead to 
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restore their physical integrity through calls for the return of missing body parts and the 
beginning of a process of juridico-political inscription around these corpses, which sought to 
start the process of reclaiming the Moleleki dead by  re-inscribing the execution within the 
juridico-political order of the post-apartheid state. 
 
Chapter 4, “A Juridico-Political Investigation”, explores the beginning of these processes of 
juridico-political inscription, prior to South Africa‟s first representative elections under the 
auspices of the declining apartheid state, as well as the early processes of inscription in the 
immediate post-apartheid period. Ironically, while the norm of law changed significantly 
from one period to another, both periods shared an essential contiguity in their efforts of 
juridico-political inscription, which sought to capture this violence unleashed from law within 
the law again. These processes of inscription began with the reproduction of the corpses of 
the Moleleki execution as signs of sovereign exception by the apartheid state. Thus, the 
corpses of the Moleleki executed were initially identified at the site of the execution as those 
of “criminal” hijackers, the embodiment of criminal exception. The reproduction of the 
Moleleki executed as the embodiment of criminal exception, was followed by a process of 
medico-legal inscription. While the medico-legal inscription of the bodies of the Moleleki 
dead, were conducted in anticipation of a juridical investigation, the ongoing context of 
conflict meant that residents of Moleleki, including the relatives of the deceased were 
unwilling to work with the police. However, after the election of a democratic government, 
residents of Moleleki claimed a new juridical subjecthood as citizens of the new state and 
came forward with information to facilitate the resumption of a police investigation. 
However, when a number of SDU members applied to the TRC for amnesty for their actions, 
as the judicial investigation against them was initiated, in the hope that this process would 
suspend the process of criminal prosecution; a critical ambiguity was evoked around the 
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nature of these actions, i.e. whether legal consequences could be attached to actions that had 
taken place in a context of exception and therefore whether the Moleleki execution was 
properly fell under the jurisdiction of the TRC, where legal consequences would be 
suspended, or the courtroom, where legal consequences would be imposed.  
 
Chapter 5, “The Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Fixing the Limits of the Political”, is 
a contextual chapter on the TRC, which explores the struggles during the negotiation process 
and later within the TRC itself, to define the nature of post-apartheid “political”. The chapter 
explores the attempt by the nascent post-apartheid juridico-political order to define the 
juridico-political present in terms of the exception of the biopolitical past. This process 
initially began with the negotiations prior to the country‟s first democratic elections and was 
later institutionalised within the context of the TRC. The TRC sought to define the 
sovereignty of the new state in terms of a new norm of law, the norm of “human rights”, 
which would putatively make it possible to define the boundaries of the juridico-political 
present, in terms of the exception of the violence of the past. However, these attempts to 
redefine the post-apartheid “political” as the juridico-political, ran aground in terms of a 
series of theoretical aporiae located within a juridical understanding of the political and its 
instrumental relation to the exception of the “past”, which masked the complexity of the 
political as the site of exception, a realm of ambiguous articulation between biopolitical and 
juridico-political power at the boundaries of the juridico-political order and the biopolitical 
nature of the fracture that would constitute the present political through a distinction between 
bare life and political life. Thus the nature of the “political” that the TRC was established to 
articulate, was to remain profoundly elusive, with the Commission acknowledging in its 
report of 1998 that, “the political nature of specific acts was hard to define” (TRC, 1998b, p. 
82).  
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Chapter 6, “Fixing the Limits of the Political, the Moleleki Execution and the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission”,  explores some of these complexities around the adjudication of 
the political in terms of the post-apartheid processes of juridical inscription around the 
Moleleki execution within the TRC. These processes of inscription sought to adjudicate the 
actions of the Moleleki protagonists in terms of an instrumental relation with a prior juridical 
intention, namely a “political” motive. However, the TRC struggled to adjudicate the actions 
of the Moleleki protagonists in these terms as rather than invoking the party political 
opponent as the object of their actions, SDU members instead invoked the ambiguous figure 
of homo sacer or the criminal to denote the boundary of the political community. Moreover, 
they were unable to articulate the motive for their actions in terms of an intention that was 
instrumentally linked to the programmes and policies of a juridically constituted political 
party such as the ANC. The chapter documents the struggles of comprehension that were 
precipitated by the engagement between the Moleleki protagonists and the Commission, as 
the SDU applicants repeatedly evoked a fluid notion of “community defence” against a 
“criminal” other as the motivation for their actions. However, this reference to a biopolitical 
“community” embodied by angry residents at various gatherings, created significant 
problems of comprehension for the TRC, which was only able to understand “community” in 
terms of a fixed juridical representation in an organisation such as the South African National 
Civic Organisation (SANCO). The failure by SDU members to invoke a juridical authority 
for their actions and their reference instead to a biopolitical authority led the TRC to reject 
their application for amnesty on the basis that their actions had been not been “politically 
motivated”.  
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Chapter 7, “Fixing the Limits of the Law, the Moleleki Execution and the Court Trial”, 
explores the processes of adjudication around the Moleleki execution in the courtroom after 
the TRC refused amnesty to the SDU applicants.  The criminal proceedings which had been 
suspended for the duration of the amnesty hearings were reinstated, leading to the trial of 
seven members of the SDU in Moleleki, four of whom had testified at the amnesty hearings. 
The court proceedings sought to establish the “criminal” nature of the actions of the Moleleki 
protagonists and the legal consequences which should be attached to their actions. While 
criminal law in general requires the demonstration of a direct instrumental relation between 
the criminal intent of the actor (mens rea) and the actions of this actor, the collective nature 
of the actions which had led to the Moleleki execution, meant that such an instrumental 
adjudication simply could not be made. Despite this, in the effort to inscribe this anomie 
within the juridico-political order, the judge in the Moleleki case used the doctrine of 
common purpose to attempt to establish the criminality of the actions of the Moleleki 
protagonists. The common purpose rule, as developed by the period that the Moleleki 
judgement was delivered, had significantly expanded the basis of liability for murder in 
contexts where more than one individual was involved, doing away with the requirement that 
there had to be a causal connection between the acts of each individual and the eventual 
consequence of murder. The chapter explores the ambiguities evoked by the attempt to 
inscribe the execution within law in terms of the doctrine of common purpose, which sought 
a corporate, rather than individual basis of responsibility for the execution. The expanded 
liability provided for by the common purpose rule meant that despite very little direct causal 
evidence, five of the accused were found guilty and sentenced to life terms of imprisonment, 
not in terms of individual liability but in terms of an “association with” a common purpose to 
kill the executed youth.  
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This thesis therefore utilises the Moleleki execution as a way to understand the construction 
of knowledge about power within a juridical discourse on power at two historical junctures, 
the period preceding the country‟s first democratic elections when the Moleleki execution 
took place, and the immediate post-apartheid period when the Moleleki execution became the 
subject of significant efforts of juridico-institutional inscription within the contexts of the 
TRC and the courtroom. In exposing this construction of knowledge about power the thesis 
seeks to make explicit the biopolitical nature of power, and the ambiguity of its articulation 
with juridico-political power, in a relation of exception. While this articulation has been 
conflated under the modern juridical conception of sovereignty, this thesis takes its cue from 
Agamben to explore this articulation, through the Moleleki execution, as the “hidden 
nucleus” of sovereign power.
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CHAPTER TWO: ANALYSING A CONDITION OF EXCEPTION 
Introduction: The Exception of South African Violence 
As was argued in the previous chapter, the struggle to understand the violence of the 1990s 
and the horror of atrocities such as the Moleleki execution was not so much an empirical 
problematic, which the most persuasive evidence and argumentation could resolve through 
the unmasking of a single empirical “truth”. It instead concerned a construction of knowledge 
about violence within a juridical conception of power, in which the biopolitical nature of 
power remained hidden and implicit and violence was conceived as an implacable exception 
to the “proper” functioning of juridical power. This chapter therefore endeavours to explore 
and make explicit these paradoxes of political conception, which traversed the period of 
violence prior to South Africa‟s first democratic elections and the subsequent processes of 
juridico-political inscription in terms of which this violence was understood in the immediate 
post- apartheid period of political reconstruction.  
 
This chapter explores these paradoxes of political conception through a re-reading of the 
critical conceptual terms on which the violence of the 1990s and the Moleleki execution itself 
were understood, namely the terms of the exception. While South African analysts and the 
juridico-political institutions that attempted to inscribe the violence after 1994 understood 
this exception in terms of a breakdown of juridico-political ordering, thus as a lacuna in law, 
an exception to the “proper” functioning of the juridico-political, the exception instead 
concerned the very boundaries of the juridico-political order, its initial conditions of 
constitution at the point of articulation between biopolitical and juridico-institutional power. 
It constituted “nothing less than the limit concept of the doctrine of law and the State” 
(Agamben, 1998, p. 11).  
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Misrecognising the Nature of the Sovereign Exception 
Thus analysts, while correctly identifying the “exceptionality” of the violence of the 1990s, 
fundamentally misrecognised the nature of the exception which lay before them as a juridico-
political phenomenon that could be empirically and historically demonstrated (for example 
Kynoch, 2006). Many authors referred to the major confusion (Beinert, 1992; Bruce & 
Komane, 1999; Friedman, 1993; Johnston, 1997; Morris & Hindson, 1992; Segal, 1991; 
Simpson, Mokwena & Segal, 1992; Taylor & Shaw, 1998) of South African politics during 
this period, to which it was “very difficult to assign political meaning” (Johnston, 1997, p. 
85). They spoke of a power vacuum in this period of interregnum (Brewer, 1994; Friedman, 
1993; Johnston, 1997; Sisk, 1995), “a situation which resembles a Hobbesian natural society 
more than one of legitimate authority” (Johnston, 1997, p. 86), in which “the rules of politics 
are often the rules of war, which are in effect no rules at all” (Sisk, 1995, p. 20). 
 
However, in seeing the “exceptionality” of the period in terms of a breakdown of juridico-
political rules, analysts were not able to recognise the real exception before them and the 
nature of the power that emerged in this exception. Critically, this power concerned the point 
of intersection between biopolitical and juridico-institutional power, the “hidden” nucleus of 
sovereign power. While analysts of the violence at the time assumed that this violence 
concerned a breakdown in state sovereignty or a distortion of state sovereignty during the 
period of negotiated transition, what they were in fact attempting to analyse was not the 
failure of a normatively conceptualised sovereignty instantiated in the state but the exposure 
of sovereignty, as the form of the state crumbled. 
 
In general this threshold remains concealed, it is the dissolution of state structures which 
makes sovereignty visible: “As long as the form of State constituted the fundamental horizon 
of all communal life and the political, religious, juridical, and economic doctrines that 
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sustained this form were still strong, this „most extreme sphere‟ could not truly come to light” 
(Agamben, 1998, pp. 11-12).  
 
While the crumbling of state structures may expose this boundary of juridico-political order 
at particular historical conjunctures, this “state of exception” is not a temporal phenomenon, a 
chronological event in time, nor is it a pre-juridical phenomenon, the chaos that precedes 
order. Instead it is a zone of indistinction and continuous transition that dwells continually 
within the civil state, simply becoming explicit “at the moment the City is considered 
tanquam dissolute, „as if it were dissolved‟” (Agamben, 1998, p. 105).  
 
In 1990, as the negotiated South African transition began and the South African state and law 
hovered on the interregnum of the old and the new, the juridical order was essentially 
suspended during the negotiation process, the “City...appeared as if it were dissolved” 
(Agamben, 1998, p. 105) making explicit the boundaries of the entire juridico-political order. 
In this historical moment and at this boundary of paradigmatic order, sovereign power 
revealed itself in an extremity of violence which radically disputed the terms of the juridico-
political order, defying comprehension in terms of this order and contesting juridical, 
political, social or ontological inclusion in this order.  
 
The ways in which power emerged at this boundary of juridico-political order therefore 
disputed inclusion in a juridical conceptual paradigm, which spanned both the period of the 
violence during the 1990s and the processes of juridico-political inscription around the 
violence and the Moleleki execution post-1994. The struggles of comprehension of analysts 
prior to 1994 primarily concerned the attempt to trace an instrumental relation of cause and 
effect between the violence committed and a prior source of power and origination. The 
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multiplication of causal explanations that emerged during this period spoke to the conceptual 
aporia embedded within a purely juridical conception of power, which could not recognise 
the biopolitical nature of power that became so explicit during the 1990s but which, as 
Agamben argues, has remained implicit in the entire history of Western thinking about 
sovereignty.  
 
This tracing of an instrumental relationship between a prior source of power and an act of 
violence was substantively premised on a particular understanding of the subject, the 
sovereign subject of Western discourse, whose actions were conceived as the unitary, 
voluntary, rationally chosen product of a pre-existing consciousness. However, the violence 
of the Moleleki execution and the actions of its protagonists implied a different form of 
subjecthood, an embodied subjecthood in which the sovereign exists as “living law”, the 
embodiment of law rather than the subject of law, and homo sacer is the “bare life” captured 
by sovereign power (Agamben, 2005, p. 69). In this context, power is not juridical, it is 
animated directly from the body of the actor and agency is the product of multiple subject 
positions embedded in the shifting praxis of actors (Feldman, 1991, p. 4) not the instrument 
of an original source of power but an “embodied force”, a biopolitical power.  
  
A Normative Conception of Sovereignty 
In South African discourse, the construction of knowledge about the violence of the 1990s 
was deeply embedded within a genealogy of thought running from Hobbes through to Weber 
in which the conception of sovereignty is not only a juridical phenomenon but is also 
fundamentally tied to the form of the state, a conception of sovereignty which Foucault, in his 
call for a political theory not constructed around the juridical concept of sovereignty, rejected 
as a basis for an analysis of power (Foucault, 1976).  
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Even more critically, this conception of sovereignty understood the foundation of state power 
in terms of its ability to monopolise violence within society. For Hobbes, through a social 
contract citizens give up their right to violent self-defence to the sovereign state or Leviathan, 
whether democratic or autocratic, to act as guarantor of peace and civility in a world that 
would otherwise be characterised by a “condition of war of everyone against everyone” 
(Woodbridge 1958, p. 270). For Max Weber too, the essential raison d’être of the state is its 
ability to monopolise the legitimate means of violence over a specific territory. Therefore, in 
this conception the legitimacy of the state forms the basis of the legitimacy of its monopoly 
on violence and its right to employ violence as part of the exercise of state power. As South 
Africa analyst Pierre du Toit contended, “security”, the ability to provide for the basic 
physical security of citizens, forms the “core of the substance from which a social contract 
between state and citizen is built. When it [the state] fails to provide security, and is seen to 
fail, the state‟s legitimacy cracks at this core” (P. du Toit, 2001, p. 72).  
 
The basis of sovereign state authority as this assumed ability to monopolise the means of 
violence in society led on the one hand to uncritical assumptions about the capacity of the 
state, “as the primary unit for the conduct politics” (P. du Toit, 2001, p. xii), to monopolise 
power in its entirety, as well as more fundamentally to a misrecognition of the basis of state 
authority as this monopoly. This misrecognition left South African analysts, when faced with 
the patent breakdown of this monopoly, with only one avenue of analysis, namely the 
mechanisms and processes of the restoration of democratic state sovereignty, on the implicit 
assumption that such a form of state sovereignty could secure the conditions of peace or at 
least constituted the most fundamental precondition for peace. As analyst Andre du Toit 
(1993) articulated it, a conception of political violence within a South African master 
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narrative of political struggle, in which the exercise of legitimate juridical state power would 
end violence and “projected democracy as the solution to the history of conflict and political 
violence” (p1).  
 
Embedded therefore in these analyses were the teleological conceptions of history, its 
“predictable sequences”, which Foucault so strongly critiqued in his essay “Nietzsche, 
Genealogy, History” (Foucault, 1971) and the conception of violence within this teleology, 
which assumed humanity would inevitably move “from combat to combat until it arrives at 
universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare” (Foucault, 1971, p. 85). 
While acknowledging the complexities of South Africa‟s “bold new experiment” (Giliomee 
& Schlemmer, 1994) and that “the reorientation of conflict from bullets to ballots is a long, 
arduous, and often violence-ridden road” (Sisk, 1995, p. 4), the possibility of this “transition” 
from a state of violence to a state of peace was posited as merely a matter of “reorientation” 
in which institutional arrangements, the re-establishment of new “rules of the political game” 
(Friedman, 1993; Sisk, 1995), could make possible this teleological shift. What was 
inconceivable in this paradigm was that this state of violence and transition would, as 
Agamben argues, dwell continuously within the “City”, violence not displaced but installed 
in law. The continuation of contemporary forms of violence in the post-1994 context thus 
compelled analyst Pierre du Toit (2001) to preface his book on South Africa‟s “brittle peace” 
with the question, “Why has South Africa, newly democratised, not also become peaceful and 
free of violence?” (p. xi). 
 
These legitimist assumptions about the nature of state authority and the right and ability of a 
“legitimate” state to monopolise the means of violence in society, has informed almost all but 
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the most recent analyses of South African violence (Buur, 2005; Hornberger, 2004; Jensen, 
2003). Thus in this conception, as South African analyst Pierre du Toit (2001) contends, the 
“essential reason of state” is “expressed in the principle of sovereignty and is executed 
through the monopoly on force and the prescriptions of law” (p. 4) and simply hinges “on the 
credibility of the state‟s claim” to a monopoly of force (p. 5, own emphasis), a claim that is 
“open to abuse” (p. 5) but not fundamentally misconceived.  
 
Therefore, in this paradigm, this state monopoly on the means of violence is the “first and 
foremost good public good, which the [democratised] state could offer” (P. du Toit, 2001, p. 
4). In this conception the “turn” to political violence (A. du Toit, 1993, p. 2) of opposition 
movements such as the ANC, in instrumental pursuit of its political objectives of 
incorporation in the modern state, was a completely “rational” and explicable response to the 
racial exclusions of the South African state and its abuse of its monopoly of violence in 
repressive defence of its exclusionary policies. Thus, “if violence was a familiar phenomenon 
in many different contexts…the violence of apartheid was generally understood as part of the 
pathology of apartheid…the problem was not so much the violence engendered by 
[apartheid] but apartheid itself” (A. du Toit, 1993, p. 2). In this vein Brewer argues that “a 
political settlement…will ensure that violence loses popular support when directed against a 
legitimate government” (Brewer, 1994, pp. 5-6).  
 
This normative conception of state sovereignty within South African political discourse, what 
Andre du Toit termed a “commitment to the basic aims and assumptions of modernisation” 
(A. du Toit, 1993, p. 20) was shared by the two major antagonists within the South African 
political struggle, namely the apartheid state and the ANC. As Crais argues, “the ANC sought 
access to state power, not its repudiation” (Crais, 2002, p. 143) and “its critique of the state 
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was less radical than reformist, that all individuals should have access to the state, 
irrespective of race” (Crais, 2002, p. 143). It was precisely because of its previous exclusion 
from the state that for the ANC “inclusion in this modern state came to define the goals of 
legitimate political action” (Crais, 2002, p. 143) and legitimate political violence. This shared 
commitment to the aims and assumptions of modernity by the two major protagonists in the 
political struggle protected the normativity of juridical sovereign state power and eventually 
created the framework in which political reconciliation between the two antagonists could 
take place (A. du Toit, 1993, p. 20).  
 
This was the discursive framework within which the analysis of the violence of the 1990s 
took place, conceiving of this violence either as a consequence of an ongoing distortion of 
state sovereignty contiguous with the distortions of state power under apartheid (Coleman, 
1998; Dugard, 2003b; Everatt, 2003; Everatt & Sadek, 1992; Taylor & Shaw, 1998) or as the 
result of a breakdown of state sovereignty in the context of the negotiated transition and the 
contestation of the illegitimate form state sovereignty had taken during apartheid (Friedman, 
1993; Gotz, 1995; Morris & Hindson, 1992; Olivier, 1994; Simpson & Rauch, 1993; Sisk, 
1995; Slabbert, 1992). However, the assumption implicit in all of these analyses was that the 
restoration of democratic state sovereignty with a legitimate monopoly over the means of 
violence would address either the distortion or breakdown of state sovereignty.  
 
A breakdown of state sovereignty 
One influential school of thought conceptualised the breakdown of sovereignty during the 
transition period as a consequence of the breakdown of the “rules of the political game” and 
the consequent “disorientation” of politics during this period (P. du Toit, 2001; Sisk, 1995; 
Friedman, 1993). Working within the contractarian approach to political thought dominant in 
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South African discourse, which (in a tradition extending from Hobbes‟ initial vision of 
government based on a social contract where individuals give up their right to self-defence in 
return for the protection of the sovereign) saw the basis of social order as the active and 
voluntary choice of the individual to consent to that order. This individual, sovereign over his 
or her actions, is subject only to those forms of authority to which they have consented, “with 
the context-transcending power to choose [their] ends and purposes” (Markell, 2003, p. 12).  
 
The extreme version of this contractarian approach to political thought, using rational choice 
and game theory derived from economics, analysed the South African transition and the 
conflict for control of the state as part of a “metagame” (Sisk, 1995, p. 20; see also Friedman, 
1993). Drawing on the analysis of transitions from authoritarian rule by writers such as 
O‟Donnell and Schmitter, the conflict of the period was characterised as the consequence of 
the breakdown of the rules of the political “game”. “South Africa‟s potential for instability 
during the transition” rested on “the disorientation caused by the sudden change of all the rules 
of the political game” (Sisk, 1995, p. 190), in which “actors struggle not just to satisfy their 
immediate interests and/or interests of those whom they purport to represent, but also to define 
rules and procedures whose configuration will determine likely winners and losers in the future” 
(Guelke, 1999, p. 1). 
 
The route to democracy was opened by the realisation “among a core set of elites” (Sisk, 1995, 
p. 13) that their “interests” lay with the benefits of a “positive sum outcome” as opposed to a 
“zero-sum” outcome to the conflict and their consequent rational and strategic choice to 
negotiate a new political order. The restoration of state sovereignty was therefore dependent on 
the establishment of a “democratic social contract” between these negotiating elites based on a 
process of establishing consensus on the “new rules of the political game”. The violence that 
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dogged the negotiation process was a result of “slippage” between leaders and their followers, 
some of whom continued to operate in terms of a “zero-sum perception of the conflict” (Sisk, 
1995, p. 122).  
 
Sisk‟s emphasis on elite pacting, premised on an entirely instrumental conception of human 
agency in which the “interests” of actors are pre-given and unchanging and their interaction 
during the negotiation process the result of a conscious maximisation of this essentialist interest, 
was critiqued in particular by Anthony Guelke, who refuted the power of elites to manufacture 
and impose political consensus from the centre. However the premise of his argument, framed at 
the beginning of his book by a quote from O‟ Donnell and Schmitter, whose thinking also 
influenced Sisk, was fundamentally the same, namely that violence was to be understood in the 
“context of conflict over the rules of political competition among all the contending parties…” 
(Guelke, 1999, p. 183, own emphasis). 
 
While authors such as Sisk, Friedman and Guelke primarily interpreted the breakdown of state 
sovereignty in terms of a breakdown of political rules, there were a range of other authors who 
conceptualised this “breakdown” in different terms. Johan Olivier implicitly analysed the 
“ethnic” dimension of the conflict, linking resource mobilisation theory (which posits that 
increased access to scarce resources results in political mobilisation and collective action rather 
than an aggregate increase in grievances), to the “competition model of ethnic mobilisation” 
(Olivier, 1994, p. 27). He argued that “ethnic mobilisation is the consequence of competition 
between groups for resources” and that it is the opening up of “new competitive opportunities” 
that provokes ethnic mobilisation when “traditional boundaries” between ethnic and racial 
groups break down (Olivier, 1994, p. 28). He explained that,  
The past fifteen years have seen a gradual erosion of the South African government‟s 
apartheid policies which enforced tight boundaries between ethnic and racial groups. 
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This set in motion a process of social change which is affecting South African society as 
a whole and impacts on social, economic and political relations in South Africa, which in 
turn have changed the way in which South Africans engage themselves in political 
behaviour. (Olivier, 1994, p. 28) 
 
 
Simpson and Rauch in 1993 argued a similar point from a different angle, contending that 
central to an understanding of the political violence of the 1990s was what they referred to as the 
“deregulation of social control” that accompanied the “the deconstruction of formal apartheid” 
within a context of heightened political competition during the run up to the country‟s first 
democratic elections, which had resulted in “high levels of social, political, economic and 
ideological dislocation within…society” (Simpson & Rauch, 1993, p. 1).  
 
For Simpson and Rauch, this “deregulation” was an “inevitable window period” in which 
“social control is utterly deregulated”, in order to create the space for “consensus based 
regulatory institutions and ideological formations” (Simpson & Rauch, 1993, p. 2). Therefore 
while the repressive mechanisms of social control established under apartheid had been under 
significant challenge since the 1980s and had been undergoing a “piecemeal” deconstruction for 
some time, the process of replacing these mechanisms with legitimate and credible alternative 
structures of authority was slow. This crisis of legitimacy was particularly severe for the security 
forces and the criminal judicial sector as a whole. While these trends are characteristic of 
transition processes around the world, Simpson and Rauch argued that “in the South African 
context, this dramatic social insecurity, bred of a sense of transitional disintegration, has 
articulated particularly destructively with the racial, class-based and ethnic identities and hostile 
stereotypes generated or reinforced by decades of apartheid” (Simpson & Rauch, 1993, p. 2).  
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Graeme Gotz similarly examined this process of “deregulation” in his analysis of violence in 
the Vaal
21
 region from a psychological perspective, in which he argued that political violence 
was essentially the result of a “failure of meaning” precipitated by the social and institutional 
“disintegration” that characterised the period between 1990 and 1994, which meant that 
people were left without institutional means to interpret and order their world and were 
forced to look for new ways to empower themselves and reassert control. He argues that the 
psychological solution to this problem was found in the identification of an “other”. This 
enemy could be ascribed the blame for the conflict while providing a means of overcoming it, 
through its defeat. The act of violence against the enemy is thus a spontaneous attempt to re-
possess a sense of self and re-establish identity. Gotz defines this process as 
“territorialisation” because it involved the localisation of forms of identity and the building of 
extremely parochial, exclusionary associations through groups or camps (Gotz, 1995).  
 
 On the other hand Morris and Hindson made a very similar argument to Simpson and Rauch, 
also locating their analysis of the violence in terms of the “disintegration” of apartheid 
institutions, which meant that “racial, ethnic and class antagonisms held in check under 
classic apartheid…resurfaced in the climate of liberalisation and deracialisation” at the same 
time as the ability of the state to control the underlying social antagonisms exposed by this 
“disintegration” significantly declined as it “lost social and political control of black urban 
life” (Morris & Hindson, 1992, p. 164). Therefore, “the gradual erosion of apartheid 
institutions and the abandonment of its policies …led to an escalation of social tensions and 
increased, not decreased, violence throughout the country” (Morris & Hindson, 1992, p. 155). 
Like Simpson and Rauch, Morris and Hindson point to the complexities of replacing one 
                                            
 
21
 The Vaal Triangle is located to the south west of the province of Gauteng, and comprises a triangular area of 
land formed by the towns of Vereeniging, Vanderbijlpark and Sasolburg – three small cities that together 
comprise a substantial urban and industrial complex.  
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social system with another, as “old elements, ideologies and strategies remain and social 
forces committed to the previous order still operate…alongside and in conflict with new 
elements, ideologies and organisational strategies” (Morris & Hindson, 1992, p. 164).  
 
However, unlike Simpson and Rauch, Morris and Hindson did not argue that endemic 
violence was an inevitable consequence of this “window period”, the interregnum between 
the old and the new, but situated their argument in terms of “the particular way in which the 
state tried to reform apartheid in the 1980s” (Morris & Hindson, 1992, p. 156), which by 
instituting a policy of “orderly urbanisation” that offered differential urban residential rights 
to some Africans, without a concomitant increase in infrastructural development, 
“exacerbated the material basis of conflict in black society” (Morris & Hindson, 1992, p. 
156) and led to the proliferation of informal settlements on the edges of townships, as well as 
an influx of men, women and children to hostels on the Reef, which created a new underclass 
of unemployed dependent on the employed in the hostels.  
 
Both these communities were living on the margins of urban society. Squatters had to 
continually defend their right to keep the land they had occupied, often through violence. The 
newly arrived hostel residents, without any economic resources, lived an equally tenuous 
existence. Thus the differential access to urban rights and resources “facilitated class 
differentiation” (Morris & Hindson, 1992, p. 157), creating divisions between those who 
benefited, however, marginally, from the reform process and those who reaped little or no 
reward from it, thus laying the basis for violent conflict around urban rights which would 
later be drawn into rising political and ethnic tensions after 1990.  
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John Kane-Berman also located the violence of the 1990s within the context of the decline of 
state sovereignty, but working within an atavistic notion of “conflict among black people” 
and concerned to refute assertions of the state‟s primary responsibility for the orchestration of 
the violence of the 1990s, argued that it was the ANC‟s campaign of ungovernability, 
launched during the 1980s to challenge the apartheid state‟s sovereignty and capture state 
power, that had successfully undermined state authority in townships and set in motion a 
cycle of violence, largely perpetrated by “politically fired up…Black youth” (Kane-Berman, 
1993, p. 43) deliberately drawn into the conflict by adult leadership, not only prepared to die 
for the struggle but “prepared to kill for it” (Kane-Berman, 1993, p. 43).  
 
The “people‟s war” initiated by the ANC during the 1980s had two consequences. On the one 
hand, “coercive strategies, intensified struggles, assassination campaigns, mass actions and 
volcanic upsurges of fired-up people” had “got out of control” (Kane-Berman, 1993, p. 44). 
In addition, the “people‟s war” had precipitated counter-violence from those who were the 
targets of the ANC‟s strategy of ungovernability, namely councillors, IFP members and other 
people identified as “sellouts” and “informers”. Thus the ANC in challenging the state power, 
whether legitimate or not, had challenged the state‟s monopoly of violence, thus creating 
conditions of “lawlessness”, which were perpetuated and exacerbated during the transitional 
period of the 1990s.  
 
A distortion of state sovereignty 
In contrast to the literature which saw the violence of the 1990s as the consequence of a 
breakdown of state sovereignty, there was a body of literature which saw this violence in 
terms of a continuum with the distortion of state sovereignty that was the hallmark of the 
apartheid state, which had “throughout the apartheid years, [used] violence strategically…to 
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enforce and uphold „white‟ domination” (Taylor & Shaw, 1998, p. 15). As Shaw and Taylor 
argued, “it would not be surprising…to expect violence to continue to be used to the 
advantage of the minority when the future of the country‟s power structures was being 
negotiated” (Taylor & Shaw, 1998, p. 15).  
 
These writers analysed the conflict of the 1990s in terms of the theory of low intensity 
conflict, which had influenced South African security establishment thinking for some time. 
This was a methodology of warfare utilised from the 1970s in particular by the United States 
in various international contexts to attempt to ensure “centrist” solutions to revolutionary 
challenges to repressive states, through a combination of negotiation and covert action 
designed to weaken and destabilise opposition movements. These analysts saw the violence 
of the 1990s in terms of a continuum with a previous apartheid state strategy of low intensity 
conflict, which had sought to marshal the full range of social forces at the state‟s disposal in a 
“total strategy” to counter the “total onslaught” of political opposition (Dugard, 2003a; 
Everatt & Sadek, 1992; Taylor & Shaw, 1998). 
 
The sophistication of these analyses varied considerably, ranging from the early analyses of 
monitoring organisations such as the Human Rights Commission (HRC) and the Community 
Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE), which initially utilised the data they collected to 
correlate the high points of the violence with key developments in the negotiation process. 
Using the analogy of a “tap being turned on and off” (Coleman, 1998, p. 168) by the state 
they argued that “violence peaks when it is most likely to damage the ANC and dies down 
most dramatically when it threatens to harm the NP” (cited in Simpson & Rauch, 1993, p. 7).  
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The HRC argued that a “new total strategy” (Coleman, 1998, p. 166) was being implemented 
by the state in line with the principles of low intensity conflict and as a continuation of the 
total strategy of the 1980s, which combined a “twin track” (Coleman, 1998, p. 174) strategy 
of negotiation with destabilisation and involved the orchestrated marshalling of all the forces 
at the state‟s disposal, namely, the security forces, “hit squads” and “vigilantes”, in a 
coordinated campaign to foment violence. This analysis of a collection of forces involved in a 
campaign of destabilisation (although its level of organisation and the extent of senior state 
complicity remained contested) would come to be widely characterised in terms of the notion 
of a “third force”, the “hidden hand” of the state behind violence of the period (Coleman, 
1998, p. 170; Shutte, Liebenberg & Minnaar, 1998).  
 
Working within a profoundly functionalist approach to violence, these analyses, by using 
monitoring data to ascertain the identity of attackers and victims, sought to demonstrate 
empirically who “benefited” from the violence and whose “interests” it was serving (Institute 
of Criminology, 1991). For example, Everatt argued that an explanation of the violence could 
be ascertained by using monitoring data to ascertain who were the “winners” and “losers” 
(2003, p. 100).  
 
The conceptual aporia of this approach, in which the origin and cause of violence can be 
unproblematically imputed from its consequences, was demonstrated for example by the 
Schutte‟s analysis of the “third force”. Using a Weberian understanding of power as “the 
probability that one social actor will be able to carry out his will in spite of the resistance of 
others” and faced with the “lack of solid evidence” of third force activity, he asks, “Who 
benefits from what is going on?” and answers, “When applied to politics in South Africa, the 
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answer to the question is basically all those involved in political power relations in the country” 
(Schutte, 1998, p. 19). 
 
The weakness of the methodologies used to collect and interpret the data to support the 
arguments that violence was “turned on and off” at strategic moments in the negotiation 
process, or that particular political groupings (characterised substantially as proxies of the 
state such as the IFP) were primarily responsible for the execution of violence or were its 
primary victims, meant that these analyses could be relatively easily dismissed on empirical 
grounds, as they were by organisations such as the South African Institute of Race Relations 
(Jeffrey, 1992).  
 
However, more importantly embedded within such analyses and in common with analyses 
which understood the violence of the 1990s in terms of a breakdown of state sovereignty, was 
a normative view of this sovereignty in which the state usurps power in its totality and wields 
violence as a tool of power at will in an orchestrated strategy to pursue its own essentialist 
“interests”. Thus Taylor and Shaw (1998), in an attempt to refine the argument put forward 
by HRC and CASE, framed their analysis with the question: “To what extent can the violence 
be firmly linked to the political will of the state?” (p. 15) 
 
 The apparently arbitrary and random nature of the violence as the conflict continued after 
1990 had presented a significant empirical challenge to advocates of an orchestrated state 
plan to use violence as a strategic tool in the negotiating process, leading these analysts to 
increasingly fall back on the explanation that the state had unleashed forces it was now 
unable to control, even though the violence was now counter-productive and no longer served 
their “interests” (Coleman, 1998, p. 205). Taylor and Shaw (1998) argued that, on the 
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contrary, the “seeming unpredictable nature of the violence” (p. 16) was in fact part of state 
strategy. Dugard, in support of this analysis, contended that “the advantage of LIC [Low 
Intensity Conflict] is that it does not require comprehensive and ongoing orchestration in 
order to be effective” (2003b, p. 41).  
 
Shaw and Taylor thus argue that until 1992 and the Record of Understanding signed between 
the National Party (NP) and the ANC, the government followed a dual strategy of negotiation 
and destabilisation which it was hoped would disorganise the ANC sufficiently to allow the 
NP, as the centre of an alliance of conservative parties, to win a democratic election and 
“lock the ANC into a compromise agreement centred on compulsory power-sharing as 
opposed to majority rule” (Taylor & Shaw, 1998, p. 17). However, following the Boipatong 
massacre of 1992, the NP began to realise that its dual strategy of destabilisation and 
negotiation had become counter-productive: “the state‟s game plan was becoming self-
defeating and there had to be a rethink of strategic options” (Taylor & Shaw, 1998, p. 23).  
 
Taylor and Shaw cite as evidence of the shift in state strategy the fact that from 1992, 
although the actual number of incidents of violence continued to increase, the nature of the 
violence shifted significantly. Thus the number of massacres, assassinations carried out by hit 
squads and train attacks declined substantially from 1992. They argue that these forms of 
violence constituted 
classic destabilisation tactics, in line with the principles of “low-intensity warfare” 
where the intent is to neutralise the opposition through killing off radical activists, 
sabotaging organisational attempts to build a support base, and generally creating a 
climate in which violence becomes self-perpetuating and preys on people, oblivious to 
whether either their guilt or innocence can be detected. (Taylor & Shaw, 1998, p. 19)  
 
It was only after 1992 and the signing of the Record of Understanding that funding and 
support by the state for violence was finally withdrawn. Taylor and Shaw leave unanswered 
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the question of why violence continued and in fact escalated in the aftermath of the 
rethinking of state strategy.  
 
Thus the conceptual terms in which analysts attempted to understand the violence of the 
1990s, which could not separate out sovereignty from the state form and which furthermore 
understood the basis of this state sovereignty in terms of a putative capacity to exercise a 
monopoly over the means of violence, led South African analysts into a series of conceptual 
aporiae that evoked the “radical problem of understanding” identified by South African 
analyst Andre du Toit (1993) at the time. For what lay before analysts was an exposure – not 
a breakdown or distortion of sovereignty, an exposure which in its irruption of biopolitical 
power appeared to contest the very basis of the modern juridical conception of sovereignty 
that in general obscures the articulation of biopolitical and juridico-political power under the 
rubric of normative state sovereignty, but whose premises now appeared profoundly 
contested.  
 
Sovereignty and the Exception 
What then was the nature of this “most extreme sphere”, the threshold of juridico-political 
order, which became so explicit during the 1990s and which South African analysts struggled 
so profoundly to analyse? It is the “sovereign decision on the exception [that] is the originary 
juridico-political structure on the basis of which what is included in the juridical order and 
what is excluded acquire their meaning” (Agamben, 1998, p. 19). Critically, Carl Schmitt 
argues, the sovereign decision on the exception is not about an individual‟s decision on these 
relations of exclusion and inclusion, but is instead a more fundamental process through which 
what is inside and outside the juridico-political order acquire their meaning, dividing the 
anomie of life into a structure that law is able to capture. Thus, the sovereign decision on the 
exception “is not the expression of the will of a subject hierarchically superior to all others, 
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but represents rather the inscription within the body of the nomos
22
 of the exteriority that 
animates it and gives it meaning” (Agamben, 1998, p. 25). 
 
These decisions on the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion within the juridico-political 
order, are, Schmitt argues, “the essence of State sovereignty, which must therefore be 
properly juridically defined not as the monopoly to sanction…The decision reveals the 
essence of State authority most clearly…” (cited in Agamben, 1998, p. 16).  
 
Therefore what is at issue in the sovereign exception is, according to Schmitt, “the very 
condition of possibility of juridical rule and along with it, the very meaning of State 
authority” (Schmitt cited in Agamben, 1998, p. 17). 
 
Consequently, sovereign exception is not about positive law, its numerous articulations, its 
“justices” and “injustices”, nor is it about the various articulations of the political order, who 
within the political order is invested with which powers – the questions which have so far 
concerned most contemporary analysts. Instead sovereign exception is about how the order 
comes into being in the first place, its conditions of constitution; it is about the threshold of 
political and juridical order. Thus, 
the state of exception is neither external nor internal to the juridical order and the 
problem of defining it concerns precisely a threshold, or a zone of indifference, where 
inside and outside [the juridical order] do not exclude each other but rather blur with 
each other (Agamben, 1998, p. 15).  
 
It therefore creates an “ambiguous, uncertain, borderline fringe, at the intersection of the legal 
and the political” (Fontana cited in Agamben, 2005, p. 1).  
                                            
 
22
 Law (Greek: νόμος, nómos; pl. νόμοι, nómoi). (Nomos. Retrieved from Wikipipedia: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nomos) 
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It was precisely this ambiguity of the exception, a threshold which, Schmitt argues, “defies 
general codification” (cited in Agamben, 1998, p. 15), which precipitated the multiplication 
of explanations of the conflict of the 1990s. This struggle of ontological inclusion of the 
exception in the juridico-political and the multiplication of explanations which it evoked led 
South African analysts in the end to take “refuge in arguing that…there are „many truths‟, 
that violence is best understood as multi-faceted” (Taylor and Shaw, 1998, p. 13). 
 
The Structure of the Exception, an Inclusive Exclusion 
These struggles of ontological inclusion were, in part, the consequence of the complexity of 
the structure of the exception which articulates the biopolitical and juridical, law and life. 
The nature of this articulation, between the biopolitical and the juridical, in the structure of 
the exception, is not a simple exclusion, but is instead a type of exclusion where what is 
excluded is retained in relation to that from which it has been excluded, i.e. it is, “taken 
outside and not simply excluded” (Agamben, 1998, pp. 17-18). “What is excluded, in the 
exception, maintains itself in relation to the rule in the form of the rule‟s suspension” 
(Agamben, 1998, p. 19, own emphasis). This process, which Agamben calls “inclusive 
exclusion”, where that which is excluded is paradoxically included in the juridico-political 
order through the very process of exclusion, takes place within a context of the suspension of 
juridico-political order in which the law employs the exception “as its original means of 
referring to and encompassing life” (Agamben, 2005, p. 1). Therefore the state of exception is 
“not the chaos that precedes order but rather the situation that results from its suspension” 
(Agamben, 1998, p. 18).  
 
Thus the state of exception as a paradigm of government does not concern the collapse of 
juridico-political order but is “a suspension not simply of the administration of justice but of 
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the law as such” (Agamben, 2005, p. 41). It is a paradoxical legal institution which “consists 
solely in the production of a juridical void” (Agamben, 2005, pp. 41-42) in response to 
periods of political crisis. These are juridical measures, therefore, which cannot be 
understood in legal terms and must be understood “on political not juridico-constitutional 
grounds” (Agamben, 2005, p. 1). Hence, “the impossibility (common to both ancient and 
modern sources) of clearly defining the legal consequences of those acts committed” 
(Agamben, 2005, p. 49) during this suspension of juridico-political order.  
 
The principle of the state of exception is the creation of a situation that makes the application 
of the norm possible. Agamben identifies that the juridico-political order contains an essential 
fracture between norm and its application, which in extreme situations can only be filled by 
means of an exception, the creation of a juridical void. Schmitt therefore distinguishes 
between two critical elements of law, namely, the norm of law and the decision on its 
concrete application. The one does not derive automatically from the other. This means that 
the norm “can be suspended, without thereby ceasing to remain in force” (Schmitt cited in 
Agamben, 2005, p. 36). 
 
The state of exception in suspending the juridico-political order is the point at which this 
distinction between norm and application is most explicit, as it separates out the norm of law 
(the juridico-political constitution) from its actual application by suspending the constitution 
and allowing it to remain in force without actually being applied. In times of political crisis, 
the state of exception separates out the norm from its application in order to introduce “a zone 
of anomie into the law in order to make the effective regulation of the real possible” 
(Agamben, 2005, p. 36), i.e. to make the application of the norm, the juridico-political order, 
possible again.  
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Thus under conditions of what Schmitt identifies as “commissarial dictatorship”, the 
constitution is suspended “in concreto in order to protect its concrete existence” (Schmitt 
cited in Agamben, 2005, p. 33), i.e. it is suspended but remains in force, making possible the 
protection of the constitution and the creation of a situation in which law can be applied 
again. On the other hand, as in the period of negotiated transition in South Africa, in the 
context of what Schmitt identifies as “sovereign dictatorship”, this situation is not limited to 
simply suspending the existing constitution in terms of provisions provided for in the 
constitution itself; “rather it aims at creating a state of affairs in which it becomes possible to 
impose a new constitution” (Agamben, 2005, p. 33). 
 
While modern state power may, as argued by Agamben, be constituted by continual 
evocations of a juridical state of exception, this structure of inclusive exclusion in the relation 
of exception is in fact the originary principle that first makes possible the space in which the 
wider juridico-political order can have validity. This anomic space without law, is in fact 
constitutive of the juridico-political machine as a whole, without it juridico-political order 
cannot exist. Thus,  
in its archetypal form, the state of exception is therefore the principle of every 
juridical localisation, since only the state of exception opens the space in which the 
determination of a certain juridical order and a particular territory first becomes 
possible. (Agamben, 1998, p. 19, own emphasis) 
 
“Pure” Violence, the Object of Politics 
Importantly, it is this fracture between norm and application that makes it possible to 
distinguish two critical elements of the juridico-political order, what is reflected in Western 
jurisprudence as the notion of the “force of law”, which separates out law‟s applicability from 
its formal essence, “whereby decrees, provisions, and measures that are not formally laws 
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nevertheless acquire their „force‟” (Agamben, 2005, p. 38). Critically, “in extreme situations 
„force of law‟ floats as an indeterminate element that can be claimed by both the state 
authority (acting as a commissarial dictatorship) and by a revolutionary organisation (acting 
as a sovereign dictatorship). The state of exception is an anomic space in which what is at 
stake is a force of law without law” (Agamben, 2005, pp. 38-39). It was in the contest to 
claim this force, this indeterminate source of power, radically separated from law, that the 
violence of the 1990s took place.  
 
As Agamben argues, 
this struggle for anomie seems to be as decisive for Western politics as...“the battle of 
giants concerning being”, that defines Western metaphysics. Here, pure violence as 
the extreme political object, as the „thing‟ of politics, is the counterpart to pure 
being…as the ultimate metaphysical stakes; the strategy of exception, which must 
ensure the relation between anomic violence and law, is as critical as capturing pure 
being for metaphysics. (Agamben, 2005, pp. 59-60) 
 
Importantly, however, Agamben argues that the idea of force of law without law is 
essentially a fiction, “through which law attempts to encompass its own absence and to 
appropriate the state of exception, or at least to assure itself a relation with it” (Agamben, 
2005, p. 51).While the idea of force of law as a way of establishing a relation between 
anomie and law may be essentially a fictive categorisation that attempts to capture something 
like “a mystical element”, what is in fact at issue in these categorisations, is, Agamben 
asserts, “nothing less than the definition of what Schmitt calls „the political” (Agamben, 
2005, p. 51). It is in defining the modes of relation of this anomie to the law that the meaning 
of “the political”, the exception, on the boundaries of the law, can become explicit, “and 
perhaps only then will it be possible to answer the question that never ceases to reverberate in 
the history of Western politics: what does it mean to act politically?” (Agamben, 2005, p. 2).  
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This anomic violence, what Benjamin has called “pure violence”23, which neither makes nor 
preserves law, is what is at issue in the struggle over the state of exception and the struggle to 
inscribe this anomie within the law. 
 
Critically, this violence which occurs outside law – unlike “mythico-juridical” violence 
which is always a means to an end, this “pure” violence, “is never simply a means – whether 
legitimate or illegitimate – to an end (whether just or unjust)”. It is instead, a “pure medium”, 
“mediality without ends” (Agamben, 2005). Agamben explains,  
The medium does not owe its purity to any specific intrinsic property that 
differentiates it from juridical means, but to its relation to them…pure violence is that 
which does not stand in a relation of means toward an end, but holds itself in relation 
to its own mediality… pure violence is attested to only as the exposure and deposition 
of the relation between violence and law.” (Agamben, 2005, p. 62) 
 
It was in this context of a deposition of a relation between law and violence that the “pure” 
violence of the 1990s was exposed and could only be perceived paradoxically in its very non-
relation to law. This violence in non-relation to law was not a means to an end, but instead a 
pure medium, what Benjamin calls a “manifestation” (Benjamin cited in Agamben, 2005, p. 
62). While the violence that took place within the South African context, as Du Toit (1993) 
argues, had always, even in attempting to overturn the law, sought to maintain a relation with 
it, “pure violence exposes and severs the nexus between law and violence and can thus appear 
in the end not as violence that governs or executes…but as violence that purely acts and 
manifests” (Agamben, 2005, p. 62).   
 
                                            
 
23
 It is important to note that Benjamin‟s conception of “purity” was about the relation of violence to law, rather 
than a substantive characteristic of the violent action itself. Benjamin argues, “The task of a critique of violence 
can be summarized as that of expounding its relation to law and justice” (cited in Agamben, 2005, p. 61). 
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Narrating an Original Site of Power 
The multiplication of explanations of the conflict of the 1990s thus concerned not only the 
ambiguity of the exception itself but the complexity of its relation with the juridico-political 
order, one of inclusive exclusion, which implied a completely different relation between 
violence and the juridico-political order than South African theory had previously conceived. 
Analysts working within a juridical paradigm could only perceive this relation between 
anomie and the juridical-political in instrumental terms, in which the basis of the state‟s 
authority rested on its ability to monopolise the means of violence, a conception of sovereign 
state power, in which was embedded “a long standing philisophico-political tradition 
according to which violence was to be conceived as instrumental in nature, that is, as a means 
or implement to put to the service of (political) ends” (Hanssen, 2000, pp. 18-19).  
 
Therefore while a number of South African analysts attempted to analyse what they identified 
as the “violence-negotiation nexus” (Everatt, 2003; Sisk, 1995), they could only conceive of 
this “nexus” in instrumental terms. As Sisk argued, “political violence was a tactic used by 
various actors as a „beyond the table‟ tool in pursuit of specific political aims” (Sisk, 1995, p. 
120, own emphasis). Or as Schutte put it, “politics is basically a bargaining process and 
violence is one of the means available to improve one‟s position within the process” (Schutte, 
1998, p. 14). The metaphor of the “hidden hand” used by numerous analysts to refer to covert 
violence (Everatt, 2003; Shutte, Liebenberg & Minnaar, 1998) anthromorphosised this 
functionalist understanding of violence. 
 
However, the anomic violence of the 1990s, which could no longer be seen in instrumental 
relation to the apartheid state, whose “functions and purposes” consequently remained 
oblique precisely because they could not easily be “derived from” or “related to” “primary 
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social processes and political phenomena” or be “readily harnessed to an intelligible public 
cause” (A. du Toit, 1993, p. 6) therefore did not fit into the “„master narrative‟ structuring 
conventional understandings of political violence” (A. du Toit, 1993, p. 1), namely a “pre-
figured narrative by which violence is appropriated to the domain of language” and given 
meaning (Thornton, 1995, p. 14). The lack of instrumental rationality, the “pre-figured 
narrative” in terms of which political violence had previously been understood in the South 
African context, led to the struggles of comprehension among South African analysts of the 
time.  
 
This instrumental conception of power which resides within the sovereign state alone relies 
on a separation between a prior origin of power, as a thing which can be usurped in its 
totality, and the effects of power (violence), “which is reduced to a transparent instrument” 
(Feldman, 1991, p. 3) that simply requires instrumental explanation and rationalisation to 
trace the relation between cause (power) and effect (violence). This led to an intensive 
“metatheoretical” debate at the time of the violence during the 1990s, a conflict over the 
nature of the conflict (P. du Toit, 2001; Horowitz, 1991), which was in fact, in the absence of 
an interrogation of the basis of sovereignty as the monopoly over the means of violence, a 
conflict over the nature of the relation between cause and effect. As Thornton wrote at the 
time “the accounts we most often give of violence either imply or state explicitly that 
violence is the consequence of previous events or that it is the cause of other events” 
(Thornton, 1995, p. 1). 
 
Consequently almost all attempts to “explain” the violence of the early 1990s, were, as Sue 
van Zyl argued, additive, each analysis attempting to find the additional ingredients that 
could explain the relation between a prior cause of power and its violent effects, in terms of a 
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variety of historical, political or sociological accounts, or a “judicious mixture of each” (Van 
Zyl, 1990, p. 2), which could explain the nexus between violence and power. This nexus, 
however, as Agamben argues, is essentially a fiction through which the juridico-political 
order attempts to establish a relation with the anomie that forms its boundary.  
 
Du Toit (1993, p. 3) thus wrote,  
The very nature and purpose of this proliferation of political violence is intensely 
controversial: it is hotly disputed on all sides whether this proliferation of political 
violence should be understood as “ethnic conflicts with deep cultural and historical 
roots”, or as a power and ideological struggle between contending political 
organisations, or as the sinister work of a “third force” behind the scenes, or as a 
consequence of poverty, social disruption and the general lack of political authority, 
or as some combination of all of these. 
  
The illusory nature of this search for an original atemporal origin of power was, however, 
made explicit by the temporality of the conflict itself and the complexities of the identities of 
its participants. As quickly as analysts developed causal explanations based on the unfolding 
of ethnic tensions (Horowitz, 1991), collective identities based on political affiliation were 
claimed by antagonists in struggle. Later further explanations and causes were “discovered”, 
adding layers and layers to an analysis that attempted to incorporate both the unfolding 
trajectory of conflict and the interpretive work of analysts. This would, if all potential causal 
explanations could be finally exhausted, purportedly “explain” violence and reveal its 
“original” truth. In fact what analysts were doing was describing the fleeting articulation of 
power in terms of a particular manifestation of ethnicity, generational cleavage or economic 
division.  
 
Thus the attempt to constitute a fictive relation of linear causality was increasingly contested 
by the unfolding trajectory of the conflict itself, what many analysts referred to as the “self-
perpetuating” nature of violence (Coleman, 1998; Simpson, 1993; Taylor & Shaw, 1998). 
 80 
 
However, over time, as Feldman argues, “political action and institutionalised ideology” 
begin to “form two discontinuous, significative systems”, as  
relations of antagonism…carve out autonomous material spheres of effect and affect 
that diverge from formal political rationalities...political violence is no longer fully 
anchored in ideological codes and conditions external to the situation of enactment 
and transaction. Political enactment becomes sedimented with its own local histories 
that are mapped out on the template of the body. (Feldman, 1991, p. 4)  
 
In this vein Marks (1995) found discontinuities between the “self-identity” (p. 9) of 
participants in the ANCYL in Diepkloof who had been involved in violent action and the 
“identity” of the ANCYL as a social movement organisation. Similarly Segal (1991), in 
her interviews with hostel residents on the East Rand, noted the discrepancy between the 
“perceptions of those involved in political violence, and the coherent explanation of their 
actions advanced by political organisations” (p. 2). Marks (1995), implicitly assuming an 
essential contiguity between political agent and institution, understood the discontinuities 
between the formal political rationalities of the ANC and the actions of ANCYL 
members in terms of a breakdown of the “ideological cohesion” (p. 211) of the ANC, 
which had in the past anchored the actions of its political agents to the formal political 
programme of the organisation but in the context of the flux of the transition period had 
been unable or unwilling to maintain this welding of agent to institution. Segal (1991) 
responded to this theoretical problematic with the truism that “these explanations of the 
violence from the people themselves are often contradictory…because there are a range 
of traditions and ideologies (themselves often contradictory), which may operate 
simultaneously in an individual‟s life” (pp. 2-3). 
 
These explanations, which located the emergence of the authoritarian subject as a 
consequence of a “breakdown of ideological leadership”, could not recognise the biopolitical 
nature of the authority they were confronted with. Critically, the nature of the power that 
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emerges in the context of suspension of law, the context of exception, is a type of power that 
is not invested in formal office but in fact exceeds the rights of formal office, a power that is 
outside the law and inside every citizen, regardless of formal rank: “every citizen appears to 
be invested with a floating and anomalous imperium that resists definition within the terms of 
the normal order” (Agamben, 2005, p. 43). Agamben argues that it is the conflation within 
the modern concept of sovereignty of biopolitical authority (auctoritas) and written law 
(potestas) which has been “the cause of the philosophical inconstancy in the modern theory 
of the state” (Fueyo cited in Agamben, 2005, p. 75), as it is premised on an assumed 
dichotomy between the representation and instantiation of power. While auctoritas attaches 
itself to the body and “springs from the person, as something that is constituted through him, 
lives only in him, and disappears with him” (Heinz cited in Agamben, 2005, p. 82), potestas 
constitutes the pre-established form of legal office into “which the individual enters…and 
which constitutes the source of his power” (Heinz cited in Agamben, 2005, p. 82). Therefore 
auctoritas, unlike the power exercised through magisterial office, “seems to imply not so 
much the voluntary exercise of a right as the actualisation of an impersonal power (potenza) 
in the very person of the auctor” and “has nothing to do with representation” (Agamben, 
2005, p. 77).  
 
Other analysts attempted to hierarchise, to order various causes, triggers, precipitating 
factors, all inevitably informed by their own intellectual biases, lending more weight to some 
factors than others, some emphasising ethnicity (Horowitz, 1991) above political affiliation 
(Aitchison, 2003; Guelke, 1999; Kentridge, 1990; Olivier, 1994), or economic tension 
(Bonner & Ndima, 1999; Heribert & Moodley, 1992; Morris & Hindson, 1992; Sapire, 1992) 
above political identity. These hierarchies were, of course, infinitely contestable, on 
conceptual and empirical grounds. It was impossible to “prove” the claim that much of the 
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tension was generated by ethnic tension, any more than it was possible to prove the primacy 
of the “political” in the conflict. Such proof rested on the demonstration of a causal 
relationship between power and its effects, which remained both empirically and 
conceptually elusive.  
 
Valuable historiographical work on the conflict (Bonner & Nieftagodien, 2001; Khosa, 1991; 
Sapire, 1992; Sitas, 1996), which implicitly sought causality in history, added nuance and 
texture to explanations of the conflict which contested some of the most simplistic causal 
explanations for violence. For example Bonner and Ndima disputed the media and state 
characterisation of the conflict as the result of primordial antagonisms between “Zulus” and 
“Xhosas”, pointing out that  
in the 1940s and 1950s the main axes of ethnic conflict on the Witwatersrand were the 
South Sotho on one side and either Mpondo or Zulu on the other. There are almost no 
recorded group clashes between the Zulu and either the Mpondo or the Xhosa. 
(Bonner & Ndima, 1999, p. 15)  
 
Sitas investigated how the differential meanings invested in the concept of ethnicity among 
hostel residents in the 1980s and the 1990s contributed to the perpetuation of violent conflict: 
in the earlier period lineage, language, values and expressions that were deemed to be 
“ethnic” were used as threads to weave the solidarity of a social movement, unionism. 
In the 1990s these value components became the defining features of division and 
strife. (Sitas, 1996, p. 246) 
 
 
Segal provided a valuable corrective to essentialist characterisations of Zulu hostel residents 
as innately aggressive and “war-like” by conducting a series of interviews with hostel 
residents on the East Rand. Read against a historiographical background of the hostel 
community and the migrant labour system, Segal sought to understand the “worldview” of 
these participants in the conflict, their particular “truth”, by detailing the complexity of their 
historical and contemporary relationship with township communities and the continued 
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salience of ethnic identity, “which is not merely crafted from above by an organisation like 
Inkatha” but “[is] an easy mobilising agent, and is open to manipulation, precisely because it 
has a continued reality in popular consciousness” (Segal, 1991, p. 22). 
 
Sapire‟s (1992) research investigated the significance of Xhosa ethnicity in a range of 
informal settlements on the Witwatersrand as Xhosa ethnic identity emerged as a significant 
new source of social tension in the conflict of the 1990s. Sapire documented how there had 
been an exponential growth of Xhosa immigrants to the Witwatersrand during the mid to late 
1980s. Of particular significance was the migration of a number of Xhosa speakers from the 
former “homelands” of Ciskei and Transkei to Phola Park informal settlement on the East 
Rand. Many of these migrants occupied sites vacated by households who moved to the new 
site and service settlement of Zonkezizwe after 1990 (Sapire, 1992, p. 687). Sapire therefore 
concludes that, “the numbers and social impact of Xhosa-speakers rose significantly in 1990 
due both to direct immigration from the rural areas and to the significant movement into 
informal settlements of Xhosa speakers from hostels, backyard shacks and elsewhere within 
the urban environment” (Sapire, 1992, p. 695).  
 
Bonner and Ndima‟s (1999) work investigating and demonstrating the “origins” of the East 
Rand conflict in a localised economic dispute between rival taxi associations in Katlehong 
attempted, through the recovery of a hidden historical narrative, to contest the dominant 
narrative of conflict in this sub-region, a narrative which also implicitly supported a broader 
thesis about the central role of the IFP as the main “perpetrator” in the contention of the post-
1990 period. While previous analyses of the violence had dated its “genesis” on the East 
Rand to the initiation of a violent political recruitment campaign by the IFP from August 
1990, Bonner and Ndima showed how this phase of conflict had been preceded by a violent 
taxi conflict in Katlehong between a taxi association serving the needs of migrant hostel 
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residents and a rival taxi association, which developed a close association with the urban and 
politically militant student organisation Congress of South African Students (COSAS). The 
IFP as a political formation was significantly absent from these processes of contention, 
therefore Bonner and Ndima were able to add complexity to an analysis which had until then 
tended to caricature the IFP as the progenitor of all conflict on the East Rand, and the East 
Rand township community as the passive recipients of this violence. 
 
This line of investigation yielded much useful description of the ways in which violence 
unfolded, the various forms it took. However, despite the putative intention of analysts to 
discover the “why” of violence, in fact what they were doing was exploring the continually 
unfolding, shifting, malleable, how of power, of political conflict. This became a substitute 
for the why of violence in an analytical paradigm, which, in assuming a juridical conception 
of power, could not in fact admit this why of violence, the articulation between juridico-
institutional and biopolitical power.  
 
Trapped in a model of causality which assumes that a relation of causality can be found, 
analysts remained enmeshed in a debate around the primacy of one causal factor over 
another. However as analysts increasingly faced the aporia of the causal line of investigation 
of the violence, as the “violence developed a momentum of its own”, its “patterns” changing 
over time, as “the effects of earlier factors, in a sense, become new causes” (Schlemmer, 
1991, p. 2), a consensus emerged among some analysts about the “multi-causal” nature of the 
violence, an explanation that recognised that “the search for mono-causal explanations is 
fruitless” (Simpson, 1993, p. 2) but which could not conceptually resolve this theoretical 
problematic within a paradigm of causality. These analysts instead offered lists of descriptive 
factors already identified in previous analyses, ranging from ethnic identity, generational 
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tensions, conflict over scarce resources, psycho-social factors, the failure of the state in its 
duty of protection, or deliberate misuse of its security force, etc., etc., concluding finally that 
“none of these descriptions is completely inaccurate. Yet none, on its own, will properly 
explain this complex situation” (Simpson, 1993, p. 2). Schlemmer, who organised these 
factors into categories of “general background conditions”, “predisposing factors” and 
“triggering events”, therefore concluded that “short-term policies cannot be expected to 
address the diversity of factors which form „chains‟ of causation” and a variety of responses 
was required at each level of causation, whether to address “background conditions”, 
“predisposing factors” or “triggering events” (Schlemmer, 1991, p. 2). 
 
However, as Feldman argues, drawing on Nietzsche‟s critique of the relation between cause 
and effect and his positing instead of “a performance theory of power” (Feldman, 1991, p. 3) 
in which power is the “simultaneous site of origin and effect” (Feldman, 1991, p. 3), this 
separation of the origin of power from its effects is as in fact a “mythic and dramaturgical 
structure within which actions in time are endowed with a singular atemporal origin” 
(Feldman, 1991, p. 3). Thornton therefore argues that if we can only know power through its 
effects, “it cannot be true to say that „power‟ causes violence or that violence is the 
instrument of power…these relationships are always…constructed” (Thornton, 1995, p. 5).  
 
Nevertheless this “perspectivist illusion” (Feldman, 1991, p. 3) remains deeply embedded in 
formal political rationalities that assume that “power distributes itself from some place 
external to its effects, external to its violence” (p. 2-3) and “legitimation resides in the 
construction of a fictive depth” (p. 3), an illusion of cause and effect. This separation of 
origin and effect makes possible a realm of ideological reasoning and instrumental 
legitimation of power, “a counter world of imaginary doubles, agents, and metaphors of 
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moral legitimation – which function as the originary sites of power, of which the act is but the 
derivative symptom” (p. 3), drawing “consciousness away from the concrete material 
investment in acts and effects that reproduce domination in time and space” (p. 3) which 
inhibits and denies the “semantic and material autonomy” of action  (p. 3). Thus, violence 
does not come about as the “realisation of intentions or the attempt to make certain concepts 
concrete, violent acts are often meaningfully constituted only at the moment of their 
commission” (Thornton, 1995, pp. 8-9). 
 
The violence of the 1990s, which could not “be understood in relation to familiar criteria of 
legitimacy and rationality” (A. du Toit, 1993, p. 2) therefore presented a profound problem of 
comprehension in terms of the paradigm of legitimation rationality. Segal noted “the need to 
impose an official sounding order on the overwhelming confusion and horror of violence, the 
need to create light where in fact there is none” (1991, p. 2). Van Zyl, recognising the 
limitations of this instrumental paradigm, argued for a distinction between a “strategic” 
violence, which is open to moral or practical criticism but which does not call for explanation 
as “rationally chosen action” that is “self-explanatory” in terms that are available to the actors 
involved, and violence, which is “symptomatic”, “political in origin but not politically 
motivated” (1990, pp. 1-2, own emphasis).  
 
As Johnston noted of the conflict in KwaZulu-Natal: “despite its clear political overtones, the 
violence…is relatively „inarticulate‟ in that no organized participant has an acknowledged 
paramilitary strategy” (Johnston, 1997, p. 84). Similarly Segal, who interviewed hostel 
residents on the East Rand, did not find that participants in the conflict articulated strategic 
political motivations  
The interviews conducted reveal a shifting assortment, a “kaleidoscope” of 
explanations. The apparent incoherence of the explanations at times indicates that the 
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view of violence as constructed from below, the human face of violence, is far more 
diffuse and complex than most media or political accounts portray. (Segal, 1991, p. 2) 
 
Van Zyl‟s (1990) analysis distinguishing the subject‟s articulated political motive from the 
substance of the political offered the possibility of a different reading of the “political” as the 
place of the exception, on the boundaries of the juridico-political order. However this was 
largely lost in a South African conceptual paradigm in which “the political” was conceived in 
terms of an instrumental relation between cause and effect within the juridico-political order, 
namely, an articulated political intent linked directly to an act carried out in furtherance of 
these stated intentions. Pierre du Toit (2001), analysing the political violence of the 1990s, 
defined it as “harm inflicted primarily from political motives” (p. 116, own emphasis), a 
relation between political intention and violent act that would later be institutionalised within 
the TRC.  
 
Therefore, while, as Feldman argues, the separation between the cause and effect of power is 
constituted through a “mythic and dramaturgical structure” through which manifestations of 
power in time are given a singular atemporal prior origin, violence is in fact “peculiarly 
temporal” (Thornton, 1995, p. 2) and profoundly unpredictable; “the proximate causes of 
violence are often so complex that it is rarely possible to know exactly or precisely what 
triggered a violent event” (Thornton, 1995, p. 9). It is instead a case of  “passing 
epiphenomena” (A. du Toit, 1990, p. 119), which “necessarily disturbs all structural causal or 
narrative sequences and continuities” (Thornton, 1995, p. 3) and therefore cannot be properly 
instrumental. We can know of the possibility or even the probability of violence but in fact 
we can only really know violence in retrospect (Thornton, 1995), and it is in this 
retrospective perspective that we construct a relation between a prior cause of power and its 
violent effects.  
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Therefore, these fleeting manifestations of power are converted, through our own 
retrospective narrative constructions, into “metaphorical and metonymical structures”, 
reconstituting what would otherwise be “passing epiphenomena as a project of sustained 
intentionalities” (A. du Toit, 1990, p. 119). The past – the “origin” of the effects of power, the 
violent event – is retrieved in the present and transformed into “a social text” (Apter, 1997, p. 
13), “a logic of outcomes” (Apter, 1997, p. 12), which “seems to emerge from the facts of the 
narrative, its truth value irresistible” (Apter, 1997, p. 14). The “inexplicability” of violence, and 
our “perplexity” (Thornton, 1995, p. 3) about it is hence rendered “explicable” (p. 3 ) in an 
“explanatory or narrative account that virtually all of the social sciences and history offer” (p. 
3), which, however, in its dependence “on some notion of spatial or temporal continuity” (p. 
3), is essentially a fictive construction of a relation between cause and effect. We can, in fact, 
“only speculate about causes, which are, in any case, rarely efficient, never unitary, and very 
often not recoverable from evidence and memory” (p. 5).  
 
What we can see and analyse are the consequences of violence, namely the production of the 
biopolitical body, implicitly acknowledged in South African analyses of the conflict, which 
relied on the “numbering of the dead” (Aitchison, 1988) by a variety of monitoring 
agencies24. However, the signification of these bodies was profoundly contested. It was in the 
denotation of these bodies by monitoring agencies and other analysts that “violence comes to 
have public meaning. Incidents, victims and sometimes perpetrators come to acquire their 
political labels…Situations of conflict in hostels, squatter settlements, townships or tribal 
                                            
 
24
 These included most significantly, the Human Rights Commission, the Community Agency for Social 
Enquiry, the Centre for Adult Education at the University of Natal and the South African Institute of Race 
Relations. 
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areas are ranked as wholly or partly „political‟ by inclusion, qualification and/or omission” 
(Johnston, 1997, p. 82).  
 
However, this process of signification was articulated in South African discourse as a debate 
about an obfuscated empirical “truth” that could be resolved through the application of 
“objective” methodology. As Horowitz put it, “the analyst who aims to ameliorate the 
conflict is confronted with the difficult task of combining relentless pursuit of the truth about 
the conflict – and persuasion of the participants that it is the truth” (Horowitz, 1991, p. 30). 
The task of analysis in this paradigm is to “unmask” and recover this origin of power, which 
is also the source of ultimate truth about power25.  
 
Therefore the process of inscribing violence within narrative, culture and juridico-political 
order creates a “metaphor of causation” (Thornton, 1995, p. 15) that we construct through a 
conception of intention. It is the intention which welds violence to power in a causal relation: 
Political violence is violence by virtue…of the violence it intends…a narrative must 
be constructed which will provide the satisfying explanatory linkage to “power”. If 
this linkage…is not constructed, or cannot be constructed, then violence is not 
“political”. (Thornton, 1995, p. 16)  
 
 
The Subject, Negotiating the Relationship between Cause and Effect 
The notion of intention relies on the enlightenment conception of the sovereign subject. And 
it was this conception of the sovereign subject which established the terms on which the 
                                            
 
25
 The paradigmatic example of this was a report, Spotlight on disinformation about Violence in South Africa by 
Anthea Jeffrey of the South African Institute of Race Relations, who in an analysis of the reports of Amnesty 
International, the International Commission of Jurists and the South African based Human Rights Commission, 
charged these organisation with, “disregard…for the rules of evidence and the safeguards of due legal 
process”(Jeffrey, 1992, p. 9), which meant that the legal principle of audi alteram partem (hear the other side) 
should be applied in the compilation of research reports, adding that, “newspaper and other reports are 
admissible in a court of law only if the author is available to testify as to the truth of the report”(Jeffrey, 1992, p. 
17 own emphasis). Implicit in the audi alteram partem principle was a conception of a juridico-political subject 
rather than a biopolitical subject, who can expressly articulate his or her “side” of the story.     
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subject would be understood both in the analysis of the political conflict of the 1990s and the 
subsequent juridico-political inscription of this violence.  
 
Analysis of the conflict of the 1990s therefore frequently attempted to mediate the 
relationship between cause and effect in terms of an implicit assumption of singular 
subjecthood and instrumental agency among its protagonists. Johnston, reviewing analyses of 
the conflict, identified this as “a conceptual orientation towards interpreting the violence in 
terms of adversarial political groupings and assigning agency to the conscious strategies of 
political leadership” (Johnston, 1997, p. 83). In this paradigm the task was to discover an 
essential original subjecthood, the “true” identity of the subject, which may have become 
masked or overlaid by other identities, but which the analyst‟s patient work could in the end 
reveal.  
 
The paradigmatic example of this notion of the subject was the “comtotsi” who knowingly 
masked his or her identity beneath the cloak of political subjecthood, exploiting violent 
conflict for personal gain in concordance with an original, essential “criminal” identity, 
motivated thus by “selfish/criminal purposes as opposed to political motives” (Minnaar, 
1994, p. 1, own emphasis). Minnaar wrote therefore of:  
the so-called „comtsotsis‟ – those who call themselves “comrades” (amaqabane), but 
are in fact “tsotsis” (thugs/criminals) who hide behind political slogans, use political 
activities and the name of specific political organisations to gain power or control of a 
community, but remain just that – “comrade criminals”. (Minnaar, 1994, p. 3) 
 
Kynoch wrote similarly of “criminal opportunists”, who “capitalized on political rivalries 
to justify their actions on ideological grounds…the term „com-tstosi‟ was coined to 
describe self-appointed comrades who utilized violence for personal gain” (Kynoch, 
2005, p. 496).  
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Minnaar implicitly articulated the aporia of these efforts to adjudicate the “political” 
nature of conflict through an unmasking of the original subjecthood of its actors as he 
wrote:  
it has become very difficult to clearly define what political violence or criminal 
violence are and whether they are two distinct types of violence or have become 
interchangeable, i.e. is there any difference between them other than being labelled 
political or having political motives as opposed to selfish/criminal purposes? 
(Minnaar, 1994, p. 1) 
 
Kynoch on the other hand sought to demonstrate historiographically the “criminal” 
dimensions of the “political” conflict of the 1990s and to investigate the extent to which 
the violence was “primarily political” (Kynoch, 2006, p. 8, own emphasis) by looking at 
the continuities between this period of violence and the “culture of violence”, which, he 
argued, “was already ingrained in township society” (Kynoch, 2005, p. 495). Therefore, 
“violent conflicts were frequently instigated by parochial power struggles that acquired 
larger political dimensions only incidentally when the state, ANC or Inkatha become 
involved” (Kynoch, 2005, p. 496, own emphasis). Bonner and Nieftagodien similarly 
critiqued the TRC‟s analysis of the conflict on the East Rand during the 1990s, arguing 
that, as a result of its mandate, it had cast much of the conflict as “political” in nature, 
when in fact “criminal activities may well have been responsible for the largest part of 
the violence in late 1992 and early 1993” (Bonner & Nieftagodien, 2002, p. 191). 
 
This conception of a hierarchy of subjecthood exercised instrumentally also permeated 
other explanations of the conflict, which, for example, sought its origins in the expression of 
an essentialist ethnic identity. Horowitz therefore argued that ethnic affiliations are kept in 
the “attic” of the mind to be “dusted off” when the “home group” is under threat (cited in 
Shaw, 1997, pp. 47- 48). Bonner and Ndima similarly contended that on the East Rand 
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“ethnic stereotypes which had lain dormant in individual consciousnesses were now 
reactivated, collectivised and sharpened” (Bonner & Ndima, 1999, p. 15). Segal notes that 
in the politically volatile climate of the period the continuities and stability offered by 
“older” forms of identity, made ethnic forms of solidarity extremely appealing: “it is the 
depth and endurance of ethnic identities, relative to other forms of allegiance, that brings 
them to the fore in times of crisis” (Segal, 1991, p. 24). 
 
This notion of the sovereign self has, however, been the subject of extensive postmodern 
critique. As Markell writes,  
influential late twentieth-century critiques of the so-called “sovereign self”…focused 
on the widespread image of the human being as paradigmatically the owner of private 
property, with an exclusive right to use and dispose of things under his dominium, 
which seemed to underwrite mainstream contractarian approaches to political thought; 
others focused on model of the self as “unemcumbered” or “atomistic”, which seemed 
to treat human beings as somehow existing above and acting independently of their 
social and historical contexts and bodily matrices. (Markell, 2003, p. 11, original 
emphasis) 
 
Thus, “contractarian political theories and voluntarist conceptions of the self anchor 
sovereignty in the notion of choice” (Markell, 2003, p. 12, original emphasis). In opposition 
to this notion of voluntaristic agency, Markell posits Hannah Arendt‟s “rejections of the 
aspiration to achieve sovereign agency”, which she calls “contradictory to the very condition 
of plurality” (Arendt cited in Markell, p. 13) and to the unpredictability to which that 
condition gives rise (Markell, 2003, p. 13). For Arendt, the history of Western philosophy is 
shot through with misguided efforts to escape the condition of non-sovereignty. (Markell, 
2003, p. 13).  
 
In his critique of the relation between cause and effect within relations of domination, 
Nietzsche therefore “disrupts neat, unmediated relations of linearity between institution and 
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agent” (Feldman, 1991, p. 3). Critically, Feldman argues, Nietzsche does this in order to 
“arrive at a theory of political subjects” (p. 3). This is a political subject who does not exist 
prior to action, who is not the “unified and underlying originator of actions and values” (p. 4), 
the “transcendental subject” of the enlightenment. Radically, Nietzsche instead reversed the 
“authorial positions between act and agent” (p. 3) and in this overturning, agency becomes 
“not the author but the product of doing” (p. 3) and as a result, “power is embedded in the 
situated practices of agents”  (p. 4), practices which can alter the subject themselves.  
 
As a result, Feldman argues, “political agency becomes the factored product of multiple 
subject positions. There can be no guarantee of a unified subject, as actors shift from one 
transactional space to another and from discourse to somatic practice” (Feldman, 1991, p. 4). 
Because agency is embedded in the praxis of actors themselves, rather than being extrinsic to 
its site of instantiation within the subject, political agency becomes, not an instrument of an 
original source of power, but an “embodied force”, a biopolitical power, in which “the 
political subject, particularly the body (is) the locus of manifold material practices” (p. 1). 
Thus, “ethnicity and ideology are literally sunk into the material density of the body” (p. 71) 
which becomes the locus “for the elimination and purification of political substance” (p. 71) 
and “the violent dematerialization of the body as the prescribed site for the lodgement and 
dislodgement” of the ideologically and ethnically coded corpse  (p. 71).  
 
The biopolitical subject 
Thus if subjecthood is literally sunk into the material density of the body, it concerns “life” 
itself. Agamben approaches this problematic through the ancient Greek distinction between 
different forms of “life”, a word for which the Greeks had no single term. This distinction 
involved a differentiation between zoē, “which expressed the simple fact of living common to 
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all living beings (animals, men, or gods)”, and bios, which was “not at all simple natural life 
but… a particular way of life” (Agamben, 1998, p. 1); critically bios was politically qualified 
life. In the classical world, simple natural life, zoē, is excluded from the polis or political life.  
 
This distinction, articulated originally by Aristotle as an opposition between the simple fact 
of living (to zēn) and politically qualified life (to eu zēn), was to become the canonical 
foundation of the Western political tradition, delineating two conceptually distinct realms, the 
juridico-political and the organic fact of life itself. It was not until Foucault introduced the 
concept of biopolitics that the intersection between these two realms was even contemplated.  
 
For Foucault, “the process by which natural life begins to be included in the mechanisms and 
calculations of State power, and politics turns into biopolitics” (Agamben, 1998, p. 3) was the 
defining event of modernity. “For millennia...man remained what he was for Aristotle: a 
living animal with the additional capacity for political existence; modern man is an animal 
whose politics calls his existence as a living being into question” (Agamben, 1998, p. 3). 
 
Taking up Foucault‟s project of examining the intersection between natural life and political 
life but rejecting his teleology leads Agamben to posit this intersection, the inclusion of “bare 
life” in the political realm and “the production of the biopolitical body” as the “original 
activity of sovereign power”, “the secret tie uniting power and bare life” , which the “modern 
State…does nothing other than bring to light” (Agamben, 1998, p. 6). 
 
If the inclusion of natural life in political life is not simply a phenomenon of modernity, 
preceded by a long age in which zoē and bios remained distinct, “it will be necessary to 
reconsider the sense of the Aristotelian definition of the polis as the opposition between life 
(zēn) and good life (eu zēn). The opposition is in fact, at the same time an implication of the 
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first in the second, of bare life in politically qualified life” (Agamben, 1998, p. 7). Thus the 
political is not a separate realm to natural life, rather, “what had to be politicized [was] 
already always bare life” (Agamben, 1998, p. 7). 
 
Therefore politics is not about an opposition between life and a “supplement” or an 
“additional capacity” to the simple fact of living (zoē) shared by all living beings, but instead 
an implication of this fact of living in politically qualified life. Instead of an instrumental 
relation between zoē and the polis, simple life and a supplement of the political, a different 
form of relation constitutes the political, critically a relation of exception, a relation which 
attempts to effect a space between “bare life” and the “good life” within life, not in addition 
to or as an attribution of life.  
 
Politics therefore is the realm in which this relation is constituted, it is the terrain in which 
bare life (zoē) is transformed (not added to or supplemented) into a different form of being, 
namely “bios”, the good life.  
 
Politics is therefore about a threshold where the ontological relation between living being and 
political being, between zoē and bios, is articulated. This relation, this threshold of 
transformation, is maintained in terms of an exception, an inclusive exclusion. 
 
Homo sacer  
Critically, it is the figure of homo sacer (sacred life) that embodies this ontological relation of 
exception that constitutes the political, a human figure which exists in an ambiguous zone of 
indistinction between zoē and bios, a liminal status between simple, animal life and political 
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life, analogous with the Germanic figure of the bandit or friedlos (without peace) who when 
banned from the city becomes a “wolf-man”,  
not a piece of animal nature without any relation to law and the city…rather, a 
threshold of indistinction between animal and man, physis and nomos, exclusion and 
inclusion: the life of the bandit is the life of the loup garou, the werewolf, who is 
precisely neither man nor beast, and who dwells paradoxically within both while 
belonging to neither. (Agamben, 1998, p. 105, original emphasis) 
 
It is in the zone of indistinction between the animal and the human, the zone of exception, 
that Hobbes‟ “state of nature” lies when he establishes sovereignty “by means of reference to 
the state in which „man is wolf to men‟” (Agamben, 1998, p. 105). This state of nature “is not 
a prejudicial condition that is indifferent to the law of the City” (p. 106). The Hobbesian state 
of nature is the exception, “a principle internal to the City” (p. 105), “continually operative in 
the civil state in the form of sovereign decision”, which appears at the moment the city is 
considered “as if it were dissolved” (p. 105). In this state of exception and of nature, “it is not 
so much a war of all against all as…a condition in which everyone is bare life (and therefore 
may be killed with impunity) and a homo sacer for everyone else” (p. 106). Thus all are both 
sovereign, with the absolute right to decide life and death, as well as bare life, subject to this 
absolute prerogative over life and death in “a zone of indistinction and continuous transition 
between man and beast, nature and culture” (p. 109).  
 
A number of South African analysts noted this condition of exception in which bare life and 
sovereign power enter into a zone of indistinction; however, they could only conceive of this 
indistinction in terms of the friend–enemy antithesis. Du Toit therefore noted of the period of 
the violence of the 1990s, “the distinction between combatant and non-combatant was more 
ambiguous and that between enemy and ally more uncertain” (P. du Toit, 2001, p. 78). 
Simpson, Mokwena and Segal also noted the ambiguity of the “enemy” during this period; 
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“the legalisation of the previously banned political movements has replaced the externalised 
enemy with an enemy within” (1991, p. 2). Johnstone wrote of  
the absence of clearly demarcated roles which often give shape to violent political 
conflicts. Who are the “authorities” and who are the “insurgents”. Which conception 
of an “order” (in the sense of a set of values, institutions and material conditions to be 
defended or challenged) represents the fixed point from which we may plot the 
orientation of participants? (Johnston, 1997, p. 85) 
 
However, what the “enemy within”, the “confusion” between protagonist and antagonist 
denoted, was not a simple relation of inclusion and exclusion but a more originary relation, in 
which “the „estrarity‟ of the person held in the sovereign ban is more intimate and primary 
than the extraneousness of the foreigner” (Agamben, 1998, p. 110). 
 
The ambiguity of homo sacer, or sacred man, as originally expressed in Roman law is the 
juxtaposition of two apparently contradictory traits within this one individual who has been 
judged “on account of a crime” and stands outside ius divinum (religious law) and therefore 
may not be sacrificed according to the prescribed ritual practices, and yet on the other hand 
also stands outside human law (ius humanum) and can therefore be killed with impunity by 
anyone without this being considered homicide, implying thus a suspension of the application 
of the law in the unpunishability of this killing.  
 
Therefore homo sacer stands in a relation of double exception from both human and divine 
law, namely, a relation of the ban in which  
he who has been banned is not, in fact, simply set outside the law and made 
indifferent to it but rather abandoned by it, that is, exposed and threatened on the 
threshold in which life and law, outside and inside, become indistinguishable. It is 
literally not possible to say whether the one who has been banned is outside or inside 
the juridical order. (Agamben, 1998, p. 29) 
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The relation of the ban connotes the relation of exception, “the originary structure in which 
law refers to life and includes it in itself by suspending it”, thus homo sacer stands in a 
relation of ban to the juridico-political order, a relation of profound ambiguity, in which he 
who has been banned is both excluded from the community and is subject to “the command 
and insignia of the sovereign” (Agamben, 1998, p. 28). 
 
As a consequence of this ambiguous relation of the ban,  
what defines the status of homo sacer is…the violence to which he finds himself 
exposed. This violence – the unsanctionable killing that, in his case, anyone may 
commit – is classifiable neither as sacrifice nor as homicide, neither as the execution 
of a condemnation to death nor as sacrilege. Subtracting itself from the sanctioned 
forms of both human and divine law, this violence opens a sphere of human action 
that is neither the sphere of sacrum facere nor that of profane action. (Agamben, 
1998, pp. 82-83) 
 
 
Thus this is a type of human action which “takes the form of a zone of indistinction between 
sacrifice and homicide” (Agamben, 1998, p. 83). At the two extremes of the juridico-political 
order are two symmetrical figures, the sovereign, “with respect to whom all men are 
potentially homines sacri” (sacred men) and homo sacer, “with respect to whom all men act 
as sovereigns” (Agamben, 1998, p. 84). The two are joined by the originary juridico-political 
relation of the ban and an ambiguous human action, the unpunishable killing that excepts 
itself from both human and divine law. Therefore,  
the sovereign sphere is the sphere in which it is permitted to kill without committing 
homicide and without celebrating a sacrifice, and sacred life – that is, life that may be 
killed but not sacrificed – is the life that has been captured in this sphere. (Agamben, 
1998, p. 83) 
 
Thus homo sacer “presents the originary figure” of the political relation, “the originary 
exclusion through which the political dimension was first constituted” (Agamben, 1998, p. 
83) and the “human victim who may be killed but not sacrificed” is the “first content of 
sovereign power” (Agamben, 1998, p. 83). Paradoxically, it is this capturing by sovereign 
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power, in a relation of inclusive exclusion, in which the “sacredness” of man lies; “life is 
sacred only insofar as it is taken into the sovereign exception” (Agamben, 1998, p. 85), but 
this sacredness also denotes an unconditional capacity to be killed or, as Foucault articulated 
it, the power of the sovereign to decide life and death. Thus it is through this relation with 
sovereign power that “human life is included in the political order in being exposed to an 
unconditional capacity to be killed” (Agamben, 1998, p. 85). Therefore, “not simple natural 
life, but life exposed to death (bare life or sacred life) is the originary political element” 
(Agamben, 1998, p. 88, original emphasis), thus “the first foundation of political life is a life 
that may be killed, which is politicized through its very capacity to be killed” (Agamben, 
1998, p. 89) and “human life is politicized only through an abandonment to an unconditional 
power of death” (Agamben, 1998, p. 90).  
 
This chapter has explored the paradoxes of political conception evoked by the violence of the 
1990s, violence which took place in a realm of sovereign exception at the boundaries of the 
juridico-political order. However, analysts working within a juridical conception of power 
could not recognise the nature of the power which lay before them. They misrecognised the 
sovereign exception as a juridical phenomenon which they sought to understand in 
instrumental terms within the juridico-political order as a simple relation between cause and 
effect. The multiplicity of causal explanations which this approach generated exposed the 
aporia of this juridical line of investigation. This chapter instead posits a different conception 
of the “political” as the site of sovereign exception at the boundary of the juridico-political 
order. This is an irrevocably ambiguous realm, which nevertheless creates the conditions of 
possibility for juridico-political order but which the analysts of the violence of the 1990s 
struggled to interpret in a juridical paradigm. What the violence of the 1990s exposed, as the 
form of the state dissolved, was this originary site of the “political” and the relation of 
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inclusive exclusion through which it is constituted, in the inscription of bare life (homo sacer) 
within sovereign power. It is these processes of sovereign inscription to which we now turn in 
an investigation of the originary struggle for juridico-political order in Moleleki Extension 2, 
which would ultimately lead to the inscription of sovereign power in the bodies of the 
Moleleki dead. 
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CHAPTER THREE: A STRUGGLE OF JURIDICO-POLITICAL ORDERING 
Introduction 
Having re-read the violence of the 1990s in terms of the exception, not as was normatively 
assumed to be a consequence of a breakdown of juridico-political order and the political 
sovereignty of the state, but as an exposure of sovereign exception, at the boundaries of the 
juridico-political order, this chapter empirically investigates this “exposure” of sovereignty 
during the negotiation process in terms of the originary struggles of sovereign exception in 
the small township of Moleleki Extension 2 on the eve of the inauguration of South Africa‟s 
first popularly elected government. This was a struggle for sovereign exception, in a national 
context of exception, which would create the very conditions of possibility for the juridico-
political order of the post-apartheid state. In these struggles of decision on the exception, are 
revealed, as Schmitt argues (cited in Agamben, 1998, p. 19), the essence of State authority, 
the principle of sovereignty.  
 
Moleleki Extension 2, a Space 
In 1993, as the old South African state waned and the new state was yet to be inaugurated by 
the country‟s first popular elections in 1994, the informal settlement of Moleleki Extension 2 
was being established, on the south east edge of Katlehong township, its western boundary 
traced by the Natalspruit river, in which the ANCYL leader “Wips” Motloung, would later be 
found, drowned, his face partly consumed by the fish that swam in this river.  
 
The urgency of the struggle for sovereign exception in Moleleki, on the eve of the country‟s 
first national democratic elections, was the critical effect of an originary struggle for juridical 
order (Ordnung). This struggle took place as the physical territory of Moleleki Extension 2, 
201 hectares of land on portion 141 of the farm Rietfontein was registered as a township in 
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November 1992. This land was therefore included, thirteen months before the Moleleki 
execution, in the administrative and geographical framework of South Africa‟s apartheid 
townships in terms of the “Black Communities Development Act” (Schyff, Baylis, Gericke & 
Druce, 1991), under a nomos of racial exclusion, still in force but in suspension on the eve of 
the country‟s first democratic elections.  
 
The pressure for land to house South Africa‟s growing urban population since the relaxation 
of influx controls by the apartheid state in the mid-1980s had been intense. The East Rand 
and Katlehong in particular, of which Moleleki Extension 2 became part through 
administrative fiat in November 1992, had been subject to significant urbanisation pressures. 
By the 1990s, the average stand in Katlehong housed approximately 22-30 people 
(Mashabela, 1988). Moleleki Extension 2 thus formed part of a local municipal “Katlehong 
Outline Plan”, which attempted to address an estimated potential shortfall of 40 000 houses in 
Katlehong by the year 2000, through a variety of forms of housing and land development 
(Schyff et al, 1991, p. 2).  
 
This small extension to the township of Katlehong therefore sought to attempt to address 
some of these problems of land and housing through the establishment of Moleleki Extension 
2 as what was known as a “site and service” area, a bare carving out of 200m square pockets 
of land, without electricity or housing, basic water reticulation providing merely one water 
point for every 20 erven
26
 (Schyff et al, 1991, p. 3) . 
 
                                            
 
26
 Erf, n pl erven (Engineering / Civil Engineering) South African a plot of land, usually urban, marked off for 
building purposes [Afrikaans] (Retrieved from The Free Dictionary: http://www.thefreedictionary.com/erven) 
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Thus the administrative registration of Moleleki Extension 2 as a township in November 
1992 constituted the township on paper, in administrative edict. However it was the struggle 
of juridical and territorial ordering between the ANCYL and the SDU in the township which 
was to substantively constitute this geographical space. This was a space which, like many 
apartheid townships, was denoted as such, as space, a mere circumference of physical land, 
an extension, its content, without name, simply areas, blocks, zones. It was in such a 
conventional South African zone of territorial, juridical and ontological anomie, namely, 
Blocks A-F of Moleleki Extension 2 that the struggle for sovereign exception took place and 
culminated in the execution, which attempted to localise the exception in the bodies of 
ANCYL members.   
 
Critically, these struggles of juridico-political order in Moleleki took place within a national 
context of juridico-political anomie, a context of suspension of juridico-political order. It was 
in this environment that the township of Moleleki  had been administratively constituted in 
terms of the law of apartheid under the auspices of the then Katlehong City Council, its plans 
approved by the Transvaal Provincial Administration as consistent with standards entitled 
“Ruimtelike standaarde vir Uitlegplanne in Swart dorpe, 1985” (Standards for Spatial Layout 
in Black townships) and approved as a “development area” in terms of section 33 of the 
Black Communities Development Act 4 of 198427 (Schyff et al, 1988, p. 2).  
 
                                            
 
27
 In terms of apartheid legislation, which saw black people as permanently excluded from the “white” national 
state, confined instead to ethnically designated Bantustan states, this Act provided for, “the purposeful 
development of Black communities outside the national states; to amend and consolidate certain laws which 
apply with reference to such communities; and to provide for matters connected therewith” (Black Communities 
Development Act 4 of 1984). (Legislation. Retrieved from City of Cape Town: 
http://www.capetown.gov.za/EN/PLANNINGANDBUILDING/PUBLICATIONS/LANDUSEMANAGEMEN
T/Pages/LegislationPart1.aspx) 
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However, during the four years between the initial application for the establishment of the 
township of Moleleki Extension 2 under the Black Communities Development Act in 1988 
and the eventual establishment of the township in 1992, the administrative infrastructure of 
“black” local government under which the township had initially been conceived and planned 
had substantively collapsed in the face of sustained national resistance to apartheid municipal 
governance from the mid 1980s onwards.  
 
A black local authority had been established in Katlehong in 1984 in terms of the Black Local 
Authorities Act of 1982 (Mashabela, 1988), which attempted to transfer responsibility for 
local apartheid governance to black municipal authorities and generated widespread national 
resistance as municipal authorities without access to any income from dormitory townships, 
increased rents in order to generate revenue for municipal administration. A national uprising 
against local councils, primarily conducted under the auspices of the United Democratic 
Front, which had been established in 1983, led to the collapse of many of these local councils 
in townships around the country after violent protests against the Lekoa Black Local 
Authority in the Vaal region of the PWV in September 1984 launched what was then known 
as “the Vaal uprising” (Chaskalson & Seekings, 1988). From the beginning of the uprising on 
the Reef in September 1984, Katlehong experienced school and consumer boycotts leading 
the council to resign in 1985 as protests intensified. A rent and service charge increase 
introduced at the beginning of January 1986 was suspended indefinitely (Mashabela, 1988). 
 
The intensity of this struggle to tie juridico-political order to territory was not only the 
consequence of an originary processes of geographic establishment as the physical territory 
of Moleleki was marked out in the bushveld adjoining the Natalspruit river, but was also the 
consequence of a context of national political extremis inaugurated by the start of the 
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negotiation process, which substantively suspended the old order for the duration of a four 
year period of negotiations between former political opponents. This period of interregnum, 
of juridico-political suspension, unleashed what Agamben has called a “force of law” without 
law, an anomic violence which was to claim at least 16 000 lives nationally between 1990 to 
1994 (Coleman, 1998, p. 243) and which left approximately three thousand people dead on 
the East Rand (Shaw, 1997, p. 30), the Moleleki executed among them.  
 
In the year between the administrative registration of Moleleki Extension 2 as a township in 
November 1992 and the atrocity of the Moleleki execution on 7 December 1993, as the 
blocks of the new settlement were marked out, a process of juridico-political ordering took 
place that sought to tie this new land unequivocally to a hierarchy of authority in the 
township and in this establishment of juridical and territorial ordering, to constitute an 
irrevocable boundary against anomie, against the violence sweeping the East Rand in 1993, 
as the township was being established. Shaw writes: 
violence on the East Rand was the determinant of conflict on the Reef as a whole for 
1993; of the 2 000 deaths in violence in the PWV in 1993 over 1 600 or 80% took 
place in the industrial towns and townships east of Johannesburg...the East Rand 
showed a 153% increase in numbers killed (Shaw, 1997, p. 32).  
 
This horror of sovereign power, unleashed from law, “where the community took the law 
in their own hands” (TRC, 1998a, p. 132), was inscribed in the wounds of more than 544 
bodies reported abandoned on the public streets of the Kathorus townships of Katlehong, 
Thokoza and Vosloorus between July and September 1993.  
 
This was a context which was thus “infested with violence” (TRC, 1998a, p. 11) “surrounded 
by violence” (TRC, 1998a, p. 283), “engulfed in violence” (TRC, 1998a, p. 179), a situation 
that therefore “demanded violence” (O. Motlokwa, personal interview, 2001), a state of 
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necessity where “there was no choice, everybody was new in Moleleki, therefore we had to 
defend, it was a crisis situation” (M. Sonti, personal interview, 2001).  
 
It was against this anomie, this “engulfing” by violence, that the struggle to constitute a 
boundary against this violence, in a localization of territory and juridico-political ordering, 
took place.  
 
However, the boundary which could exclude anomie proved elusive, permeable, 
unlocalisable. It was around this space of anomie, this space of exception, which had not yet 
been annexed to the juridical political order of the township, that the contest for sovereign 
authority in Moleleki revolved. The struggle to annex this space to the juridico-political order 
of the township of Moleleki was to constitute an ongoing anomie in the nomos of the 
township. 
 
It was in such a space of physical and juridical anomie, the geographic “no-man‟s land”, 
literally the land that belonged to no-one, an area of as yet uninhabited grassland on the edge 
of the township of Moleleki, that the execution took place. Jabulani Amon Mtwalo, a 
survivor of the execution, explains, “We were taken to the last shack in Block F right towards 
the veld, the last line in Block F…They took us to that shack, it was still under construction it 
was not complete” (TRC, 1998a, p. 685). 
 
 
Tying Land to Juridical Order on the East Rand 
Therefore the struggle for sovereign exception in Moleleki has to be located within a wider 
context of conflict on the East Rand, which by the time Moleleki township was being 
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established at the end of the 1992, had significantly carved up the space of the East Rand into 
politico-ethnic territorial “strongholds” under the sovereign authority of either the IFP or the 
ANC. 
This violent tying of Ordnung (juridical order) and Ortung (territory) had sought, in a radical 
localisation of the relation between territory and juridico-political order, to expiate the 
irreducible ambiguity of the sovereign exception in the townships of the East Rand, in violent 
inscriptions of this exception in the bodies of the citizens of these townships.  
 
Thus during the initial stages of the conflict on the East Rand, hostels and townships were 
progressively “cleansed” of any of the social heterogeneity which had previously 
characterised them. Hostels became bastions of exclusive identity, in particular Zulu ethnic 
identity, as reciprocal movements of people from hostel and township, frequently under 
physical coercion, took place. “Non-Zulus” were driven from hostels at the same time as 
people identified as “Zulu” were driven from townships into hostels. These zones of pure 
identity were physically separated by zones of anti-identity, the “no-go zone”, across which 
the battle for hegemony was waged and which marked the boundaries against which 
solidarity was formulated.  
 
A joint report by the Independent Board of Inquiry and Peace Action describes the no-man‟s 
land which formed a buffer zone between the hostel and township on the East Rand: 
This area is completely deserted. Burnt out houses and empty streets bear testimony to 
the devastation which violence has wrought on this community. The danger of sniper 
fire from gunmen hiding in the ruins means that only security forces driving in 
armoured vehicles are willing to cross this area. (Independent Board of Inquiry & 
Peace Action, 1993, p. 2)  
 
The “no-man‟s land” was the antithesis of space. It was space that could not be used, which 
excluded uniformly. In it was distilled all the identities and antagonisms of the conflict as 
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well as the absence of these within the space of the no-man‟s land. This exclusion represented 
the antagonists‟ differences to each other, “automatically (codifying) the other side of the 
barricade as an immanent source of transgression” (Lacan cited in Feldman, 1991, p. 35). 
These processes of territorial reordering precipitated massive geographical movements of 
people across the spaces of the East Rand during the three years preceding the execution as 
residents fled persecution and violence, particularly on the boundaries of what were to 
become the “no-go” zones, what Feldman refers to as the “interface”, “the topographical-
ideological boundary sector that physically and symbolically demarcates ethnic 
communities…from each other” (Feldman, 1991, p. 28). This process of geographical 
relocation and social reordering constituted the critical spaces of the East Rand conflict, the 
hostel and township as two axial poles, metonyms for the relations of antagonism between 
“politico-ethnic” geographic blocs constituted by and through violence.  
 
In the year of the Moleleki execution, these processes of topographical and political 
reordering of space were still ongoing on the East Rand. In January 1993, a systematic 
programme of political coercion was undertaken against residents of Phenduka section in 
Thokoza who failed to actively and visibly assert their association with the IFP, while in 
Katlehong between May and July later the same year, a violent process of “ethnic cleansing” 
was undertaken against Zulu speakers, or a more malleable “other” which could include 
residents perceived to have any type of association with the IFP or hostel residents (Independent 
Board of Inquiry & Peace Action, 1993, p. 23). The majority of these “others” expelled from 
Katlehong township were migrants from KwaZulu-Natal living in shacks in Katlehong who 
were forced to flee to the hostels of Kwesine and Buyafuthi, by now armed and fortified ethnico-
political enclaves, effecting, as in similar reciprocal campaigns of arson and intimidation taking 
place across the East Rand during this period, a radical “denial of space” (Feldman, 1991) for 
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these violently constituted “others”, anomalous now in a new spatial homogeneity in the 
territory of the township.  
 
Thus the spatialisation of power which took place in Moleleki Extension 2 during 1993 
occurred at the margins of and was part of this wider process of Ordnung and Ortung on the 
East Rand. 
 
Tina Mootsi, whose son, Edward Mootsi, died in the execution, was subjected to these 
processes of violent territorialisation in the neighbouring informal settlement of Zonkezizwe, 
which constituted this area as an IFP “stronghold”.  This process helped constitute the 
boundary against which the homogeneity of Moleleki Extension 2 as an ANC area could be 
substantiated, a boundary of enmity which the SDU that would later execute Tina‟s child 
would claim to substantiate its sovereignty in the township.   
 
Zonkezizwe, the informal settlement on the southern border of Moleleki‟s outermost and 
most contested section, Block F, formed a continuous part of the administrative and 
geographical municipal plan for the development of the Greater Katlehong area (Schyff et al,  
1991, p. 4). 
 
However in the contest for sovereign authority which unfolded in Moleleki in the year after 
its establishment, the geographical boundary with Zonkezizwe, a single line on the edge of 
the municipal map of Moleleki Extension 2, would constitute a critical boundary evoked by 
the SDU in Moleleki, against the other of the “IFP” township, Zonkezizwe, in its struggle for 
sovereign exception. As an ANCYL member explained, “They‟d [the SDU] say Zonke is 
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attacking. But to tell you the truth there is no enemy that ever came to this section to attack. It 
was all lies” (ANCYL, focus group, 2001).  
 
While the contest between township and hostel stood at the emblematic centre of the bloody 
internal conflict of the 1990s, Moleleki Extension 2 did not experience direct conflict with 
the hostels surrounding the township Katlehong, of which it formed part. The geographical 
distance of Moleleki Extension 2 from the hostels that bordered Katlehong meant that the 
boundary of enmity in Moleleki was articulated in terms of the physical proximity of the 
informal settlement, Zonkezizwe, rather than in terms of the hostels which had been 
implicated in conflict with the older township.  
 
The efforts of the SDU in Moleleki Extension 2 to yoke territory to juridical order against the 
boundary of Zonkezizwe, and to invoke this as an unambiguous “other”, had been made 
possible by earlier struggles of sovereign exception in Zonkezizwe, which cleansed its space 
of political and ethnic diversity through violent contests, which tied an irrevocable ethnic and 
political identity to this bare informal settlement and constituted it as an IFP “stronghold”.  
 
The space in which the Moleleki execution would eventually take place was the geographic 
“no-man‟s land”, which formed the physical and metaphorical boundary between Moleleki 
Extension 2 and Zonkezizwe. 
 
 Thus the spatialisation of power that took place in Moleleki Extension 2 occurred within a 
wider national nexus of Ordnung and Ortung, which constituted the township, at its original 
establishment as a homogeneity, against the boundary of an IFP “other”. Chairperson Judge 
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Sandile Ngcobo, questioning SDU amnesty applicant Oscar Motlokwa, assumes this 
spatialisation of power, the de facto sovereignty of the IFP and ANC in hostel and township 
respectively:  
 
CHAIRPERSON: The position is that the townships were then occupied by ANC 
members in Katlehong, is that right?  
MR MOTLOKWA:  Accept (sic) just one, Zongezizwe. Zongezizwe was inhabited by 
the IFP but the rest of them were ANC. (TRC, 1998a, p. 135)  
 
Critically, however, this spatialisation of power in the territory of Moleleki against the 
boundary of the IFP “other” was not the result of a violent reordering within the township as 
had occurred on the rest of the East Rand, but was instead the result of these wider processes 
of territorialisation, the geographic inscription of an embodied subjectivity, within the 
territory of Moleleki, as residents of Katlehong and surrounding townships came to Moleleki 
Extension 2 as, Zola Sonti argues, ANC members, “previously living in shacks” (M. Sonti, 
personal interview, 2001). As SDU member Oscar Motlokwa later affirmed,  
MR MADASA: Now, was Moleleki from A to F inhabited by the members of the 
ANC? 
 MR MOTLOKWA:  That is correct. (TRC, 1998a, p. 135) 
 
 
Homo sacer, defining the boundaries of the political community 
It was this putative party political homogeneity in Moleleki Extension 2 which later led the 
TRC to dispute the “political motive” of the protagonists in the conflict that unfolded after 
the township was established. 
 
In the context of this political party uniformity SDU and ANCYL members articulated the 
boundaries of sovereign conflict in Moleleki in terms of the need to defend the “community” 
against the “criminal” other, accusing “one another of failing to protect the community and of 
engaging in criminal activities instead” (Truth and Reconciliation Amnesty Hearing 
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Decision, 1998, p. 4). While these mutual assertions of criminality led the TRC to reject the 
amnesty application of the SDU members, what both SDU and ANCYL members were in 
fact articulating, in their representation of the boundaries of enmity in terms of the “criminal” 
rather than the party political opponent, was the “originary figure” of the political relation, 
homo sacer or bare life, whose exclusion defines the boundaries of the political domain. 
Crucially, homo sacer, one who has been judged “on account of a crime”, stands in a relation 
of profound ambiguity to the political juridical order, namely the relation of ban, a relation of 
double exception from both human and divine law. Abandoned therefore by all law, the 
killing of homo sacer is considered neither homicide nor sacrilege.  
 
Therefore it is the sovereign decision on the exception which defines the relation of ban in 
which homo sacer finds himself and which traces a threshold between inside and outside the 
juridico-political order. Paradoxically, it is through this relation of sovereign ban that human 
life is first politicised through its very capacity to be killed. In the “state of nature” 
(Agamben, 1998, p. 106), a principle that dwells continuously within the City but which is 
exposed when the City appears “as if it were dissolved” (Agamben, 1998, p. 105), exists a 
condition in which all are both sovereign, with the absolute power to decide life and death, as 
well as bare life, subject to this absolute prerogative over life and death. It was in exactly 
such a context of exception during the period of negotiated transition, a zone of continuous 
transition between bare life and political life, that the struggles of sovereign exception in 
Moleleki took place.  
 
These ambiguities of the sovereign decision on the exception, articulated through the figure 
of the criminal, the friedlos (bandit), who exists in a relation of ban from the community, 
connotes a more originary and intimate relation than a simple relation of inclusion and 
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exclusion, as Oscar Motlokwa explained, “We were looking for an enemy from outside 
whereas we had an enemy within, that is why there was this kind of a conflict”28 (TRC, 
1998a, p. 167, own emphasis). It was thus this figure of the “criminal”, the friedlos who 
usurped and represented the anomie within the township, the anomie of the exception, which 
even in a wider context of territorial and political rigidification on the East Rand, had not yet 
been decisively excluded in Moleleki township itself
29
.  
 
As Agamben argues, the “„estrarity‟ of the person held in the sovereign ban is more intimate 
and primary that the extraneousness of the foreigner”(Agamben, 1998, p. 110). All the 
protagonists involved in the struggle for sovereignty in Moleleki lived in close proximity to 
each other. Civic activist Bulelwa whose murder precipitated the chain of events leading to 
the Moleleki execution, caught the train to work daily with SDU member Zola Sonti. Elphina 
Mngadi whose son Isaac was killed in the execution was the neighbour of several SDU 
members, “I knew them just as my neighbours but there were others I was close to; and they 
would come and visit here because I am speaking Xhosa and they were also speaking Xhosa, 
we were calling each other „homey‟”(E. Mugadi, personal interview, 2001). Jabulani Mtwalo 
explains how he was released moments before the execution because his neighbour, SDU 
                                            
 
 
29
 A number of South African authors have noted similar sovereign struggles to define the boundaries of the 
political community, articulated in terms figure of the “criminal” who exists not extraneously, but in a relation 
of inclusive exclusion, on the margins of the political community. Seekings notes for example that “much 
collective violence on the part of the „community‟ was not directed against targets which were unambiguously 
part of the system, but rather on the margins of the community”(Seekings cited in Beinert, 1992, p. 483). Marks 
in her documentation of the role of youth as “moral defenders of the community” (Marks, 1993, p. 243), notes 
the struggles to define this boundary of “community” in the context of the juridico-political suspension of the 
1990s as the targets of political violence, “became anyone or anything that prevented the Charterist social 
movement from achieving its hegemonic project of a non-racial, democratic South Africa”(Marks, 1993, p. 
269).  Xaba and Ball‟s studies of the violent punishment of “criminals” in South African townships  exposes this 
punishment, not simply as a juridico-political punishment, but as sovereign punishment, a response to “treason” 
against the community, “Anyone considered guilty of these crimes was perceived to be an „enemy‟ of the 
people”(Xaba, 1995, p. 63). 
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member Michael Armoed, recognised him as his son‟s playmate, “[he said] „Comrades, this 
is my boy, he resides right next to my house in Block D‟”(TRC, 1998a, p. 695). 
 
 
Therefore critically what was at issue in these mutual ascriptions of criminality was a contest 
of sovereign decision on the exception that would trace the boundaries between political and 
“bare life” and define who could be a political subject in the wake of the national 
deprohibition of the ANC, under whose sovereignty the township of Moleleki Extension 2 
had been established. Thus while the contest for sovereign authority in Moleleki was 
articulated by its citizens as a conflict over territory and criminality, not a party political 
struggle, what was centrally at issue in these contests was in fact the political party of the 
ANC. Crucially, on the eve of the country‟s first national democratic elections, the content of 
the democracy which this organisation intended, the extent of political subjecthood which it 
foresaw, and in the context of the conflicts of Moleleki, would women, “children” and the 
“ethnic” other be part of this political community or would they remain as “bare life”, 
essential to but excluded from this community. 
 
“Who Must Rule the Area?” A Struggle of Juridico-Political Ordering 
These struggles of sovereign decision on the exception, a “power struggle [over] who must 
rule the area” (ANCYL, focus group, 2001, own emphasis), which would open the space in 
which the determination of a local juridical order within a particular territory could become 
possible, formed the substance of the conflict that took place between the ANCYL and SDU 
in Moleleki Extension 2 in the year after the establishment of the township. The struggles for 
sovereignty between the ANCYL and the SDU in Moleleki, the struggles to define the 
boundaries, the juridico-political substance of this small territory, to unequivocally yoke 
territory to juridical order and constitute the space in which the juridico-political would 
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function in the township, would finally lead to the violent localisation of the exception in the 
bodies of nine ANCYL members, in the atrocity of the execution.   
 
As the blocks of the new township were being physically laid out from November 1992 
onwards, a network of local organisation began to be established, which in the absence of the 
institutional presence of the state, sought to tie territory to juridical order. At the pinnacle of 
this rubric of organisation was the local branch of the civic association, which formed part of 
the national civic organisation at the time, the South African National Civic Association of 
South Africa (SANCO). SANCO was ostensibly an “independent” organisation (TRC, 1998a, 
p. 129), the “umbrella body” in the township (ANCYL, focus group, 2001) that, “is a 
community organisation, it doesn‟t matter whether you belong to the IFP or National Party, it 
belongs to the community” (TRC, 1998a, p. 172, own emphasis). However, from 1991 
SANCO was officially given the responsibility by the ANC for the establishment of SDUs, 
paramilitary defensive structures, which were already rapidly and often chaotically being set 
up across the country as violence escalated. Critically, it was the right of the civic in Moleleki 
to exercise its authority over the township as a whole and over the SDUs in particular that 
became one of the central points of tension in the unfolding conflict over authority in the 
township. Although SDU members in general agreed that the civic was “the main body” (M. 
Sonti, personal interview, 2001), their “mouth piece” (TRC, 1998a, p. 288) and cite a meeting 
called by the civic as the main basis of authority to form a SDU in the township, it was the 
later conflation of the authority of the civic with that of the ANCYL which was to lead to the 
rejection by the SDU of the authority of both the civic and the ANCYL and their counter-
assertion of their right to the decision on the sovereign exception and the articulation of the 
boundaries of the political community in Moleleki.  
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The election of Lethusang Rikaba, already secretary-general of the local ANCYL, as 
secretary-general of the civic in approximately August or September of 1993 was a crucial 
turning point in the contest for sovereign authority in Moleleki. Rikaba argued: “because the 
Civic was the umbrella, everybody in the township submitted to the Civic” (TRC, 1998a, p. 
663, own emphasis).  Crucially, however, it was this “submission” to the civic closely allied 
with the ANCYL under the leadership of Lethusang that was at issue in the struggles for 
sovereign exception in the township. Lethusang explains, “they [the SDU] said SANCO 
wants to rule them and yet, they were independent…they did not want to subscribe to us. 
They said we must subscribe under them” (TRC, 1998a, p. 568). 
 
SDU member Michael Nkomo explains the impact that the election of Lethusang to the 
leadership of the civic had: “The first executive of the civic was very strong but when the 
new executive was appointed with Lethusang as the secretary everything changed. [He] was 
the source of the problem” (M. Nkomo, personal interview, 2001). Importantly, as Oscar 
Motlokwa argued of Lethusang and his fellow civic leader, Mokwena, “They were supposed 
to give proper direction to the youth but they did the opposite” (O. Motlokwa, personal 
interview, 2001, own emphasis). The conflation of youth and civic authority, authority that 
was supposed to “belong to the community”, marked for the SDU a fundamental disputation 
of the legitimate boundaries of sovereign authority in the township, a boundary which quite 
explicitly excluded youth from the domain of the political community.  
 
Therefore in the six months following the initial patrols of the township at the beginning of 
1993, in which ANCYL members participated under the tutelage of the SDU, a profound 
disputation around the content of sovereign authority in the township began to emerge, which 
expressed itself in the conflict between the SDU and the ANCYL, increasingly closely allied 
with the civic association. In this period of juridico-political suspension what was revealed 
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was the tension between biopolitical authority, auctoritas, authority which is embodied and 
invested in the person, and juridico-political authority, authority exercised through 
representative office (Agamben, 2005, p. 77), which are normally conflated under the modern 
juridico-political conception of sovereignty, which assumes the supremacy of potestas 
(written law). 
 
While the ANCYL and the civic association claimed the discourse of rights of the ANC, and 
in this claiming assumed the primacy of potestas, what was revealed in the conflict that 
unfolded in Moleleki was the biopolitical nature of the “Doctrine of the Rights of Man”, 
which inaugurates the citizen of the modern nation state. These “inalienable” rights, 
articulated in written law (potestas) and ostensibly belonging to all human beings by virtue of 
birth were in fact revealed to be a biopolitical status. It is this biopolitical status, rather than 
the simple fact of birth in a particular nation, which in fact defines the right to citizenship and 
the correlate right to participate in the political community (Agamben, 1998). Thus both the 
ANCYL and the SDU rejected the right of the other to exercise authority in Moleleki, in 
terms of a conflation of ethnic, generational and gendered markers, a “reading” of the body as 
an ideological text that,  
constructs a conjuncture of clothing, linguistic dialect, facial appearance, corporal 
comportment, political religious insignia, generalised special movements, and inferred 
residential linkages into a “sign system” that coheres into an iconography of the 
ethnic30 other (Feldman, 1991, pp. 56-57).  
 
Because ethnicity and ideology are literally sunk into the material density of the body, in the 
struggle for the sovereign exception, the body becomes the site for the “violent 
dematerialisation” (Feldman, 1991, p. 71) of ideological codes essentialised in the corpus and 
                                            
 
30
 Note here that the term ethnic is used in the sense of biopolitical marks of identification rather than the more 
common use of the term as an ascribed cultural identity.  
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the site for the “elimination and purification of political substance” (p. 71) that took place in 
the final atrocity of the execution. 
 
SDU members bore these “ethnic” insignia in the blankets that they wore as they patrolled 
the township
31
; in the “Xhosa traditional dresses” (TRC, 1998a, p. 148) they wore when they 
went to rallies, which led ANCYL members to regard the SDU “as a Xhosa dominated 
thing” (TRC, 1998a, p. 148); in the “magic” they used – as an ANCYL member explained, 
“they are the ones who came with the strategy of ntelezi32 so that they could become the 
SDUs for this section as a whole… So that is why the SDU was dominated by older people” 
(ANCYL, focus group, 2001); in the songs they sang
33
; and in the residential history they 
shared, as Oscar Motlokwa explained: “the majority of SDU people come from rural 
areas…Transkei, Lesotho, Pietersburg…then the youth come from the township” (O. 
Motlokwa, personal interview, 2001).
34
  
 
This conflation of biological markers led the ANCYL to dispute the right of the SDU to claim 
sovereign authority in the township: “they started saying they were not going to be ruled by 
the Xhosa speaking people and they [ANCYL] belonged to the township” (TRC, 1998a, p. 
                                            
 
31
 SDU member Themba Mtshali was told by civic leader Alfred Buthelezi at the site of Bulelwa‟s body, “we 
don‟t want a person wearing a blanket here” (TRC, 1998a, p. 544). 
 
32
 Ntelezi is a a herbal preparation which “protects against misfortune” and is “sprinkled around home and body 
boundaries” (Emmet & Butchart, 2000, p. 169).  In a study of crime and violence in South Africa, it was found 
that for a significant proportion of interviewees, “traditional herbal and spiritual devices constituted an 
important source of protection and prevention” for residents to, “keep themselves safe” in an environment of 
insecurity. One of the key “herbal and spiritual” protection methods used was Ntelezi, (Emmet & Butchart, 
2000, p. 169).  
 
33
 Martha Mthembu, whose son, Ditaba Joseph Mthembu died in the execution recounts that after the killing, 
“while I was preparing to go to work [I] heard a group of men singing Xhosa songs”(Mthembu, 1998).  
 
34
 While most young ANCYL members had been born in urban townships, as most SDU members were older a 
number had grown up in apartheid South Africa‟s rural “homelands”, coming to urban South Africa to seek 
work as young adults. This history, despite the fact that most SDU members had spent the larger proportion of 
their lives living in townships, marked them, for the ANCYL as permanently “other”.  
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149, own emphasis). While SDU members had in fact come from a range of former 
“homelands”35 and some, such as Michael Armoed, were born in townships, according to 
Sapire (1992), the numbers and social impact of Xhosa-speakers did significantly increase in 
1990 due to a variety of forms of migration of Xhosa-speakers, particularly to the informal 
settlement of Phola Park on the East Rand, (p. 695). At the same time as this migration of 
Xhosa speakers to Phola Park, there were other new arrivals, particularly former soldiers 
from war-torn Southern African countries such as Mozambique who were perceived to be 
playing an important role in both training
36
 and acquiring weapons for SDUs
37
. It was in this 
context that ANCYL members in Moleleki asserted: “SDUs want to make it like Phola Park, 
most are Xhosas so they wanted Xhosas to rule Moleleki” (ANCYL, focus group, 2001).  
 
What the ANCYL invoked in opposition to the figure of this ethnic other, who had become 
“alien and dangerous to those for whom the community had become a community of national 
democratic subjects” (Chipkin, 2007, p. 135), was the figure of modernity – free from 
communal and “tribal” identities, rural associations, traditional generational hierarchies – 
unequivocally secular and urbane. This, critically, was the figure of the National Democratic 
Revolution (NDR), a politics of nationalism, which had come to dominate civic and youth 
                                            
 
35
 In terms of the 1970 Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act (National States Citizenship Act) No 26, all black 
persons were required to become citizens of a purportedly “sovereign” self-governing territorial authority 
(homeland) that corresponded to each person‟s ethnic designation under the Population Registration Act, thus 
denying black South Africans the right to claim national citizenship in the “white” state (Bantu Homelands 
Citizenship Act (National States Citizenship Act) No 26 1970).  (Legislation. Retrieved from South African 
History Online: http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/governence-projects/liberation-
struggle/legislation_1970s.htm) 
 
 
36
 Police press statements on the SDU in Phola Park alleged first that two Frelimo soldiers had been training 
SDU members in Phola Park (Potgieter, 1992) and later that, “Renamo instructors are actively involved in the 
training and supplying of firearms to self-defence units in Phola Park” (Zwane, 1992). 
 
37
 Sally Sealey, researcher for an NGO which investigated and monitored violence on the East Rand, testified at 
TRC hearings on SDUs in Thokoza, that “many of the applicants have mentioned that they bought firearms 
from the Polla [sic] Park informal settlement.  In Polla Park there are a number of people that are…illegal 
immigrants [from] Mozambique and many of [sic] people were involved in selling AK47s and the like to 
people” (Truth and Reconciliation Amnesty Hearing, 1998, p. 12). 
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organisation on the East Rand as elsewhere during the rise of resistance to apartheid from the 
mid 1980s onwards. According to Chipkin, NDR invoked a set of biopolitical markers to 
define the “authenticity” of the national subject in ways that had on the East Rand 
increasingly excluded the “traditional”, Zulu-speaking migrant hostel worker from the orbit 
of democratic organisation in a similar manner that SDU members were rejected by the 
ANCYL in terms of a set of biopolitical markers that defined them as the ethnic other.  
 
Crucially, what had characterised the politics of NDR over the previous decade was a 
significant challenging of generational hierarchies, which had seen young people come to 
dominate and lead urban resistance to apartheid through what Sitas calls the “politico-cultural 
web” of the “comrade” movement, “involving voluntary (and sometimes coerced) 
participation, cultural dynamics and a new volatile social identity shaped through 
mobilisation and conflict” (Sitas, 1992, p. 633). For comrades, struggle was visceral and 
experiential, “it is not legitimated in the abstract by a broader movement that was everywhere 
and nowhere, but also practically” (Sitas, 1992: 640).  As SDU member Zola Sonti argued of 
ANCYL members, they “would want to act immediately, without discussion [you] must get 
go ahead from head office therefore there was conflict with the youth” (M. Sonti, personal 
interview, 2001). Like the signage that delineated SDU members, the boundaries between 
those who were and weren‟t comrades were also delineated through a “sign system” that 
cohered into an “iconography” of the authentic “comrade”; “you belong because of the way 
you sing, the slogans you know, the lineages you have learnt, the way you speak to each 
other” (Sitas, 1992, p. 636).  
 
ANCYL members‟ rejection of the right of SDU members‟ to “rule” in Moleleki, in terms of 
a set of biopolitical markers, revealed the confusions caused by the conflation of auctoritas 
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and potestas under the modern juridico-political conception of sovereignty, which conceals 
the “hidden” nucleus of sovereign power, the articulation between juridico-institutional and 
biopolitical power. Thus implicit in the claims to sovereign authority of both the ANCYL and 
the SDU and their rejections of the sovereign authority of the other, was exactly this 
articulation between the juridico-political and the biopolitical. While ANCYL and civic 
members claimed their right to sovereign authority in terms of the potestas, representative 
authority, articulated through the “Doctrine of the Rights of Man”, the essentially biopolitical 
nature of these “rights” to membership of the political community was exposed in their 
rejection of the claims to sovereign authority of the SDU in terms of a series of biopolitical 
markers.  
 
However, implicit in the very rejection of the right of the SDU to juridico-political “rule” in 
Moleleki, while expressed in biopolitical terms, was an assumption that SDUs, despite the 
fact that they were ostensibly merely a defensive paramilitary formation, did in fact have a 
wider claim to juridico-political authority in the township, a claim which could thus be 
contested in juridico-political terms. ANCYL members therefore argued of the SDU that they 
“must do things right, if going to rule” (ANCYL, focus group, 2001) and that SDU members 
had not “consulted” the “community” before establishing the SDU, as would have been 
expected from an organisation established in terms of potestas as a representative authority. 
However, they expressed their rejection of the SDU‟s claims to juridico-political authority in 
biopolitical terms, arguing that the SDU was established unilaterally by “Xhosas” who 
“selected themselves”; “we did not know about it, we were never told anything” (ANCYL, 
focus group 2001). 
 
 122 
 
While ANCYL members rejected the authority of the SDU in Moleleki in terms of a 
conflation of the biopolitical and the juridico-political, SDU members similarly claimed their 
authority in terms of both potestas and auctoritas. Although SDUs were ostensibly 
“independent” paramilitary formations accountable to the “community”, represented by the 
civic association, it was quite clear that in the context of the violent conflict which had 
already parcelled land up on the East Rand in ethnic and political enclaves, the boundaries of 
the “community” who could participate in SDU patrols was quite explicitly defined in 
juridico-political party terms. As Oscar explained, “people who were allowed to volunteer [in 
SDUs] were members of the PAC, ANC, members of the civics, not members of the IFP, 
they were not allowed” (TRC, 1998a, p. 141).  
 
In reality, most members of the SDU in Moleleki were supporters of or signed-up members 
of the ANC
38
. As SDU member Michael Nkomo explained, he joined the ANC in 1990 in 
order to “fight for the rights of people” (M. Nkomo, personal interview, 2001, own 
emphasis). Moreover SDU members saw themselves as critical allies in the violent struggle 
for ANC hegemony on the East Rand. Several SDU members argued that SDUs had played a 
“key political role” (O. Motlokwa, personal interview, 2001; M. Nkomo, personal interview, 
2001) in this struggle for hegemony and understood that while the ANC may have decided 
that SDU structures should be accountable to civic structures in townships, SDUs were 
critically the initiative of the ANC and therefore had their tacit, if not explicit, political 
support. As Oscar Motlokwa argued, “the mere fact that the ANC made an announcement 
that [they] should establish [SDUs] and that Kasrils
39
 accounted for SDUs in Kathorus at the 
                                            
 
38
 The TRC decision on the amnesty application of 13 SDU members from Moleleki in connection with the 
Moleleki execution stated, “The applicants are all members of the ANC”(TRC, 1998c, p. 2).  
 
39
 Ronald Kasrils (commonly known as Ronnie Kasrils) (born November 15, 1938) is a lifelong member of the 
African National Congress (ANC) and one of the founding members of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the ANC‟s 
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TRC showed [the ANC‟s] involvement” (O. Motlokwa, personal interview, 2001). Not only 
did SDU members understand their organisation to have the ANC‟s political support but they 
believed that their defensive activities were critical to the ANC‟s ability to win a 
representative election on the East Rand; “without SDUs the ANC would never have got 
votes in Kathorus, the IFP would have been ruling” (M. Nkomo, personal interview, 2001). 
Thus it is clear that SDU members, like ANCYL members, conceptualised their claim to 
sovereign authority in the township in terms of the “Rights of Man”, which articulated the 
ANC‟s struggles for popular democracy in South Africa.  
However, this claim for juridico-political authority based on potestas or written law, which 
invoked a contractual relationship, was vitally co-ordinated with a claim to biopolitical 
authority, invoking a relationship of bond. Unlike contractual relationships, which regulate 
juridico-political exchanges between legal subjects, bonds relationships “are embodied in 
inequality – that of the kind necessarily found between parent and child, lord and serf, man 
and God” (Van Zyl, 1990, p. 7, own emphasis). While bonds “constrain the rights of the 
younger or weaker party”, they offer “privileges not expected in the contractual form” (Van 
Zyl, 1990, p. 7), in particular the entitlement to protection and nurture. In return, however, 
bonds require from the subject obedience and loyalty. Critically, also, “what distinguishes 
bonds from contracts... is a right to violence in the interests of nurture” (Van Zyl, 1990, p. 9, 
own emphasis). 
                                                                                                                                       
 
armed wing. During the 1990s Kasrils was one of three senior members of MK who set up a unit to assist in the 
arming of Self Defence Units. Kasrils later applied for amnesty for these activities.  (TRC, 2003, p. 272).  After 
1994 Kasrils served as Deputy Minister of Defence (1994 -1999). He was also appointed Minister of Water 
Affairs and Forestry (1999- 2004) and Minister for Intelligence Services (2004 – 2008). (Ronald (Ronnie) 
Kasrils, Retrieved from South African History 
Online:http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/people/bios/kasrils,r.htm) 
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Auctoritas and Potestas 
The biopolitical authority of SDU members in Moleleki during 1993, in a context of 
interregnum, of juridico-political suspension, exposed this critical co-ordination between 
auctoritas, authority founded on the bond relationship and potestas, authority founded on a 
contractual relationship where neither can fully exist without the other; “auctoritas seems to 
act as a force that suspends potestas where it took place and reactivates it where it was no 
longer in force” (Agamben, 2005, p. 79, own emphasis). Crucially, in a situation analogous 
with that in the classical Roman state, in an extreme situation such as that of interregnum, 
where there remained “no consul or other magistrate” in the city, it is auctoritas that ensures 
the continuity of power and the continued “functioning of the Republic under exceptional 
circumstances” (Agamben, 2005, p. 79).  
 
It was in such a “state of emergency” (ANCYL, focus group, 2001), an anomic space that 
resulted from the suspension of law, that SDU members claimed the authority to establish a 
defensive formation in Moleleki in terms of ensuring a continuity of power in this context of 
juridico-political suspension. As Oscar Motlokwa explained, “Four people, Manyala, Majola, 
Mtunzi and Nkosi, started the SDU. [The] Community had nothing to do with how 
commanders [were] chosen, only these four chose Nchebe as commander, not the rest of the 
SDU” (O. Motlokwa, personal interview, 2001, own emphasis). Thus, while the SDU was 
established in Moleleki in response to a general call at a civic association meeting that 
residents in Moleleki could not expect assistance from the “central” SDU in Katlehong if they 
did not have their own defensive structure (M. Nkomo, personal interview, 2001), SDUs 
were hierarchically established and were not a representatively elected formation. Oscar 
Motlokwa explains: “The central civic formed the central structure of the SDU and then the 
central structure formed the sectional and the zonal structures” (TRC, 1998a, p. 138).  
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Members of SDUs comprised those who volunteered, rather than those who were elected or 
went through a selection procedure. “You couldn‟t recruit anyone because you had to be 
ready to die at any time, therefore [you] had to volunteer” (O. Motlokwa, personal interview, 
2001, own emphasis). “Volunteering” was necessitated, “because of the situation” (M. Sonti, 
personal interview, 2001), in which you, “had to choose sides, [you] couldn‟t be neutral” (M. 
Armoed, personal interview, 2001), because “the IFP attacked everyone, whether SDU or 
not” (M. Nkomo, personal interview, 2001). Therefore SDU members held their positions, 
not because of the office they represented but because of the qualities they embodied, they 
“had to be ready to make these sacrifices” (O. Motlokwa, personal interview, 2001), to “risk 
[their] life” (M. Nkomo, personal interview, 2001).  
 
What the context of interregnum reveals, which helps elucidate the nature of the power SDU 
members exercised, is the structural analogy between private and public law, which requires 
a “duality of elements”, auctoritas and potestas (Agamben, 2005, p. 78). In private law, 
auctoritas is the property of the “auctor”, the “pater familias”  (p. 76), whose authority 
(auctoritas) is necessary to “confer legal validity on the act of a subject who cannot 
independently bring a legally valid act into being” (p. 76); for example, the “auctoritas of the 
father „authorizes‟ – that is, makes valid – the marriage of the son in potestate” (p. 76). 
Critically, in a context of exception, when the constitution has been suspended and public 
offices have been dissolved, public authority returns to the “fathers”, the pater familias of 
private law – in Rome, the consular family. The formula used was “res public ad patres redit 
[the republic returns to the fathers]” (p. 79). This authority to ensure the functioning of the 
Republic under exceptional circumstances is not representative but “rests immediately with 
the patres auctores” as “private citizens” (p. 80).  
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SDU members explained their duty of protection in a context of exception in terms of this 
contiguity of auctoritas in the private and public domains. All SDU members articulated the 
basis of their authority as the need to “defend the community” (M. Armoed, personal 
interview, 2001; O. Motlokwa, personal interview, 2001; M. Nkomo, personal interview, 
2001; M. Sonti, personal interview, 2001) in a time of crisis. This was not a responsibility of 
participation in representative political office but a responsibility of auctoritas in a time of 
juridico-political suspension. As Oscar Motlokwa explained: “in the SDU there were a lot of 
people who didn‟t know anything about [juridical] politics, [they] just had to respond to the 
situation and defend the community” (O. Motlokwa, personal interview, 2001). This 
obligation “as a member of the community” (M. Nkomo, personal interview, 2001) to protect 
the “community”, was both a personal and public duty. As Oscar Motlokwa explains, the 
community used to “love [him] very much” because [he] didn‟t want “wrong things to be 
done to the community” (O. Motlokwa, personal interview, 2001, own emphasis). Therefore, 
“the community [including his family] always came first” (O. Motlokwa, personal interview, 
2001); it was necessary to make sure the community “were safe” (O. Motlokwa, personal 
interview, 2001), that they “were protected” (M. Nkomo, personal interview, 2001), a duty 
from which SDU members did not “gain” or “benefit” personally (M. Armoed, personal 
interview, 2001; O. Motlokwa, personal interview, 2001; M. Nkomo, personal interview, 
2001; M. Sonti, personal interview 2001; TRC, 1998a, p.546), as might be expected from 
formal representative public office.  
 
Crucially, this duty of protection as pater familias in both private and public domains 
invoked a contest of sovereign authority with the ANCYL in terms of the bond relationship. 
Thus, it was the betrayal of this bond relationship, and in particular the obligation of 
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protection of the pater familias, in addition to a failure of representivity, which invoked the 
rejection of the authority of the SDU by the ANCYL. An ANCYL member explained: “As 
we were still young we expected the SDU as elder people to protect us when we go to sleep” 
(ANCYL, focus group, 2001). Elphina Mugadi, whose son Isaac was killed during the 
execution, articulated the conflict in similar terms: “We thought that the children were safe 
under the protection of the SDUs, whereas they were perpetrators, they were the ones who 
were killing our children” (Mugadi, 1998, own emphasis). Therefore as ANCYL members 
emphasised, referring to money donated by community members to buy the firearms that 
would eventually be used in the execution, “parents collected money for firearms which 
ended up killing [us]” (ANCYL, focus group, 2001). 
 
Agamben has pointed out the essential contiguities between the “unconditional authority 
[potestas] of the pater over his sons” (Agamben, 1998, p.87) with sovereign authority, whose 
first expression in law, as a power to decide life and death, was formulated in terms of this 
unconditional authority of the father over his son. This power is instantiated in the relation 
between father and son, “in the instant in which the father recognizes the son…he acquires 
the power of life and death over him” (Agamben, 1998, p. 88). This tie between father and 
son “is more originary than the tie of positive rule or the tie of the social pact” (Agamben, 
1998, p. 90) and indicates in fact an untying in the abandonment of the son to an 
unconditional power over life and death. 
 
Therefore this is not a power which is confined to the private domain but which “attaches 
itself to every free male citizen from birth” and hence defines “the very model of political 
power in general” in which “life exposed to death (bare life or sacred life) is the original 
political element” (Agamben, 1998, p. 88 original emphasis). Thus in Rome, the power of the 
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father, “patria potestas was felt to a kind of public duty… a „residual and irreducible 
sovereignty‟” (Agamben, 1998, p. 88), which would allow the father Cassius to drag his son 
from the rostra, when he was trying to supersede the authority of the senate, the highest 
political authority in Rome (Agamben, 2005, p. 88). It is this contiguity between the power of 
the father and the power of the sovereign that Agamben illustrates when he recounts the story 
of Brutus, who having put his sons to death, “adopted the Roman people in their place”, 
transferring the power of death over his sons to the citizenry as a whole, invoking the sinister 
epithet, “father of the people”, “which is reserved in every age to the leaders invested with 
sovereign authority” (Agamben, 2005, p. 88). 
 
In the conflict which unfolded between the ANCYL and the SDU in the township of 
Moleleki, what were evoked were the ambiguities of the exception which articulates 
biopolitical and juridico-political authority. In claiming the discourse of rights of the ANC, 
ANCYL members refuted the authority of the SDU in the township in juridico-political 
terms, arguing that the SDU had been established unilaterally, without the democratic 
“consultation” with the “community” that would be required of an organisation established in 
terms of potestas. But this was critically coordinated with a biopolitical claim, namely that 
this lack of representative consultation was the result of an embodied “ethnic” identity, which 
led “Xhosa” men to select each other for the formation of the SDU. These claims were 
further articulated with another biopolitical claim, which evoked the relation of the bond and 
the failure of the duty of the pater to offer protection and guidance to his subjects. As 
Lethusang Rikaba explained of the ANCYL member‟s initial involvement in the patrols of 
the SDU, “we wanted to join them because they were elderly people, we wanted them to 
show us the way… maybe as the Youth we were not walking the right way” (TRC, 1998a, p. 
575). 
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Therefore ANCYL members initially participated in patrols of the township under the 
auspices of the newly formed SDU, which, showing the essential contiguity between the 
auctoritas of the pater and the sovereign, claimed the authority to “fetch” young boys from 
their familial homes for public patrols, evoking the anomic space of exception that existed in 
the township, where public and private domains enter into a zone of indistinction. Although, 
as Elphina Mugadi explained, “they were asking for them politely in the beginning”, over 
time “they were not asking for the parents‟ permission” (E. Mugadi, personal interview, 
2001), taking Elphina‟s son against his will to participate in patrols. “I think it was the 
treason because he said he no longer wanted to patrol” (E. Mugadi, personal interview, 2001, 
own emphasis). The reason that Isaac, Elphina‟s son, no longer wanted to participate in 
patrols was the violence he allegedly saw being perpetrated by SDU members:  
my child was always crying. He said they caught one Zulu man who was an IFP 
member and they stabbed him on the stomach and they drove off with his car. So the 
children would go but they were scared as they tell us what happened. (E. Mugadi, 
personal interview, 2001) 
 
Critically it was this involvement in violent “crime” which would lead ANCYL members to 
contest the sovereign authority of the SDU in Moleleki as a violation of the duty of protection 
shared and embodied by all “men” in the township. As one ANCYL member expressed it, “in 
the beginning every male was supposed to go out, there was no SDU, so therefore when the 
whistle blows every male would go out…A father, a son would… all go out” (ANCYL, 
2001a, p. 28). 
 
In the context of the challenges to generational hierarchies that had taken place under the 
auspices of the “comrade” movement, which appealed to a set of “rights” that ostensibly 
refuted the biopolitical hierarchies of gender and generation, ANCYL members assumed that 
they were in fact such “men”. Burman and Schärf write of the anti-apartheid resistance of the 
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1980s and 1990s, “the battling youth acquired a great deal of prominence and prestige as the 
„young lions‟, with consequent tacit transfer of authority to them to represent adult interests 
in one arena of struggle – the streets” (Burman & Schärf, 1990, p. 730). However, in 
opposition to this assertion of potestas, SDU members evoked the relation of the bond and 
rejected the right of “young boys” in the ANCYL to claim the authority to protect the 
township as “men”. SDU member Michael Nkomo emphasised, with regard to the 
establishment of the SDU in Moleleki, that “it was announced…that men should report to the 
[SDU] commander, Manyala. Not boys, men. Men with responsibilities, heading 
households… No women could be part of the SDU” (M. Nkomo, personal interview, 2001).  
 
As Carton (2000) points out, “the mutually reinforcing relationships of generation and gender 
effectively maintain…patriarchal authority” (p. 6). Therefore just as Bulelwa was told on the 
eve of her death that as a woman she should remain silent, young ANCYL members who 
attempted to challenge the authority of the SDU were similarly told that they were “too 
young to ask questions” (ANCYL, focus group, 2001) and that “they must better keep quiet” 
(TRC, 1998a, p. 570). ANCYL members explained: “They [SDU members] were 
untouchables; they did not want us to come and sit down with them to discuss…whatever 
they are saying is final” (ANCYL, focus group, 2001). However, drawing on the juridical 
rights articulated by the comrade movement, which urged “the ideals of democratic decision 
making, in which they [youth] expected to participate, and to seek a degree of authority in the 
formulation of ideas and policy” (Burman & Schärf, 1990, p. 730), ANCYL members refused 
the obedience and loyalty of the bond relationship. Elphina concludes: “The youth were not 
prepared to do what they [SDU members] told them to do, so there was a fallout” (E. Mugadi, 
personal interview, 2001).  
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It was in this context that challenges to generational hierarchies provoked challenges to 
gendered hierarchies, which created another basis for the ANCYL to contest the sovereign 
authority of the SDU and for the SDU to attempt to re-assert the relationship of the bond. 
ANCYL and civic leader Lethusang Rikaba argued that SDU members were “not politically 
literate, they saw politics as war, women stay in the kitchen, men fight” (ANCYL, focus 
group, 2001). When, according to SDU member Zola Sonti, girls from the ANCYL joined 
SDU patrols, the SDU sought to “consult the community” about this; however, ANCYL 
members, in a complete overturning of the relation of the bond and the counter-assertion of 
potestas through the discourse of rights articulated by the ANC, “went to parents to tell them 
to release their girls [for patrols] because Peter Mokaba said the ANC would train them” (M. 
Sonti, personal interview, 2001, own emphasis). Paradoxically, in invoking the “Doctrine of 
the Rights of Man”, ANCYL members, although influenced by the “comrade movement”, 
which drew in youth of both sexes, in fact invoked a set of biopolitical rights which at their 
inception excluded women from the political community and which, as Sitas points out in 
relation to the “comrade” movement of the 1980s, had in fact included women differentially, 
away from the frontlines of battle and the male duty of protection. While comrades were 
drawn from both sexes there was simultaneously “a military division of labour: young men 
would be the warriors, and young women their assistants, their support and caring networks, 
and also the messengers and organisers of the supply lines for battle” (Sitas, 1992, p. 633).   
 
Thus, in the months after the SDU began patrols of the township, increasing contention 
emerged because, as SDU member Michael Nkomo explains, ANCYL members “didn‟t want 
to be instructed, corrected by adults” (M. Nkomo, personal interview, 2001). This failure to 
submit to the authority and guidance of the pater familias, purportedly led ANCYL members 
to engage in criminal activities:  
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during the day [when adult SDU members were at work]…people would be looting 
Spaza shops… taxis would be shot at, if you were a Zulu speaking person you would 
be assaulted and they would be saying that you are a member of the IFP. You had this 
Spaza shop and you would be expected to provide food. Now the commander was 
trying to bring order to this situation and that is where the division started
40
(TRC, 
1998a, p. 143).  
 
Thus, as Oscar Motlokwa explains, “In the beginning SDUs were joined by adults and young 
people but over time it was clear that the young were unruly and undisciplined” (personal 
interview, 2001). In refusing to offer the obedience and loyalty required by the bond 
relationship with the pater familias, ANCYL members ultimately forfeited sovereign 
protection, instead provoking a sovereign punishment that in its violent excess would 
“eclipse” the crime against the sovereign41:  
So they told the other ones [ANCYL members who were incarcerated before the 
execution] that you think you are clever than us your seniors – We‟ve been living for 
a long time. So I can say that they were beating our guys…because they were saying 
to them, you think you are wise, you want to [hit] us your seniors. (ANCYL, focus 
group, 2001) 
 
While SDU members accused the ANCYL of being involved in a variety of criminal 
activities during the day, the SDU in claiming the sovereign decision on the exception, which 
traces a threshold between inside and outside the juridico-political order, had imposed a 
township-wide curfew that would attempt, through the violent tying of juridical order to 
territory, to physically demarcate the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion from the 
“community” of Moleleki. During the night within the borders of the township, sovereign 
                                            
 
40
 ANCYL members argued that SDU members had themselves carried out these acts of criminality (TRC, 
1998a, p. 569). 
41
  Foucault argues of the spectacle of the public execution, “It is a ceremonial by which a momentarily injured 
sovereignty is reconstituted. It restores that sovereignty by manifesting it at its most spectacular”(Foucault, 
1977, p. 49). Sovereign punishment as an effect of sovereign power thus brought, “into play, at its extreme 
point, the dissymmetry between the subject who has dared to violate the law and the all-powerful 
sovereign”(Foucault, 1977, p. 49) and, “whose function was to go further than this atrocity [against the 
sovereign], to master it, to overcome it by an excess that annulled it” (Foucault, 1977: 56). 
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punishment, which evoked the contiguities between the unconditional authority of the pater 
over his sons and sovereign authority over the “people”, would be meted out to those who 
“disobeyed” instructions (T. Mootsi, personal interview, 2001); “after a certain time [people] 
should be in bed”, and there would not be “shebeens or stokvels, and no lights in the street”42 
(O. Motlokwa, personal interview, 2001). An ANCYL member explains:  
When we call a meeting people would take all their clothes off during the meeting and 
say look what happened – they got stripes from sjambokking during the night. And 
what was said about that is that these people [SDU members] are coming…into the 
house when you are still asleep – they find the lights on and they say hey why are you 
still having your lights on we told you it‟s time to go to sleep. So they sjambok them. 
(ANCYL, focus group, 2001)  
 
Critically, it was the “mysterious deaths at night” (T. Mootsi, personal interview, 2001), “the 
bodies that were found in the morning” (ANCYL, focus group, 2001) and the “inexplicable” 
(TRC, 1998a, p. 393) violence which occurred under the night-time custodianship of 
Moleleki by SDU members, which would irrevocably break the bonds of loyalty for young 
ANCYL members. SDU members had claimed sole domain of the township at night after 
“instructing” ANCYL members to “patrol during the day and they will patrol at night” 
(ANCYL, focus group, 2001). Despite the night-time patrols of the SDU, people continued to 
die during the night. As Lethusang Rikaba explains, “the community was saying we have an 
SDU, it is patrolling, but people keep on dying” (TRC, 1998a, p. 567).  
 
However, the irreducible ambiguities of defining these boundaries and the impossibility of 
localising the exception in order to irreversibly fix an inside and outside of the “community”, 
led irrevocably to sovereign atrocity. Oscar Motlokwa explains, “we had a sign which we 
                                            
 
42
 Foucault has noted the conflation of the “public” and “private” in the punishment of disobedience to 
sovereign authority, in which, “rules and obligations are presented as personal bonds, a breach of which 
constituted an offence and called for vengeance” but whose breach was simultaneously an act of treason, “the 
first sign of rebellion…not in principle different from civil war” (Foucault, 1977, p. 57).  
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used at night…any car which was entering Katlehong, would use a sign of flicking the lights 
then we‟d know that those are members of the community” (TRC, 1998a, p. 131). On the 
other hand, “if people don‟t use signs they would be killed even if they were members of the 
community” (O. Motlokwa, personal interview, 2001). Thus, in the attempt by the SDU to 
localise the exception and define the boundaries of the political community, ANCYL 
members were constituted as homo sacer, bare life abandoned on the threshold of life and law 
who  “became enemies in the section” (ANCYL, 2001a, p. 21). 
 
The Moleleki Execution, a Localisation of the Exception in the Body of Homo Sacer 
It is the power of sovereignty, at the boundary of the juridico-political order, to mediate this 
boundary of life and death, to produce the condition of death as an artifact of power, that is 
critical to understanding the mute corpses of the Moleleki execution. As Mbembe argues,  
the ultimate expression of sovereignty resides, to a large degree in the power and the 
capacity to dictate who may live and who must die. Hence, to kill or to allow to live 
constitute the limits of sovereignty, its fundamental attributes. To exercise sovereignty 
is to exercise control over mortality and to define life as the deployment and 
manifestation of power. (Mbembe, 2003, p. 11) 
 
What is produced thus at the limits of sovereign power, is the corporal body, the 
manifestation of the sovereign‟s right to decide who may live and who must die. The 
production of this biopolitical body, the inclusion of bare life in the political realm, is the 
starting point for the analysis of the horrifying corpses produced by the Moleleki execution. 
 
The Body of Homo Sacer 
What was radically exposed by the corpses of the Moleleki execution, rotting unattended in 
the bushveld, consumed as mere flesh by roaming dogs, was the implication of bare life (zoē), 
“the simple fact of living common to all living beings (animals, men, or gods)” (Agamben, 
1998, p. 1) in political life (bios). This “bestialization” of man, which Foucault (cited in 
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Agamben, 1998, p. 3) first noted as an effect of modernity, is in fact, “the secret tie uniting 
power and bare life” (Agamben, 1998, p. 6). In the production of the biopolitical corpse, 
therefore, the nature of the “political” was exposed not as an opposition between bare life and 
political life, where the “political” is merely an additional instrumental capacity, which leaves 
“life” itself essentially unchanged. Instead the “political” was revealed as a transformation of 
life itself, which produces a different genus, a different form of life. The “political” is the 
locus of this transformation of life itself, through a relation of exception within life itself, a 
relation of exception with his own bare life that “man” achieves critically through language, 
logos
43
, where politics “occupies the threshold on which the relation between the living being 
and the logos is realized” (Agamben, 1998, p. 8).   
 
What was evoked by the Moleleki execution therefore was the extreme locus of “the 
political” in the sovereign decision on the exception at the threshold of the juridico-political 
order. Exposed on this boundary of life and law stands the ambiguous figure of homo sacer, 
who exists in a relation of ban on a verge of indistinction between “animal and man, physis 
and nomos, exclusion and inclusion” (Agamben, 1998, p. 105). In this state of extreme 
ambiguity and exception, it is the denial of logos by sovereign violence that mediates this 
boundary of physis and nomos. Without language, the exceptio of bare life within life, which 
makes possible the good life, is revoked, and what is revealed is merely “bare life”, sheer 
corporality. The localization of the exception in the atrocity of the execution irrevocably 
extinguished logos and sought to permanently fix the transformation of the Moleleki victims 
                                            
 
43
 The term logos derives from the verb λέγω legō “to count, tell, say, speak”. The primary meaning of logos is: 
something said; by implication a subject, topic of discourse, or reasoning. Secondary meanings such as logic, 
reasoning, etc. derive from the fact that if one is capable of λέγειν (infinitive) i.e. speech, then intelligence and 
reason are assumed (Logos. Retrieved from  Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logos#cite_note-3). 
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from “man” to “animal” in order to define the boundary of the “political” at the boundary of 
bare life.  
 
The Stray Dog 
In Moleleki, prior to the execution, this mediation of the boundary of life and death took 
place as both linguistic and material practice (Feldman, 1991, p. 69), in which certain 
“indexical terms” refer to “states of destroyed or altered embodiment” that correlate to 
“categories of action and consequent transformations of the body” (Feldman, 1991, p. 69). 
Prior to the production of the actual corpse as material practice in Moleleki, this linguistic 
transformation was effected through the metaphor of the dog and in particular the stray dog, a 
dog who in a condition of displacement and ban, like homo sacer, is exposed and threatened 
on a threshold of life and law, a threshold of extreme violence. SDU member Michael Sonti 
articulates the threat of this linguistic and material threshold in the metaphor of the dog, 
“There was this word that was saying: „Here are these dogs, attack gentlemen or attack 
gents‟” (TRC, 1998a, p. 293, own emphasis). In recounting the events immediately prior to 
the execution, survivor Vuyani Tshabalala evokes the extreme danger of the relation of ban 
conjured by the metaphor of the stray dog, “He remembers seeing accused 6 [Langa Michael 
Nkomo] armed with a long axe upon which was emblazoned the words: „No peace for 
Mdlwembe‟”44 (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 1786).  
 
However, this relation of ban, this exposure on the threshold of life and law, was a relation of 
extreme ambiguity in which outside and inside become, as Agamben argues, 
indistinguishable. These ambiguities of the boundary of the “community” and the 
                                            
 
44
 Meaning “feral dogs – from the Zulu adage that says once a domestic dog has left the kraal, or homestead, and 
gone into the bush, it becomes wild and can never be domesticated again” (Marinovich & Silva, 2001, p. 110). 
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tenuousness of the inclusion of Moleleki residents in this community in a context of 
exception, were reflected in the continual struggles of linguistic transformation and 
denotation, to which all residents were constantly subject, and which could summarily place 
them, through the linguistic metaphor of the dog in relation of banishment, vulnerable to a 
death which was neither homicide nor sacrifice, a death of absolute abjection. As TRC 
Commission attorney Mr Jonas Sibonyoni asked of amnesty applicant Michael Sonti, “Mr 
Sonti, let me interrupt you, the group you met referred to you as dogs but when you use those 
words, to whom were you referring as dogs?” (TRC, 1998a, p. 293, own emphasis). 
 
 
After the execution, as the corpses now produced as political artifacts lay decomposing under 
the hot summer sun, SDU members publicly proclaimed this biopolitical transformation, 
inscribed in the flesh of these corpses as embodied signs but also amplified linguistically in 
terms of the metaphor of the dog, now shouted like the message of a town crier
45
, the 
messenger of sovereign authority to the township of Moleleki. Martha Mthembu, mother of 
Ditaba Joseph Mthembu, recounts  
while I was preparing to go to work [I] heard a group of men singing Xhosa songs. 
They were shouting outside in the street saying, “Those who know that their dogs 
(meaning their boys) did not sleep at home they must go look for them in the veld”. 
(Mthembu, 1998, p. 3) 
 
These metaphoric “dogs” lying in the bushveld, foraged now as mere flesh by the animal 
genus dog in the 24 hours before their organic bodies were “collected” by police, marked a 
                                            
 
45
 The “town crier”, the public proclaimer of community information, decrees, instructions, and prohibitions 
plays a critical role in all societies, both contemporary and ancient, in which orality as a means of 
communication remains important. In medieval Europe, prior to the advent of print media the town crier, 
shouting aloud in the streets, was the central mechanism through which sovereign authority in a town would 
communicate public instructions and prohibitions. The etymology of the word “cry” indicates a very specific 
link to sovereign authority in ancient Rome, in which, “ancient folk etymology traces to it to the  „call for the 
help of the Quirites‟, the Roman constabulary”(Cry. In Online Etymology Dictionary. Retrieved from: 
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=cry). 
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final decomposition of the material and the metaphoric, logos and praxis, in the collapse of 
the distinction between their flesh and the bare life shared by all living beings. What was 
exposed in this zone of indistinction between animal and political life was the absolute 
undecidibility, “as long as the iustitium46 lasts”, of human action in the state of exception, “in 
the extreme case, whether human, bestial, or divine” (Agamben, 2005, p. 50). 
 
Elphina Mugadi recounts the indistinguishibility of these spheres at the site of the execution: 
I took the Bible and went to the place where the children had died. Before I reached 
the children I stood and prayed because I had already heard that any person that goes 
to that place may not come back…I went all the way praying saying: “God I trust you 
because here is my firearm, I have my firearm”…as I was walking I saw two dogs on 
top of the children…standing on their two legs. When I arrived I said: “Oh Lord our 
children have died in a sorrowful manner, that of Jesus Christ, they have been tied up 
and again they have been given to the dogs”. I tried to hit those dogs, I took away the 
shawl with which I was beating them and the shawl then fell down to the ground. I 
tried to chase those dogs away but I could see these dogs‟ jaws were red, I do not 
know what these dogs were dragging but I could see blood on these dogs‟ jaws. (The 
State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, pp. 1093-1094) 
 
A Finishing Off 
Therefore the metaphor of the dog, in a relation of ban from the human community, 
materialised the sovereign exception in the unsanctionable killing of homo sacer and finally 
produced the corpses of the Moleleki dead in a condition of complete abandonment on the 
edge of township, literally collapsing logos and material practice in the consumption of the 
bodies of the dead by dogs.  Another key metaphor, as both category of performance (verb) 
and category of embodiment (noun) (Feldman, 1991, p. 68) and ultimately category of 
ontological being, similarly effected the collapse of logos and praxis in relation to the act of 
unsanctionable killing itself. The metaphor of “finishing”, used both as noun and ontological 
state, “to be finished”, and verb referring to the act of killing, “to finish off”, constituted 
                                            
 
46
 Formal suspension of juridico-political order. 
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“indexical” terms that also referred to “states of destroyed or altered embodiment” (Feldman, 
1991, p. 69), used and shared by all protagonists in the conflict. On the day of the execution, 
Selina Motloung returned home to find “my uncle sitting with other men. I greeted them, 
asked him how was life, he replied that the children are finished in Zulu, „Abantwana 
baphekhe‟. I asked him if my son was amongst those children, he replied yes” (Motloung, 
1998, p. 1, own emphasis).  
 
Oscar Motlokwa in his testimony to the TRC, describing the moment of execution itself – as 
Anastasia Mohale, the mother of executed Ditaba Mthembu, fainted in the hearing room 
(Sebolao, 1998) – uses these indexical terms to refer very specifically, not simply to the act of 
killing, but to a particular type of “finishing”, a decimation and dismembering of the body 
itself that could literally and figuratively effect a complete effacement, an obliteration. This 
human action lay in an entirely ambiguous zone between homicide and sacrifice. The 
mechanism of the killing itself evoked these ambiguities in an initial homicide as the victims 
were shot at close range. However, the decimation, decapitations and mutilations performed 
on the wounded bodies of those shot, invoked the form of ritual, rituals of death, which 
attempt a complete finality, an ontological and physical state in which what is killed is not 
only the physical body, but the “essence” that lies within it. The ordinary act of homicide 
cannot kill this substance, which requires ritual for its final “death”, its “finishing off”47.  
 
                                            
 
47
 Ball in her study of the “necklace” method of homicide used primarily during political conflict in South 
Africa refers to the role that burning had historically played in annihilating more than the physical body itself, 
“Yes, there was a reason for the burning of abathakathi [evildoers] like rubbish. It was the shade. If a person was 
burnt with fire…there could never be a shade of that person. So if a person was umthakathi that person must be 
destroyed totally (ukuqedwa), nothing remaining (kungasali nokunci)” (quoted in Ball, 1994, p. 7).  
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A TRC Investigation Unit memo on the execution records this investiture of “magic” and 
ritual in the execution, which sought, in the dismemberment of the corpses, a restoration of a 
“momentarily injured” sovereignty (Foucault, 1977, p. 49). It states: 
One of the victims Edward Mootsi‟s (sic) had been decapitated and his head thereafter 
chopped into several pieces which were then disposed of some distance from his 
torso. According to rumours this was done to avoid the head of the deceased returning 
to his body, as the perpetrators believed him to be a deamon (sic). (Killian, 1998)
48
  
 
Oscar Motlokwa‟s account of the execution thus evokes the ambiguities of the killing of 
homo sacer, which “subtracts itself” from both the human and divine and opens a sphere of 
human action that is “neither the sphere of sacrum facere nor that of profane action” 
(Agamben, 1998, pp. 82-83), instead taking place in a zone of un-decidable indistinction 
between homicide, which seeks merely instrumental death, and sacrifice, which seeks 
purification and ritual cleansing. Oscar Motlokwa describes the execution, 
They were shot and they were hacked and stabbed with knives…When we arrived at 
the veld all of them were ordered to sit down. Ntjebe himself starting shooting. Our 
commander Ntjebe Ndondolo started shooting them with a 9mm shot and thereafter, 
with our AK47‟s, we shot them. After shooting them, those who had sharp 
instruments hacked them to finish them off. We shot them Sir, and some of them were 
still alive and they were finished off with these compasses. The rest of them were shot 
at their heads and the chest. We were very close to them Sir, close. (TRC, 1998a, p. 
41, own emphasis) 
 
Vuyani Tshabala, one of two survivors of the execution, describes these same moments of the 
execution, in which logos was materialised in the attempted “finishing” of his own body 
through its dismemberment:  
then I heard the sound of gunfire and when the gunfire started everyone of us wanted 
to shield himself by another one on the ground. And after they stopped firing I heard 
                                            
 
48
 Crais and others (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1997; Geschiere, 1997) have explored the contemporary and 
historical imbrications of political power and “magic” in the African context, which Crais argues continues to 
form a critical part of the contemporary political imagination and everyday discourses of power in the South 
African context and is, “often involved in the intricate and competitive politics of power and authority”(Crais, 
2002, p. 130). Importantly, the discourse of magic is also a discourse of “morality”, it is profoundly concerned 
with the problem of social health, the “problem of evil”, “Evil stands in opposition to life and, especially to the 
ways life should be lived” (Crais, 2002, p. 4). 
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someone say: finish them off… And after the word was given: finish them off, I then 
heard the sound of chopping and I was also chopped, I think four or five times on my 
head. (The State v Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 222, own emphasis)  
 
Elphina Mugadi, hiding in the nearby bushveld at the moment of the execution, experienced 
this finishing as an aural amplification, an aural definition of the moment of “finishing”, a 
triumph of sovereign exception that would later be broadcast by SDU members to the 
township of Moleleki:  
And after they killed them they made a certain noise – and I asked MaMtolo what is 
going on, she said in Xhosa [custom] if a person is going to be killed, after he‟s been 
killed they make a certain sign to show that they‟re finished. (E. Mugadi, personal 
interview, 2001) 
 
 
While the ritual of the killing sought a transcendental “finishing”, its homicide was also an 
unequivocally political act, expressed again in terms of the metaphor of “finishing”. Prior to 
the execution, at the site of the body of slain civic activist Nombulelo Zwane, “somebody in 
the SDU group, from the Khumalo Valley SDU, shouted that „we will finish off the Youth 
League and nobody will stop us”‟ (Mugadi cited in Dwane-Alpman, 1998, p. 7). 
 
The later decimations of the bodies of the Moleleki executed marked a final moment in the 
contest for sovereign authority in Moleleki, materially inscribing sovereign exception in a 
definitive moment of political metaphorization and instrumentation of the body, which 
transposed “political values from social totalities to the singularity of the stiff” 49 (Feldman, 
1991, p. 70).  
 
                                            
 
49
 In Northern Ireland, the term “cunt” semantically marked the targeted male victim of political assassination, 
who then in death, in the transposition of the linguistic to the material, becomes a “stiff” that circulates as an 
embodied political sign (Feldman, 1991, 69). 
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Critically, however, while the dismemberment of the bodies of the executed sought a 
transcendental and political “finishing”, a final localisation of the sovereign exception in the 
decimated bodies of the children, what this human action instead revealed was the ambiguity 
of this inscription of sovereign exception in the political encoding of body parts as artefacts 
of sovereign power and the ultimate reversibility of this encoding of social totalities in body 
parts. As Feldman argues, the formation of the body as a political artifact permits it to 
function not only as a representation of wider social totalities but also retrospectively “as a 
sympathetic (as in magic) manipulator of those overarching structures” (Feldman, 1991, p. 
70). 
 
Thus while the localisation of the exception in the bodies of the Moleleki dead had sought to 
irrevocably represent the triumph of sovereign exception in the inscription of political codes 
within body parts, the body produced as enchanted political object by the dismemberments of 
violence in fact produces a struggle around the transcription of the biopolitical corpse 
produced as a political sign.  
 
The pleas of the parents of the Moleleki executed in the proceedings of the TRC and the later 
courtroom trial for the recovery of the children‟s mutilated body parts therefore sought in the 
restoration of the corporal integrity of these boys, a restoration of their place within the realm 
of the sacred and the political and in this, finally, a transcendence of the bestiality of their 
deaths, which could putatively refute the production of these children as artifacts of sovereign 
power. 
 
Tina Mootsi, standing outside the court room during the trial of SDU members, wept 
repeatedly while telling journalist Dominic Mahlangu,  
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Since 1993 I have been haunted by dreams of my son, whom I was forced to bury 
without a head. He would have been 18 this year. They must tell me where they took 
his head to, or what they did with it. (Mahlangu, 1999) 
 
Pathologist‟s reports reveal, however, that in fact 15-year-old Edward Mootsi‟s head, after 
being hacked from his body, had been battered to pieces. Pathologist Jane Klepp explained: 
there has been total mutilation of this head, the head is here in small little bits…one 
can see fragments of the skull and the lacerated brain lying in the vicinity of the body, 
the head is gone, I mean it has been completely chopped off…and then the head 
destroyed itself, so it is not just cut off. (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 891) 
 
The corporal recovery which Edward‟s mother Tina pleaded for would thus never in fact 
happen. Selina Motloung, mother of ANCYL leader “Wips” Motloung, attending the amnesty 
application of SDU members, similarly made her forgiveness of those who committed the 
killing conditional on the recovery of missing body parts, “I would forgive them if they could 
give me Vips‟s [sic] head, I should say eyes and hair, if they can give me those things, I can 
forgive them, but if they cannot give me those things, I cannot” (TRC, 1998a, p. 757).  
 
However, Wip‟s corpse had been left for several days in the Natalspruit river, making 
impossible the corporal recovery his mother sought. As pathologist Jane Kleep explained,  
We find that if a person has died in water the fish and crabs move in very quickly and 
they eat away the lips and eyes and the ears…and give you this gross appearance that 
we have of his face as demonstrated in photograph 1. (The State v. Michael Sonti, 
1999, p. 869) 
 
In these parents‟ attempted recoveries of the body parts of the maimed children and the 
subsequent processes of juridico-political inscription around the execution, these bodies 
therefore became not the irrevocable signs of sovereign authority that SDU members had 
attempted, but instead began to effect a reciprocal political metamorphosis of the 
“overarching structures”, the social totalities which SDU members had sought to finally 
inscribe in the dismembered corpses of the executed. In the wake of the execution, the SDU 
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as a structure of sovereign authority was literally and metaphorically dismembered, its arms 
confiscated, its structures officially disbanded and finally in the subsequent jailing of some of 
the protagonists of the execution, a tenuous inscription of this anomic body of sovereignty 
within the juridico-political order of post-apartheid South Africa was made possible. The 
bodies of the Moleleki dead thus became part of a process of making feasible not only a local 
reciprocal political metamorphosis but a wider national political metamorphosis, which 
would seek to refute the political values that SDU members had attempted to finally inscribe 
in these bodies produced as political signs by the execution. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: A JURIDICO-POLITICAL INVESTIGATION 
 
Introduction 
This chapter begins the process of examining the juridico-political inscription that followed 
the production of the Moleleki corpses as the body of exception. These processes of re-
inscription traversed both the period of juridico-political exception in which the execution 
took place and the period subsequent to the inauguration of the post-apartheid state and 
shared, paradoxically, an essential contiguity in their efforts to recapture this “pure” violence 
unleashed from law, within the law again. Thus, although the norm of the law changed 
significantly from one period to another, the principle of inscription remained essentially the 
same, immediately evoking in both periods a critical ambiguity around the nature of this 
human action committed during a context of exception, which it was assumed concerned the 
breakdown of juridico-political rules, a lacuna in law rather than the exposure of sovereignty 
at the boundaries of the juridico-political order.  
 
This chapter therefore examines the processes that followed immediately after the execution, 
when the corpses of the young ANCYL members, first produced as signs of sovereign 
exception by the SDU in Moleleki, were now reproduced as the signs of sovereign exception 
by the apartheid state. Initially their corpses were identified at the site of the execution as 
those of “criminal hijackers” and were claimed by the apartheid state as the embodiment of 
criminal exception. The subsequent processes of medico-legal inscription, which sought to 
translate this mass of organic flesh into a “legible” narrative of cause and effect through post- 
mortems in order to make subsequent criminal prosecution possible, ran aground in a context 
of ius belli (legal war). The pressure of multiple corpses produced by this conflict meant that 
that the identification and “mapping” of the wounds of the body, which sought to definitively 
establish a cause of death, remained incoherent and contested. In the immediate post-
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apartheid period, as the work of the TRC was initiated, a new complexity was introduced 
around the bodies produced by the Moleleki execution, concerning a contestation regarding 
the nature of the human action which had led to the production of these bodies, whether 
“criminal”, and thus properly the domain of the formal juridical system and hence subject to 
the legal sanctions it was empowered to impose, or “political” and therefore eligible for 
consideration by the TRC Amnesty Committee and the suspension of legal consequence, 
which this body was authorised to dispense.  
 
A Mutable Truth, the Juridico-Political Investigation of the Body of Exception 
The charge sheet compiled by the Witwatersrand Attorney-General for the Supreme Court 
tabulates the bodies of the Moleleki deceased in the following way: 
13. The deceased died as a result of the wounds as set out hereunder: 
Count Deceased Cause of Death 
1 Mile Simon Simela Bullet wound of left and 
right jugular vein and 
trachea 
2 Peter Mavuso Mdishwa (sic) Bullet wound of lung 
3 Ditaba Joseph Mthembu Bullet wound of Brain, 
Lung, Liver and intestines 
4 Isaac Mgadi Bullet wound of intestines 
and Aorta 
5 Lucas Hlatshwayo Bullet wound of brain. 
Penetrating incised wounds 
of lungs 
6 Thokozani Buthelezi Bullet wounds of Brain 
7 Itumeleng Edward Mootsi Fractured Skull 
8 Alfred Philemon Buthelezi Crushed Skull. Lacerated  
Brain 
9 Isaac Mbitjana Motloung Consistent with drowning 
The deceased were all members of the ANCYL. (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1998, p. 
140)  
 
In the wake of the execution the apartheid state, which had been strikingly juridically and 
politically absent from Moleleki as it was in most other South African townships, now 
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engaged in death with these young residents of Moleleki, not as juridical subjects or citizens 
of a nation state, but as mere bodies.  
 
In death, these bodies became the object of a juridico-political process of inscription from the 
moment their decomposing corpses were first photographed and notarized by local police 
more than twenty-four hours after the execution. The subsequent post-mortems conducted on 
these maimed bodies initiated a medico-legal inscription of death as they arrived in the heat 
of the summer of 1993 in the Germiston mortuary, which was already stacked with the bodies 
of those who had been killed during this period. The waning juridico-political order of the 
apartheid state therefore set in motion a process of attempting to capture this anomie in law 
and in this inscription of anomie to make legible this manifestation of violence, this now 
undifferentiated mass of organic flesh. This was a process that would pursue these bodies 
through the next five years across the inauguration of a new political dispensation, in the 
processes of the TRC and the post-apartheid court room, endeavouring through these 
processes to finally capture this elusive manifestation for a new law, a new juridico-political 
order.  
 
Sovereign Police 
During the 1990s, in a context of anomie and of exception, these young people, whom the 
juridico-political order now attempted to inscribe in death, had been particularly subject to 
the repressive force of law, without law, “pure violence”. This “pure violence” unleashed 
from law in the state of exception was claimed by both the SDU, as local sovereign power in 
the context of the execution, and by the security institutions of the state. As Nathan and 
Philips argued, in the context of exception of the 1990s, “in the interregnum between 
apartheid and democracy, the SAP and SADF are not merely instruments of government 
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policy but actors in their own right; they are an unpredictable factor, with the potential to 
disrupt the transition process” (Nathan & Phillips, 1992, p. 112). Critically, it is the 
institution of the police which shows the separation of law from the “force of law” most 
distinctively. As Benjamin argues:  
The assertion that the ends of police violence are always identical or even connected 
to those of general law is entirely untrue. Rather, the “law” of the police really marks 
the point at which the state, whether from impotence or because of the immanent 
connections within any legal system, can no longer guarantee through the legal 
system the empirical ends that it desires at any price to attain. (Benjamin cited in 
Agamben, 2000, p. 103,5) 
 
Thus, the police, “contrary to public opinion” “are not merely an administrative function of 
law enforcement” (Agamben, 2000, p. 103,5); instead they mark the boundaries of this 
juridical-political power and evoke the sovereign decision on the exception. The police, 
therefore, Agamben argues,  
are always operating within a…state of exception. The rationales of “public order” 
and “security” on which the police have to decide on a case-by-case basis define an 
area of indistinction between violence and right that is exactly symmetrical to that of 
sovereignty. (Agamben, 2000, p. 104,4) 
 
The Internal Stability Division of the South African Police force represented, perhaps most 
nakedly, this area of indistinction at the boundaries of the juridico-political order and the 
entrance of the concept of sovereignty into the figure of the police, in particular as the 
apartheid state rapidly declined and its legal system proved entirely unable to guarantee the 
empirical ends of this state, especially the “government‟s frequently stated commitment to 
maintain law and order in the transition period” (Nathan & Phillips, 1992, p. 123).  
 
Thus in March 1992 the South African state, after having withdrawn the South African 
Defence Force (SADF) from South Africa‟s townships under massive internal protest at the 
end of the 1980s and as part of a wider shift in state security strategy which saw a decline of 
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the dominance of the military in state governance in general (Nathan & Phillips, 1992; Taylor 
& Shaw, 1998), now responded to the politicised violence sweeping across the country by 
creating a separate unit of the South African Police (SAP), the Internal Stability Division 
(ISD), which was in fact the organisational successor to the infamous “Riot Unit” of the SAP 
that had violently policed South Africa‟s townships for decades. The ISD was thus launched 
in 1991, specifically tasked with public order functions (Rauch & Storey, 1998, para. 17) and 
operating essentially as a paramilitary unit; “although it was never openly stated, the ISD 
was… designed to be the hard point of the SAP, in a position to counter „fire with fire‟ and so 
serve to contain violence and stabilise conflict torn areas” (Shaw, 1997, pp. 230-231).  
 
The establishment of the ISD was part of a wider internal post-1990 SAP strategic initiative 
to “„depoliticise‟ the police and re-orientate their focus from „crimes against the state‟ to 
„crimes against individuals‟” (Nathan & Phillips, 1992, p. 116). In the light of this broader 
strategic alignment within the context of political transition, the Internal Stability Division 
was established with the ostensible objective of “defusing political violence and…freeing 
other police units to „fight crime‟” (Levin, Ngubeni & Simpson, 1994, p. 2). Thus,  
The creation of the ISD as a specialised public order component separate from the rest 
of the SAP was premised on naive ideas… that the performance of the ISD would not 
impact on the image and capacity of the rest of the SAP to carry out other police 
functions. (Rauch & Storey, 1998, para. 17)  
 
Critically, however, as Agamben points out in relation to both the Gulf War and the Nazi 
extermination of the Jews, both devastating conditions of ius belli that were conceived of and 
conducted as mere “police operations”, this “de-politicisation” of war cannot only be 
considered to be “a cynical mystification”, a mere naivety, but is instead about the entrance 
of sovereignty into the figure of the police, a conjunction premised on the criminalisation of 
the “enemy”, “a process by which the enemy is first of all excluded from civil humanity and 
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branded as criminal; only in a second moment does it become possible and licit to eliminate 
the enemy by a „police operation‟”. Such an operation is not obliged to respect any juridical 
rule and can thus make no distinctions between the civilian population and soldiers…thereby 
returning to the most archaic conditions of belligerence” (Agamben, 2000, p. 106,7). This 
condition of exclusion from civil humanity is the condition of homo sacer.  
 
On the East Rand, this condition of ius belli, in which the ISD, purportedly a mere police unit 
but in fact a critical protagonist in the civil war taking place in the region‟s townships, made 
the civilian population “criminal”, subjecting its residents to the arbitrary and anomic force of 
law, loosed from law, as the ISD units which operated in these townships had “no structural 
relationship with local police commanders and conducted their activities with no regard to 
local communities” (Rauch & Storey, 1998, para.18). 
 
Repeated allegations that members of the ISD were involved in assault, torture, random 
shooting, looting and property damage led residents to hate and fear the unit (Peace Action, 
1993)
50
. In Moleleki this was a view shared by all protagonists in the conflict. Civic leader 
Lethusang Rikaba, questioned by a TRC commissioner on why the police were not called in 
the wake of the Moleleki execution, reacts with disbelief to this question: “I think I have 
alluded to the fact that the situation in Katlehong was to such an extent that co-operation was 
not possible between the police and the community…I would never dare do that because we 
did not trust them” (TRC, 1998a, p. 670). SDU member Michael Nkomo similarly states, 
                                            
 
50
 The report of the TRC comments on the role of the police post 1990: “Violence…arose from the continued 
use of lethal force in public order policing. The HRC [Human Rights Committee] estimated that killings by the 
security forces, primarily in the course of public order policing, numbered 518 between July 1991 and June 
1993” (TRC, 1998b, p. 585). 
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“There was no co-operation with the police at that time, I hope you know the situation that 
was in place at that time” (TRC, 1998a, p. 438)  
 
Therefore on the East Rand, the unit‟s conduct led to escalating protests from residents living 
in a state of necessity and civil conflict, who clearly saw the ISD as another role-player in the 
conflict, whom they “accused of deliberately targeting and eliminating the leadership 
structures of the ANC-aligned SDUs. Furthermore, there were accusations that the ISD was 
involved in clandestinely supplying hostels with arms and of assisting hostel residents in their 
attacks” (Shaw, 1997, p. 232). Oscar Motlokwa explains, of the situation in Katlehong, “if 
there is a fight between ANC and IFP the police would take the side of the IFP, then we 
would regard them as our enemy because of their actions” (TRC, 1998a, p. 11). 
 
It was the “youth” in particular, the leadership of previous generations of political resistance 
to the apartheid state, who in these conditions of “archaic belligerence” were most 
extensively subjected to the depredations of the ongoing “police operation” on the East Rand. 
Young people were materially essentialised as the body of the “criminal”, thus the body of 
the “enemy” whom it was “licit to eliminate” as the assassination of numerous youth leaders, 
defence unit members and former Umkhonto we Sizwe guerrillas during this period made 
explicit51. Lethusang Rikaba, civic leader in Moleleki, explains the extreme vulnerability of 
the “youth”, which left them on the threshold of life and law, subject to the arbitrary violence 
of the ISD: “Now for them [the ISD], every young man is a criminal, they don‟t choose, that 
is why the youth ran away from the Stability Unit” (TRC, 1998a, p. 671). Elphina Mugadi, 
                                            
 
51
 The TRC report states of the period between 1990 and 1994, “During this period political opponents 
continued to be killed in circumstances which pointed directly to security force involvement” (TRC of South 
Africa, 1998, p. 592) and that “The HRC [Human Rights Committee] recorded large numbers of political 
assassinations during the early 1990s, the victims of which were largely office-bearers of the newly unbanned 
ANC, MK members or members of allied organizations”(TRC of South Africa, 1998, p. 594). 
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mother of Isaac Mugadi, one of the ANCYL members killed in the Moleleki execution, 
recounts: “There were problems with the ISD, they would pick up children, Isaac was picked 
up twice and beaten” (E. Mugadi, personal interview, 2001). It was this fear of the ISD which 
would eventually place the children of the Moleleki execution in a relation of abandonment 
and danger, as they gathered together on the eve of the execution in an unoccupied shack on 
the edge of the township, in anticipation of an “attack” by the ISD, which SDU members had 
told them was imminent. A number of these ANCYL members were reportedly later captured 
from this shack by the SDU members who had directed them there. 
 
This anomic “force of law” unleashed by the state on South Africa‟s townships in the context 
of exception, was Moleleki township‟s only substantive experience of the state‟s security 
presence during the period prior to popular elections in 1994. As Elphina recounts: “At that 
time it was just stability coming here” (E. Mugadi, personal interview, 2001). The unit came 
in a condition of war, either, as Lethusang Rikaba explains, to “attack” residents (TRC, 
1998a, p. 671) or to collect the bodies of this war, arriving in Moleleki not to intervene in 
defence of its residents as juridical subjects but merely to collect their corporal bodies. 
Bulelwa, Blanko and the nine Moleleki executed were all casually “collected” many hours 
after their deaths by the ISD, simple material objects to be cleared from the space of 
Moleleki.  
 
Collecting the “criminal” body of exception 
Elphina describes the way in which the Moleleki executed were finally collected by the 
police at least 24 hours after their death:  
When I arrived I sat down next to the eight corpses or bodies. A policeman then came 
out and said I am asking for one of the parents, I would like to load these bodies so 
that the body should not get lost. Some of the parents were afraid. I then stood up and 
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said I am one of the parents, a parent to Isaac. (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, pp. 
1094-1095, own emphasis)  
 
At approximately 11am on the morning of 8 December 1993, Sergeant Andre Hermanus van 
Vreden, who was stationed with the Unrest and Violent Crimes unit of the SAPS, arrived at 
the scene where the corpses lay. He had received a call at approximately 10.30am that 
morning from an “unknown black man”, informing him that eight bodies were lying in the 
veld next to Moleleki squatter camp. At 11am when Sergeant van Vreden arrived at the place 
identified by the anonymous caller a large group of people had already congregated at the site 
(Van Vreden, 1993). 
 
In a final gesture of material essentialisation of the body of the youth as “criminal”, the mute 
corpses of these young residents, who could now never stand trial as juridical subjects (some 
of whom, as legal minors, could never have in fact been engaged as adult juridical subjects), 
were now in this condition of death, “judged on account of a crime” (Agamben, 1998, p. 29), 
as local police brought employees of a paraffin company, which had been repeatedly robbed 
during deliveries to the township, to the site of the killings to “identify” these decomposing 
corpses as the “perpetrators” of “crime” in the township. Thus among the crowd at the scene 
of the killings were three truck drivers working for the Benoni-based
52
 paraffin company, 
Royal Paraffin – Frans Tau, Josia Ngwenya and Herman Mabokela, who had been the victims 
of these hijackings (Mabokela, 1993; Ngwenya, 1993).  
 
                                            
 
52
 Benoni, was one of several “white” towns which were at the centre of South Africa‟s manufacturing economy 
on the former East Rand, now the Gauteng municipality of Ekurhuleni, which were supplied with labour by a 
rapidly growing black labour force that settled in what were known as the “Kathorus” townships, namely 
Katlehong, Thokoza and Vosloorus.  
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Less than a week before the execution, on 1st December 1993, Frans Tau accompanied by his 
two assistants, Josia Ngwenya and Herman Mabokela, were stopped by a group of about 17 
“youths” armed with axes and “kierries”, who hacked open the safe containing the day‟s 
cash, when they tried to deliver paraffin in Moleleki. Tau, along with Joshua and Herman, 
fled the scene (Tau, 1993, p. 2). After this incident, the owner of Royal Paraffin, Mr 
Moodley, cancelled all further deliveries to Moleleki until he could “sort things out with the 
Civic Association in Katlehong” (Moodley, 1993).  
 
On Wednesday 8 December at approximately 8am, Tau received a call from the owner of the 
Moleleki coal yard, who assured him that he could deliver paraffin safely to Moleleki, 
informing him that the people who had robbed him were dead and that they had been killed 
by “people” from Moleleki (Tau, 1993)53. Later the same day Frans Tau reportedly identified 
to Sergeant van Zelderen of the Katlehong Unrest and Violent Crimes Unit, four of the bodies 
of the Moleleki executed as the people who had robbed him (Tau, 1993, p. 3). 
 
Also on Wednesday 8 December at about 9am, drivers Josia and Herman arrived at Inyoni 
Park police station to ask, as they frequently did, for a police escort into Moleleki. They were 
told that all policemen at the station had already left to investigate a murder case in Moleleki 
Extension 2. However, not long afterwards, some police returned and asked Josiah and 
Herman to accompany them to the scene of the murder in order to ascertain whether any of 
the dead were the “black males” who had robbed them. Josiah identified two of the bodies 
                                            
 
53
 Tau‟s statement records, “On Wednesday 93-12-08 I was at work again when the telephone rang, the person 
said that he was the owner of the Moleleki coal yard. He told me that I can deliver paraffin and I mustn‟t be 
worried because the people who robbed me are dead and further that the people from Moleleki had killed them” 
(Tau, 1993, p. 3). Original: Op Woensdag 93-12-08 was ek weer by my werk, die telefooon het gelei…die 
persoon het aan my gese date hy die einaar van die Moleleki kole werf is. Die man het aan my gese dat ek 
parafien moet kan afbewer en nie moet bekommerd wees nie, aangesien die mense wie my geroof het dood is en 
verder dat die mense van Moleleki hulle doodgemaak het (Tau, 1993, p. 3). 
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and Herman three of the bodies as those of youths involved in the robbery on 1 December. 
Both conclude their police statements with the identical sentence: “Nobody is allowed to 
robbed (sic) anybody or point fire-arm to anybody” (Mabokela, 1993; Ngwenya, 1993).  
 
A medico-legal inscription of the body of exception, notarising death 
In the wake of the Moleleki execution, which had materialised the exception in the bodies of 
the executed, a process of juridico-political inscription began which sought to retrieve this 
anomie for law, by tracing a relation between cause and effect, a relation of juridical 
instrumentality, which could not recognise the ambiguity of the biopolitical transformation 
that it in fact sought to elucidate.  
 
The medico-legal processes of the post-mortem, through which the apartheid state sought a 
final “mapping” of the body of the apartheid subject, was a “mapping” which had pursued 
this body in various statutory and discriminatory prohibitions in life and which now pursued 
this body beyond death. This “mapping” sought to render this corporal mass “legible” 
(Pugliese, 2002, p. 380) in terms of a medico-scientific anatomical “atlas” (p. 374) which 
reconstituted this body in terms of regime of medical hermeneutics and medical visuality that 
would “translate” (p. 369) this dismembered organic mass into an evidentiary object, making 
this body with all its wounds and mutilations, legible to law, a medico-legal sign, rendering it 
thus in a relation to law.  
 
Critically, what this anatomical “reading” (p. 374) of the organic mass of the body makes 
possible is the inscription of this body within a medico-legal regime of instrumentality that 
seeks to determine “the precise cause of death” (p. 369)  through a series of instrumental 
mediations, “to ascertain whether or not any foreign agent was employed and the mode in 
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which the instrument used (if any) produced the effect” (p. 370), and hence to make it 
possible to trace a linear relation of cause and effect, which “discloses the hidden and effaced 
cause of death” (p. 381) and the agents of its inscription. Thus,  
in forensic pathology, the practices of visuality and language work hand in hand in 
making legible the signs of violence and trauma that mark the body of the victim and 
in transmuting these signs into coherent narratives of cause and effect. (p. 369, own 
emphasis)  
 
This process of transmutation and translation of the traumata of the body into a narrative of 
cause and effect, moving from the exterior to the interior spaces of the body  (p. 368), begins 
from the moment the body is first encountered by the policing agencies of the state, which, in 
order to locate the body within a narrative structure which will make possible the disclosure 
of the precise cause of death, “orders a vast array of forensic practices, beginning with the 
photographing of the victim‟s body in situ and extending to the presentation of visual 
evidence…in the courtroom” (p. 370).  
 
At 11am on the morning after the Moleleki execution, Sergeant van Vreden of the Unrest and 
Violent Crimes unit of the SAPS arrived at the scene of the execution and at the discovery of 
these bodies initiated a process of narrativisation which would track “when, where and to 
whom” (Pugliese, 2002, p. 370) control of the body was relinquished, inscribing these bodies 
in a “chain of evidence” that would putatively maintain the body “intact”, in its “original” 
form, from “the site of injury…to the pathologist” (Pugliese, 2002, p. 370), an “originary 
state” which in fact, occluded the narrative of the chain of evidence in which the body had 
been inscribed and which were actually the condition of its intelligibility within each 
recorded stage of its “originary condition” (Pugliese, 2002, p. 370).  
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Van Vreden notes the first stage of this condition of originality in his report of the Moleleki 
bodies in situ at the crime scene, recording that he had found eight black “men” lying in the 
veld. Seven were bound together with rope around their hands. One man was lying 
separately, also bound. Van Vreden comments further that the bodies were “bundled 
together” with their heads in a “southerly direction” (Van Vreden, 1993, p. 1). The dead had a 
variety of bullet and head wounds. Sergeant van Vreden found 14 spent AK47 cartridges on 
the scene, which he handed over to Sergeant Hayle from Springs police station.  
 
Van Vreden then talked to members of the crowd gathered at the scene. According to his 
rough sketch of the scene, “deceased number seven” was identified to him as Isaac Mugadi, 
“a 17-year-old Xhosa”, by a “black woman”, Mugadi‟s mother (Van Vreden, 1993, p. 1). 
“Deceased number eight” was identified by Paulina Moketsi as Miles from 7215 Moleleki 
Extension 2. Sergeant van Vreden concludes his report by noting on his sketch that the skull 
of “deceased number four” was crushed and pieces of the skull were lying around (Van 
Vreden, 1993, p. 1).  
 
Sergeant Van Vreden, Deputy-Detective Johannes Pieterse and Detective Lance-Sergeant 
Andre Viljoen, all at the scene of the killing, thus collectively conclude their statements with 
a standard confirmation of the synchronic originality of the bodies at the moment at which 
they were found: “While the bodies were under my supervision they did not acquire any 
further wounds”54 (Pieterse, 1993; Van Vreden, 1993; Viljoen, 1993), an originality which 
was confirmed as intact before the bodies were handed over to the next authority in the chain 
of evidence, Constable Elijahr Mapshoane from the Germiston mortuary (Van Vreden, 1993).  
 
                                            
 
54Terwyl gemelde lyke onder my toesig en beheer…het dit geen verdure beserings opgedoen nie. 
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Constable Mapshoane‟s main duties at the time were the collection and delivery of bodies to 
the Germiston mortuary (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 1216). At the site of the bodies, 
Mapshoane filled out an SAP 180 form stating the place and time at which the bodies were 
found, the name of the detective who oversaw the bodies until their removal, visible injuries, 
and the person who received each body for transportation to the Germiston mortuary, namely 
himself. The sex and race of the bodies were also noted. At the Germiston mortuary, 
completed SAP 180s were kept in a file for the pathologist and other official reference (The 
State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 1229).  
 
On arrival at the mortuary the bodies were again recorded in the “condition received”. Each 
body was “tagged” and allocated death registration numbers (The State v. Michael Sonti, 
1999, p. 203), again inscribing the bodies in a narrative chain of evidence. At 4.31pm the 
bodies were thus unloaded from the lykswa (hearse), washed down and assigned numbers 
from the death register, a “big book” containing the SAP form 183, on which all known 
details of the dead were recorded as they were “admitted” to the mortuary (The State v. 
Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 1231).  
 
After “admittance”, Constable Masidele Benjamin Mbashlehle, a colleague of Elijahr 
Mapshoane, took photographs of the bodies, for the purposes of examination by a pathologist 
(The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 1230). Constable Masidele Mbashlehle, who had 
received no training or supervision, struggled to carry out his brief and frequently failed to 
capture on film the wounds which had caused death or injury (The State v. Michael Sonti, 
1999, p. 172), contesting the possibility of a synchronic recording of the “original state”  
(Pugliese, 2002, p. 370) of the body at the time of receipt by the pathologist in what district 
surgeon Nienaber described as a condition of war (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 195).  
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Doctor Nienaber, who was working as a district surgeon at the Germiston mortuary at the 
time of the execution, explains the state of necessity that produced this disjuncture between 
wounds described and wounds photographed:  
we had violence on the East Rand. We got up to 60 post-mortems between two district 
surgeons. So we were under big pressure, to do work and I think…the person that 
takes the photographs did not…look for wounds, before the photographs were taken. 
(The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 172) 
 
After the bodies had been washed, tagged, numbered and photographed, they were placed 
above and among bodies already stacked to the ceiling waiting for examination by a district 
surgeon before burial. Autopsies did not take place in a separate room, district surgeons 
worked among the corpses. Once the bodies of the Moleleki victims were finally placed on 
the stainless steel of the pathologist‟s table for examination, these now decomposing corpses 
were brought into a new visibility through the medico-legal gaze of the forensic pathologist, 
even as they in fact lost their material corporal identity. Thus a series of techniques of 
visuality established the reality of this material body “as though, prior to the deployment of a 
series of medico legal practices, the body is obscured by a shroud that renders it invisible” 
(Pugliese, 2002, p. 368). This was achieved through the meticulous spatial mapping and 
documenting of the location and positioning of wounds and a “detailed analysis of the surface 
areas of the body” (p. 371). 
 
Critically, the bringing into visibility of the body which establishes its evidentiary value must 
apply logos to this manifestation, must anchor this materiality in language, through the device 
of the autopsy report, which orients the medico-legal gaze in relation to the visualised object 
in terms of language, thus rendering “the organic articulable” (Pugliese, 2002, p. 381) and “in 
the context of the law, in which the logos of the word governs all other systems of 
signification, the visual and the visible must literally become language, or alternatively, must 
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be anchored and explained by language” (Pugliese, 2002, p. 381). This articulation of the 
silent organic corporality of the body, the bringing of this body into speech and language, 
enables the corpse to metaphorically “speak” (p. 369) again, through the forensic pathologist, 
after a “rigorous and scientific analysis of the traumata of the body” (p. 369) through which 
the forensic pathologist “ventriloquises” this death  (p. 369), its causes and its last moments. 
In this ventriloquisation of death through forensic pathology, a process of juridico-political 
inscription begins in which “man”, the animal that has language, separates himself from his 
own bare life and effects in this distancing a biopolitical transformation between bare life and 
“political life”. Thus the post-mortems performed on the Moleleki dead sought to achieve 
such a transformation and retrieve this flesh made animal for logos and law.  
 
However, this retrieval of flesh for law, which attempts to translate the visual data generated 
by the corporality of the dead body into a linguistic narrative of a relation between cause and 
effect, remains deeply ambiguous and irrevocably contingent, a juridical “truth” about the 
circumstances and causes of death, which in its very statement of causality, questions 
causality and thus can only remain infinitely contestable. As Didier Coste argues,  
all narrative discourse, including causal discourse, questions causality as much as it 
states or suggests it. An attorney defending a criminal case will use this well known 
device to dissociate verbally the death of the victim from the gesture of the murderer; 
the defending attorney analyzes the prosecutor‟s claim that “X shot Y dead” into an 
unfortunate coincidence between “X shot” and “Y died”. (Didier Coste cited in 
Pugliese, 2002, p. 369)  
 
The state of “chaos” (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 209) at the Germiston mortuary, in 
which the bodies of the dead, piled on top of each other, were stored in a condition of “bare 
life”, as mere flesh, disputed the possibility of the articulation of a coherent narrative of cause 
and effect around the Moleleki execution. Under these conditions of war and summer heat in 
December 1993 the pressure to complete post-mortems before decomposition had wrought 
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irrevocable damage to bodies was intense. The autopsy reports filled in by Nienaber and 
Bekker reveal that they both averaged 15 minutes per autopsy (Bekker, 1993; Nienaber, 
1993). Court records reveal that the quality of their work was erratic. Wounds photographed 
were not described; wounds described were not photographed; exit and entrance wounds 
were confused, as were the site or type of wound (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 172) 
and medical terminology was improperly applied. This led senior state pathologist Jane 
Klepp to conclude,  
With all due respect the quality of the post-mortems is very bad. You know the 
terminology, the wounds that are missing, the lack of photographs, but that is just to 
really explain why some words have been used that shouldn‟t be. It is just a very poor 
post-mortem. (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 858)  
 
Thus what was demonstrated by these processes was the difficulty “of locating definitively 
any cause within a linguistic system of signification” (Pugliese, 2002, p. 388). This is a 
question concerning causation in both science and law which Pugliese (2002) argues, 
“remains fundamentally irresolvable” (p. 388). However empiricism (in science and law) is in 
fact founded on this fundamental irresolvability. These fundamental ambiguities of cause and 
effect were made explicit in the struggles over the medico-legal transcription of the bodies of 
the Moleleki dead, as the “reading” of these corpses by district surgeons Bekker and 
Nienaber was extensively contested in court by senior state pathologist Jane Klepp.  
 
A Juridico-Political Investigation of Death 
This ambiguous medico-legal transcription of the organic mass of the body into something 
putatively, legible and juridical was undertaken in 1993 in anticipation of a further process of 
legal inscription, namely a subsequent police investigation and court trial, which could 
ostensibly capture the protagonists of this death and exact a juridical punishment. However, 
the context of ius belli meant that although a murder docket was opened after the Moleleki 
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execution, the investigation did not proceed further as Moleleki residents, including the 
relatives of the deceased, were unwilling to work with the agents of apartheid law and make 
available the information that would have made a police investigation possible. A press report 
on the trial of the Moleleki accused recounts the conditions of enmity which prevailed on the 
East Rand at the time:  
Police collected at least 140 corpses on the streets of East Rand townships over about 
eight months, during the early 1990s, yet local communities insisted on keeping silent 
about the circumstances surrounding the deaths. In court yesterday, policemen based 
in the East Rand townships of Katlehong, Thokoza and Vosloorus (Kathorus) during 
the violence-ridden early 1990s painted a picture of death, mayhem and distrust 
between communities and police. (Moya, 1998) 
 
Investigating officer Lieutenant du Plessis explains: “No witnesses could be found who could 
help with the investigation. No cooperation could be got from the public” 55 (Du Plessis, 
Unrest and Violent Crime Unit, letter, 4 October, 1999). Consequently the original 
investigating officer, Inspector Leon van Zelderen, was led to conclude that “as a result of 
fruitless previous investigation, the case was prepared for an inquest”56 (The State v. Michael 
Sonti, 1999, p. 1194).  
 
Therefore, following the Moleleki execution, because of the repressive excesses of apartheid 
law, none of the protagonists to the Moleleki execution, neither survivors, witnesses nor 
relatives considered using this law to attempt to bring a legal case against the perpetrators. 
Instead civic leaders in Moleleki “reported” the matter to SANCO. As civic leader Lethusang 
Rikaba explained,  
                                            
 
55
 Geen getuies kon gevind word, wat kon help met die ondersoek nie. Geen samewerking kon van die publiek 
gekry word nie. 
 
56As gevolg van vrugtelose vooraf ondersoek is die saak voorberei vir die hou van „n geregtelike nadoodse 
ondersoek. 
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I think I have alluded to the fact that the situation in Katlehong was to such an extent 
that co-operation was not possible between the police and the community so it was 
my duty to inform the bigger organisation which is SANCO or rather the Civic. (The 
State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 670) 
 
In the wake of the execution itself, the ANC, which had already been requested to intervene 
in escalating tensions between the ANCYL and the SDU in the township, finally sent its 
representatives to address the atrocious consequences of this battle for sovereignty in the 
township. Critically, however, this “intervention” did not involve an engagement with the 
apartheid law of the state. Thus following the Moleleki execution, Afrika Khumalo, head of 
the then PWV
57
 ANC Department of Intelligence Services, was sent by the regional 
leadership of the ANC to Moleleki to “intervene” and “bring the ANCYL and the SDU in 
Moleleki together” (Dwane-Alpman, 1998, p. 11). Partly by disarming both parties, he sought 
a path of “reconciliation” which, rather than exacting individual punishment of the offenders 
through the judicial system of the apartheid state, attempted the restoration of “balance in the 
community” (Crais, 2002, p. 86). Thus Khumalo posited a “political solution to the problem” 
(Ndlozi, 1997, p. 3). This “political” solution, however was not a party political solution but 
concerned a question of local juridico-political ordering in terms of which “it was agreed that 
it [the conflict] would be solved the „African way‟ because this was a domestic issue” (O. 
Motlokwa, personal interview, 2001). Thus after Afrika Khumalo had ensured that the SDU 
in Moleleki was disarmed, he concluded that the “situation” had been “defused” and “left it 
with the local leadership” (Ndlozi, 1997, p. 3). 
 
                                            
 
57
 The former Pretoria Witwatersrand Vaal (PWV) region of what was then the Transvaal province, which is 
now know as Gauteng province.   
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Police investigation, a juridical application 
It was only in 1995 after the inauguration of a new political dispensation that the witnesses, 
survivors and families of the Moleleki dead claimed a new juridical citizenship through the 
deployment of the national jurisprudence of the post-apartheid state against the protagonists 
of the execution. This contested the “domestic” exercise of “African” sovereignty that SDU 
member Oscar Motlokwa articulated and which had in fact claimed the lives of the Moleleki 
executed. Thus, “the first statements from witnesses were only provided to the South African 
Police some two years after the incident” (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 1775), as 
Moleleki citizens sought to ensure that the execution would be juridically investigated and 
the processes of juridical inscription, which had remained suspended in the condition of 
exception of the pre-1994 period, would take place. 
 
Consequently, during July and August 1995, the police, following allegations made to them 
in connection with the execution, for the first time actively solicited statements from a 
number of relatives and witnesses in connection with the Moleleki execution. As a result four 
suspects were arrested and appeared in court in September 1995. By December 1995 nine 
men had appeared in the Alberton
58
 Magistrates Court on charges of murder related to the 
execution, among them some of the final accused, Zola Michael Nceba Sonti, Siviwe 
Malcoms Ngam, Michael Armoed and Bethwell Tabiso Ntoma. One of those charged, 
Bethwell Ntoma, was employed as a community policeman, stationed at the Katlehong police 
station at the time of his arrest. In January 1996, the case faltered when the accused appeared 
again at Alberton Magistrates Court before Magistrate Bandjies, who refused to postpone the 
case further pending instructions from the Attorney-General‟s office, which was at the time in 
                                            
 
58
 Alberton, also part of the industrial complex on the former East Rand, now forms part of the Gauteng 
municipality of Ekurhuleni.  
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possession of the docket. The case was withdrawn and all the accused were released. Despite 
this setback, the continued investigation of the case was actively encouraged by the policing 
agencies of the new juridico-political order, which saw in these processes of juridical 
investigation an opportunity for the establishment of a new norm of law.  
 
Inspector Baumann of the East Rand Murder and Robbery Unit, the third investigating officer 
assigned to the Moleleki murder docket, in the wake of the withdrawal of the case in January 
1996, articulated this concern for the recovery of the norm of law in a juridico-political order, 
in which for the first time, the Moleleki execution had become a subject of juridical 
investigation, not an object of local “custom”. Inspector Baumann explains:  
When the case against the suspects was withdrawn before I was the investigating 
officer, the community was angry with the police. The community felt that they had 
not done their work. After a certain incident and after the arrests then the community 
began to trust the police. The community then began to now come forward again. 
They felt that the police now are doing something…It was not like in the past that we 
must go look for witnesses. (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 1272)
 59
 
 
Thus in 1996, while attending meetings of the recently established Community Policing 
Forum (CPF), set up in the immediate post-apartheid period in order to bridge divisions 
between township communities and the South African Police services, Inspector Baumann 
became party to discussions of “the Moleleki incident” and during these discussions to 
information that there were reportedly further witnesses who could testify in relation to the 
killings. Inspector Baumann worked closely within the CPF with civic leader Lethusang 
Rikaba, survivor Samson Mokoena and Elphina Mugadi, mother of the one of the executed 
Moleleki children, who all served as members of the Community Police Forum and 
                                            
 
59
Toe die saak teruggetrek is teen die verdagtes voordat ek nou die ondersoekbeampte was, was die gemeenskap 
kwaad vir die polisie. Die gemeenskap het gevoel hulle het nie hulle werk gedoen nie. Na „n sekere voorval en 
na die arrestasie toe het die gemeenskap weer begin vertrou vind by die polisie. Die gemeenskap het toe nou 
weer na vore gekom. Hulle het gevoel die polisie doen nou iets…Dit was nie soos in die verlede dat ons moes 
gaan soek het na getuies nie. 
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apparently “assisted Inspector Baumann in regard to the investigation”. The closeness of the 
relationship between the Inspector and these CPF members eventually lead Justice 
Boruchowitz to question the credibility of some witnesses in the court trial of SDU members 
(The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 1777). 
 
In November 1996, despite the initial withdrawal of the case due to repeated postponements, 
the office of the Attorney-General issued an instruction that “efforts to re-arrest the accused 
must proceed” (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1996, p. 1)60 as a result of the continued 
investigation of Inspector Baumann, which led him to identify further witnesses to the case.  
 
In 1997, in response to the instructions of the Attorney-General and more than a year after 
their release, the accused were rearrested.  
 
The seven accused are described by the office of the state prosecutor and the Attorney-
General as: 
1. Zola Michael Nceba Sonti @ [aka] Ncaba, 39 years old, Zulu speaking, residing at 
7080 Moleleki  
2. Siviwe Malcolms Ngam @ Manzini, 42 years old, Xhosa speaking, residing at 
7056 Moleleki 
3. Michael Armoed @ Rooivark, 39 years old, Afrikaans speaking, residing at 6982 
Moleleki 
4. Betuel Tabiso Ntomo @ Thabiso 30 years old, South Sotho speaking, residing at 
7477 Moleleki 
5. Petros Mtembu @ Vusi, 31 years old, Sotho speaking, residing at 8470 Moleleki 
6. Langa Michael Nkomo @ Michael or Nkomo, 35 years old, Sotho speaking, 
residing at 8141 Moleleki 
7. Oscar Mohale Motolkwa, 34 years old, Pedi speaking, residing at 479 
Moleleki/Leeukop Prison 
(The State v. Michael Sonti, 1997, p. 1) 
 
                                            
 
60
 Pogings om die beskulgigdes te herarresteer moet voortgaan. 
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TRC investigation of the Moleleki execution, a juridical suspension 
However, this renewed process of juridical investigation and inscription, initiated by 
Moleleki citizens in the wake of the political transition, immediately evoked a critical contest 
around the nature of this human action committed during the context of a juridical void, in 
particular a contestation regarding the type of legal consequence which could be attached to 
such acts, a contest which, as Agamben argues, betrays the difficulty of defining the nature of 
human action in this juridical void and the “impossibility” of clearly defining the legal 
consequences of these actions. This adjudication of the legal consequence of acts committed 
during the exception hinged critically in the immediate post-apartheid period, on an 
adjudication by the Amnesty Committee of the TRC regarding whether such acts could be 
shown to have been committed with “political” intent and therefore would be eligible for 
amnesty, including the extinction of the legal consequences that that this entailed.  
 
Thus the Moleleki protagonists applied to the TRC for amnesty for their involvement in the 
execution in May 1997, four months before the state prosecutor recommended to the 
Attorney-General that 10 charges of murder and 10 charges of kidnapping should be brought 
against the seven accused in relation to the execution. This precipitated an initial suspension 
of the formal juridical processes around the execution.  
 
However, the ambiguity of this human praxis during a period of iustitium was repeatedly 
evoked during the course of 1997 in an ongoing contest between the formal judicial system 
and the amnesty processes of the TRC regarding whose object of adjudication the execution 
should properly be. Thus, SDU members involved in the execution were re-arrested soon 
after the investigation unit of the recently established TRC initiated an inquiry into the killing 
with the intention of persuading the protagonists to voluntarily come forward to the 
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Commission to apply for amnesty. The success of this initiative was primarily the result of 
the work of TRC investigator George Ndlozi, who had himself been an SDU member in 
Katlehong. Ndlozi explains:  
We were very successful in obtaining the information and in convincing perpetrators 
to apply for amnesty. We were very disturbed to learn that some of the people we 
spoke to got arrested a week after we spoke to them. This action hampered our 
investigation as it developed an atmosphere of animosity between us and the SDU in 
Moleleki. We spoke to some of them and they felt very bitter as they suspect that I 
might have handed the information to the police about their involvement. (Ndlozi, 
1997, p. 4)  
 
In fact the re-arrest of the accused in the Moleleki execution had nothing to do with the TRC 
investigation. Siviwe Malcolms Ngam, accused number two in the subsequent trial, had 
appeared in the Alberton court in connection with a charge of theft. Captain du Plessis, who 
was briefly involved in the Moleleki investigation, alerted the current investigating officer, 
Inspector Baumann, to Ngam‟s appearance. Baumann “booked out” Ngam two nights later 
and he then reportedly identified five other accused. One of the other accused, Oscar 
Motlokwa, was in fact already in jail on a charge of murder in connection with an attack on 
an alleged IFP supporter on a train during 1993.  
 
At the time that the state prosecutor was listing witnesses for the state‟s case, he was also 
aware of the pending applications of several of the accused to the TRC for amnesty and 
attempted to dispute the assertion of political intent on which the amnesty applications of the 
Moleleki accused hinged, in terms of the apparently transgressive nature of the actions of 
SDU members, “It is my respectful submission that there is no foundation for these murders 
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as political…These murders were carried out in an extremely gruesome manner on the lives 
of young children and a woman”61 (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1997, p. 12).  
 
The TRC would ultimately concur with the state prosecutor regarding the nature of these 
actions as “non-political”, not on the grounds that the actions had been transgressive but on 
the basis that SDU members could not articulate a juridical political motive as an 
instrumental expression of the objectives of a “known political party”, namely the ANC. 
Instead they invoked the ambiguous biopolitical concept of the “community” as the basis of 
the authority for their actions and the criminal rather than the political party opponent as the 
object of enmity. After the Truth and Reconciliation process, the execution was passed back 
to the criminal justice system for a final adjudication regarding its “criminal” nature. 
However, in using the doctrine of common purpose for this adjudication, which abandoned 
the relation of causality usually required for a finding of criminal culpability, the multiple 
problems of undecidibility around the execution within the TRC, which concerned the 
attempt to juridically inscribe what had in fact occurred outside the law, were simply 
exacerbated and reiterated, producing a profoundly mutable “truth”. 
 
                                            
 
61
 Dit is my respekvolle submissie dat hier geen ander grondslag vir hierdie Moorde is, as politiek nie…Hierdie 
moordes is op „n uiters grusame wyse uitgevoer op die lewens van jong kinders en „n vrou. (The woman 
referred to is Bulelwa Zwane) 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, FIXING 
THE LIMITS OF THE POLITICAL 
 
Introduction 
The negotiated transition between the pre and post-apartheid periods was made possible by 
the essential continuity of the principle of juridical inscription, namely the capturing of 
“pure” violence for law, which was instantiated in terms of the provision, that amnesty would 
be granted for “political” offences committed by protagonists on all sides of the conflict. 
However,  during this subsequent historical epoch, the processes of juridical inscription that 
surrounded the Moleleki execution, and other incidents of biopolitical violence that had 
occurred during the struggle between the apartheid state and its opponents, were critically 
concerned with the establishment of the sovereignty of the new state in terms of a new norm 
of law, the norm of “human rights”, which sought to define the boundaries of the juridico-
political present in terms of the “exception” of the violence of the past.  
 
Paradoxically, however, despite the explicit intention to constitute the present “political” as 
the juridico-political, in opposition to the biopolitics of the past, the norm of human rights, 
“which is invoked today as an absolutely fundamental right in opposition to sovereign 
power” (Agamben, 1998), in fact introduces a critical biopolitical principle into the 
functioning of modern nation states. This apparent paradox becomes explicit if one examines 
the advent of the modern nation state during the “great age of revolutions” in the late 18th 
century, inaugurated by the French Revolution of 1789, which for the first time made the 
“people” the immediate bearer of sovereignty. Under the dynastic system, which had 
preceded this era of the nation state, sovereignty was embodied in the person of the divinely 
authorised sovereign. However, with the advent of the modern nation state a profound 
transformation takes place where birth marks not simply the emergence of the subject of a 
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sovereign (who can live anywhere under the dominion of a particular prince), but the 
emergence of a citizen of a nation state.  
 
The instrument of the transformation from subject to citizen is the Declaration of the Rights 
of Man, which ostensibly makes birth the “source and bearer of rights” (Agamben, 1998, p. 
127). Critically, however, what remains implicit is the fact that these “inalienable rights” can 
only be exercised by a citizen of a nation state and are therefore contingent, not on a meta-
juridical value but location within a nation state62. Moreover, the “Rights of Man”, and the 
protections the declaration affords, also emerge not as a meta-juridical right, but as a 
biopolitical status, which is acquired within the context of the political community. An 
examination of the Declaration of Rights itself makes the “essential fiction” underlying this 
formulation immediately explicit, as “at the very moment in which native rights were 
declared to be inalienable and indefensible, the rights of man in general were divided into 
active rights and passive rights” (Agamben, 1998, p. 130), where all inhabitants of a society 
would enjoy “passive rights”, but “active rights” – those rights “by which society is formed” 
– specifically excluded (among others) women, children, foreigners, the insane, minors and 
those condemned to punishment (Agamben, 1998, p. 130). These people, “who would not at 
all contribute to the public establishment” and “must have no active influence on public 
matters” would not be citizens (Agamben, 1998, pp. 130-131). Citizenship therefore, is not in 
fact a right, but a status (Chipkin, 2007, p. 55), which invokes the “inscription of life in the 
                                            
 
 
62
 The hidden difference between birth (allegedly the immediate source of rights) and nation, was made explicit 
by what Arendt called, “The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man”, which produced the 
figure of the refugee, “who should have embodied the rights of man par excellence” but in fact signalled the, 
“concept‟s radical crisis”(Agamben, 1998, p. 126). Confronted with those who had, “lost all other qualities and 
specific relationships-except that they were still human” it was instead revealed that, “in the system of the nation 
state, the so-called sacred and inalienable rights of man… lack[ed] every protection and reality at the moment in 
which they [could] no longer take the form of rights belonging to citizens of a state”(Agamben, 1998, p. 126). 
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state order” (Agamben, 1998, p. 129) and whose “duties and obligations issue not from 
nature, but from the political community itself” (Chipkin, 2007, p. 55).  
 
Thus, in the shifting of sovereignty from the prince to the “people” through the figure of the 
citizen of the nation state, a figure that is in fact produced in and through the political 
community, a fundamental ambiguity emerges, namely, how is this boundary between bare 
life and political life to be generated? The grounding of sovereignty in the “people” therefore 
leads to a “constant need to redefine the threshold in life that distinguishes and separates what 
is inside from what is outside” (Agamben, 1998, p. 131) and thus to define the limits of the 
political community in terms of a distinction between “authentic life and life lacking every 
political value” (Agamben, 1998, p. 132), an “authenticity”, which as a status to be earned 
rather than a birthright, “one had to prove oneself worthy and which could therefore always 
be called into question” (Agamben, 1998, p. 132)63. Thus in the context of the nation state, 
the determination of who is and isn‟t an “authentic citizen” begins to “coincide with the 
highest political task” (Agamben, 1998, p. 130).  
 
It was this “highest political task” that the South African TRC had to grapple with, namely, 
“to overcome the worry that the South African people did not actually exist” (Chipkin, 2007, 
p. 174) and through this delimitation of the “people” in whom sovereignty would be vested 
purportedly establish a post-apartheid nationhood, the “National Unity” on which the 
founding act of the Commission was premised.  
 
                                            
 
63
 Thus for example, “the mass denaturalization of populations” (Agamben, 1998, p. 132) from the First World 
War onwards, where, for example, the citizenship of naturalized citizens of the “enemy” was revoked in France 
and Belgium, and in Italy where citizenship was revoked from those who had shown themselves to be 
“unworthy of Italian citizenship” (Agamben, 1998, p. 132) and finally in Nazi Germany, where Jews were 
systematically “denationalized” before being sent to extermination camps as part of the “Final Solution” 
(Agamben, 1998, p. 132).  
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In the immediate post-apartheid context, the principle of this constitution was the exception 
of the past: “The South African people lacked national marks. It was only really clear who 
they were not. They were not the South Africans of old: those who had perpetrated and 
endured the injustices of the past” (Chipkin, 2007, p. 174). Thus the quality of identity that 
South Africans shared was a common history, more specifically the biopolitics of the past 
which became the marker of a new type of authenticity, where “being authentically South 
African comes to mean sharing the traumas of apartheid and uniting in the subsequent 
process of „healing the nation‟” (Wilson, 2001, p. 14). It was in establishing an instrumental 
relation with the violence of the past that the juridico-political present based on the national 
sovereignty of a post-apartheid “people” could purportedly be instantiated. Critically, 
however, the instrumental relation envisaged by the TRC as the means of institutionalising 
the exception of the violent past as a basis of a common identity and nationhood, in fact 
disguised the complexity of the relation of exception, through which this relation with the 
past was in fact enacted.  
 
Thus, it was assumed that that the transfer of sovereignty to the “people” through the 
country‟s first democratic elections was a purely juridical phenomenon, through which all 
residents of the territory of South Africa would be accorded citizenship rights. This would 
ostensibly establish a juridical “political” in opposition to the biopolitics of the past. 
However, what remained implicit was the biopolitical nature of the relation of exception that 
would constitute this present “political” through the biopolitical fracture, in terms of which, 
“the human species [is constituted] into a body politic”, through a fundamental split between  
naked life (people), and political existence (People), exclusion and inclusion, zoē and 
bios...hence the contradictions and aporias that such a concept [the people] creates 
every time that it is invoked and brought into play on the political stage. It is what 
always already is, as well as what has yet to be realized; it is the pure source of 
identity and yet it has to redefine and purify itself continuously according to 
exclusion, language, blood and territory. (Agamben, 2000, p. 30. 1-2) 
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At the heart of the TRC‟s work therefore was this profound ambiguity, the ambiguity of the 
relation of exception through which the People could be constituted and in whom national 
sovereignty could be vested.  
 
The TRC, Making an Exception of the Past 
The TRC was legislatively established in 1995 in terms of the Promotion of National Unity 
and Reconciliation Act to investigate “gross violations of human rights” which had taken 
place in the country between 1 March 1960 and 10 May 1994 and to grant indemnity to those 
who had committed violent acts associated with a political objective during this period. While 
it was widely recognised by its architects, critics and advocates alike as a project intended to 
establish a new basis for the sovereignty of the post-apartheid state, what remained implicit 
was the ambiguity of the relation of exception that would inaugurate this new sovereignty.  
 
A significant body of literature critiqued the “script of nationhood” (Posel & Simpson, 2002a, 
p. 9) on which the work of the TRC was so explicitly premised, either criticizing this 
aspiration toward “national unity and reconciliation” as a self-serving project of legitimation 
by the post-apartheid state (Buur, 2002; Wilson, 2001) or noting the various consequences of 
this nation-building imperative in terms of the limitations it imposed on a range of aspects of 
the Commission‟s “truth-seeking” work (Kistner, 2003). Various authors observed the 
“privileging” (Simpson, 2002, p. 221) of an imperative of “nation-building” in the work of 
the TRC, whether in terms of its report, which Posel, for example, argued was less an 
analytical historiography than a moral narrative, which could make possible the “imagining” 
of a new form of national community based on a “collective memory”, a “shared history” 
(Posel, 2002, p. 149); or in terms of the way in which the Commission‟s report flattened and 
obfuscated the complexities of localized conflicts through its emphasis on national political 
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party conflict and its definition of the “political” in these narrow juridical terms (Bonner & 
Nieftagodien, 2002); or in terms of the way in which narrative testimony within the 
Commission was decisively linked to notions of restorative justice, within a wider political 
and ideological project of “nation building”, which sidelined “those truths that could not 
easily be harnessed to Reconciliation” (Kistner, 2003, p. 11) leading to the “uncoupling of 
Truth from Justice”,  in order to inscribe it within “a relation to Reconciliation” (Kirstner, 
2003, p.13 ) that de-legitimated calls for retributive justice in the name of “nation-building”;  
or in terms of the internal functioning of the Truth Commission, which through the positivist 
codification of data in its information management system sought to construct a “new 
national history” (Buur, 2002, p. 78) that could “serve as the foundation for a new 
nationhood” (Buur, 2002, p. 76). 
 
Similarly, in a paper entitled National Narrative Versus Local Truths, Van der Merwe noted, 
in relation to the TRC‟s public hearings in the East Rand township of Duduza, the 
subjugation of competing local “truths” about the conflict in the township to a “broader 
agenda of constructing a national narrative” (Van der Merwe, 2002, p. 216) and the negative 
impact that this had on the possibility of effecting localized forms of “reconciliation”, which 
would have required a more sustained and nuanced engagement with the conflict in the 
township.  
 
Belinda Bozzoli also observed the tensions between a “nationalist narrative” and the fractured 
accounts of local community members at the hearings of the human rights violations 
committee in Alexandra, which, she argued, significantly obfuscated the critical role of the 
youth in this township:  
It appears that two different narratives of the events covered by this particular hearing 
have emerged. First there was the public, nationalist and official “community” 
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narrative, as already existing in the public sphere, articulated by Obed Bapela and 
reinforced by other witnesses speaking on „behalf of the community‟. Second, there 
were the private narratives of the individual witnesses speaking mainly on behalf of 
themselves and their families. There are several overlaps, but also sharp disjunctures 
between the two. (Bozzoli, 1998, p. 11) 
 
Wilson, who sub-titled his book on the Truth Commission Legitimizing the Post-Apartheid 
State, saw the South African Truth Commission in a relation of instrumental legitimation to 
the post-apartheid state, which “dragooned” human rights “talk” “into the service of nation 
building” and the “re-imagining” of the nation by constructing new official histories and 
“manufacturing legitimacy for key state institutions”, in particular the criminal justice system 
(Wilson, 2001, p. xvi). Quite correctly identifying the historical connections between human 
rights and the development of modern nationalism, Wilson however sees these processes in 
terms of a straightforward project of ideological legitimation, where “human rights talk” is 
used by new nation states to bolster their authority and sovereignty by treating the concepts 
of human rights as “a full-blown political and ethical philosophy” rather than “as narrow 
legal instruments which protect frail individuals from powerful state and societal institutions” 
(Wilson, 2001, p. 224). The “appropriation of human rights by nation building discourse” 
meant that human rights became associated with “forgiveness, reconciliation and restorative 
justice”, which deemed “social stability to be a higher good than the individual right to 
retributive justice” (Wilson, 2001, p. 26) and ignored much more complex local 
understandings of justice, which incorporated both retribution, restoration and revenge, as 
well as an increasing turn in the international global context towards the demand for 
individual legal accountability. 
 
However, what these analyses did not reveal was the fundamental ambiguity on which the 
entire Truth Commission project hinged. It did not involve a straightforward process of 
legitimation of something that did not in fact exist a priori, namely the nation state. Instead it 
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concerned a complex process of delineation in terms of the relation of exception, of the 
people and the People, on which the nationhood of the post-apartheid state could ostensibly 
be founded.  
 
Amnesty, Effecting a Relation of Exception 
This relation of exception was articulated most critically in a “Postamble” appended to the 
Interim Constitution in terms of which the country‟s first popular elections would be held and 
the country governed for a period of five years. This Postamble to the Interim Constitution 
provided that amnesty would be granted in respect of acts “associated with a political 
objective”. The Postamble constituted the legal basis for the TRC and was subsequently 
included in the Preamble to the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act No 34 of 
1995 (TRC, 1998b, p. 48), which would establish the TRC as an institutional body.  
 
By the end of the negotiations process, which led to the finalisation of the Interim 
Constitution in November 1993, one issue remained outstanding, namely the question of 
amnesty for those who had committed acts of violence in pursuit of political objectives 
during the course of the struggle of the previous decades:  
A compromise was eventually reached only after the finalisation of the rest of the 
Interim Constitution and was recorded in what became known as the “Postamble”. 
This provided that there would be amnesty for politically-motivated offences and that 
future legislation would provide the criteria and procedures to regulate the process. 
(TRC, 1998b, p. 52)   
 
In the course of the negotiation process that preceded this compromise the state had 
promulgated the Further Indemnity Act in November 1992 which gave the State President 
significant powers and discretion, without public process, to grant amnesty to individuals 
who had committed acts “with political intent” and whose release might “promote 
reconciliation and peaceful solutions” (Van der Merwe, 1999, p. 3). 
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While the secrecy of the amnesty process provided for by this Act was widely contested at 
the time, it was the process for the granting of amnesty, the suppression of the “truth” about 
the crimes of the past in the secrecy of these processes, that was the source of contention, 
rather than the principle of amnesty itself. The entire negotiation process remained 
significantly contingent on making an exception of the past of violence, through the granting 
of amnesty for acts committed during the course of “past conflicts”. 
 
Critically, in the ongoing national debate about the question of amnesty for political offences, 
as the outgoing state attempted to secure indemnity for its own operatives, the ANC did not 
reject the possibility of amnesty for operatives of the apartheid state involved in the 
commission of violence but argued for a qualified amnesty, an amnesty which would rest on 
the demonstration of an instrumental relationship between this violence and the political of 
the past, an instrumental relationship to which the TRC would later attempt to give 
institutional effect.  
 
While the question of amnesty for political offences was widely framed as simply a 
pragmatic issue, a question of “realpolitik” which needed to be resolved before elections 
could go ahead, resulting in a “last minute compromise” concluded behind closed doors by a 
small coterie of leaders who hammered out a solution to this outstanding issue (Boraine, 
2000; Graybill, 2002; Hayner, 2001; Sarkin, 2004; Simpson & Van Zyl, 1995; Tutu, 1999; 
Wilson, 2001), in fact the Postamble to the Interim Constitution was a far more significant 
document, which was to establish the terms of exception on which the post-apartheid state 
was founded by framing the entire Interim Constitution as a “bridge” between past and 
future, a “bridge” which would establish a conjuncture between the biopolitics of the past and 
the present political. This was a conjuncture that would make possible a “transcendence” of 
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this past, as an exception that would redefine the “political” as the juridico-political and 
establish the basis on which the sovereignty of the new state would be founded.  
 
This relation of exception which would constitute the juridico-political of the present in terms 
of the exception of the biopolitics of the past, was a relation of inclusive exclusion, in which 
what had been excluded, the gross human rights violations of the past, would in fact remain 
ever present, producing “enough truth to demonstrate and exemplify the inequities of the 
past” (Posel & Simpson, 2002b, p. 151) and “prevent a repetition of such acts in the future”.  
 
Critically, however, the complexity of the relation of exception and the ambiguity of the 
boundaries that would found the new juridico-political order, remained implicit throughout 
the negotiation process and in its later institutionalisation in the TRC. It was assumed that the 
capturing of violence as an exception concerned the tracing of an instrumental relation 
between a prior origin of power as a thing which could be usurped in its totality and the 
effects of power (violence) that are reduced to a “transparent instrument” (Feldman, 1991, p. 
3). This would simply require instrumental explanation and rationalisation to trace the 
relation between cause (power) and effect (violence). By adjudicating this relationship 
between the commission of violence and a prior political motive as an act associated with a 
political objective, it was assumed that this relation could be administratively sundered and 
an exception rendered.  
 
 
The Juridical Classification of the “Political” – An Enigma 
Therefore the process of indemnification which would make possible the commencement of 
negotiations hinged on a classification of the political that would legislatively establish an 
 180 
 
instrumental relation between the juridico-political of the past and the perpetration of 
violence in pursuit of this political, a legislative relation that attempted the constitution of 
strategic violence as the object, the tool of this “past” politics. In defining this relation, the 
process of making an exception of this past violence could putatively be initiated. 
 
The first juridico-political act in this process of constituting the exception that would come to 
define the South African political was the Groote Schuur Minute, an agreement concluded in 
May 1990 between the then apartheid state and its political antagonists, the ANC, which 
“contained and recorded the understandings resulting from the early negotiations between the 
then government and the ANC” (Sarkin, 2004, p. 37). With this agreement, as the 1998 TRC 
report explains,  
the negotiations process began seriously… In terms of the Minute, a working group 
was established to make recommendations, amongst other things, on a definition of 
political offences in the South African situation, and to advise on norms and 
mechanisms to deal with the release of political prisoners. (TRC, 1998b, p. 50, own 
emphasis) 
 
However, the group found that globally such a classification of “the political” had not yet 
been attempted and that “there was no generally accepted definition of a political offence or 
political prisoners in international law” (TRC, 1998b, p. 50, own emphasis). In this 
international legislative vacuum the working group turned instead to “principles of 
extradition law…to develop guidelines” (TRC, 1998b, p. 50).  
 
The Political Offence Exception 
In turning to international extradition law, the working group were in fact turning to the only 
formal international legislative attempt to give juridical form and legal consequence to the 
terrain of human action which constitutes “the political”. However, these efforts to give legal 
form to “the political”, have to date, remained apparently irresolvable. “There is…no 
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universally recognised definition of political offence in extradition law. Any common crime 
can be deemed political when it subjectively or objectively affects the existing socio-political 
order” (Van den Wijngaert cited in Bhargava, 2002, p. 1329). 
 
The history of extradition is deeply bound with the protection of state sovereignty. The 
earliest extradition treaties date back to the 13th century and were concluded between the 
Egyptian, Chinese, Chaldean and Assyro-Babylonian states (Bassiouni, 1974). Critically, 
these extradition treaties sought to ensure the return and punishment of citizens of states who 
had purportedly committed crimes of lese majeste, crimes against the political authority of 
the monarch or sovereign (Perry, 1988). In the principle of extradition between one sovereign 
state and another, an exception to the putatively inviolable territorial sovereignty of states 
was effected which sought to establish a relation between the political and juridical, allowing 
states to request the juridical extradition of “political offenders” from the sovereign of the 
territories to which they had fled.  
 
During the 19th century, in the wake of the French revolution and the rise of the concept of 
inviolable human rights which citizens could invoke against the state, a doctrine of political 
offence exception developed, which sought to define conditions under which a state could 
refuse extradition to another state. At this historical conjuncture, the doctrine of political 
offence exception sought primarily to extend the protection of “human rights” to the citizens 
of monarchical states who had committed “political” offences in the course of struggles to 
overthrow or change these regimes and had who had subsequently sought asylum in other 
sovereign states.  
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Critically, the doctrine of political offence exception hinged on a classification of “the 
political” that failed to yield a definitive conclusion in more than a century of subsequent 
international legislative endeavour in the courts of states around the world and in 
international adjudicative tribunals, leading legal theorists to conclude of the political offence 
exception that “it would be Utopian to expect that as complex a problem as this one can be 
solved on a purely juridical basis” (Van den Wijngaert, 1980, p. 229).  
 
The “complexity” of the problem of political exception, however, exposed, in the 
multiplication and contradiction of criteria for the legal adjudication of “the political”, the 
essential impossibility of inscribing within the juridical what was in fact meta-juridical, a 
type of human action which occurred fundamentally, as Agamben argues, in a zone of 
exception on the boundaries of the juridico-political order.  
 
The ambiguity evoked by the contradictions of the various laws that sought to classify the 
political in terms of the political offence exception, were thus not in fact about a lacuna in 
law, as most legal theorists assumed, but about a boundary of law, it‟s very relation to “life”. 
Paradoxically, this exception and the ambiguities of this exception were essential to the 
articulation between anomie and law, between life and law, an articulation which, Agamben 
argues, is made possible by this very threshold of irrevocable undecidibility. What was at 
issue in this decision on the “exception” was, as Schmitt argues, the very condition of 
possibility of juridical rule.  
 
South Africa at the end of the 20
th
 century, with the belated inauguration of a state based on 
the doctrine of rights in the wake of the decline of the authoritarian apartheid state, ironically 
used a classification of political exception that had been born at the advent of 19th century 
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European democracy, and which, as it was instantiated in the South African juridical order, 
was being done away with in the international juridical contexts in which it had initially been 
given institutional effect
64
.  
 
The Norgaard principles 
The principles of extradition law which constituted the South African “political” in terms of 
the principle of exception, through the doctrine of political offence exception, were grounded 
in the classification of the political utilised in the United Nations-supervised elections in 
Namibia in 1989, which became known as the “Norgaard Principles”. These were 
“formulated under the guidance of Professor CA Norgaard, the former President of the 
European Commission on Human Rights, and [were] applied to guide the process of 
identifying Namibian political prisoners for release” (TRC, 2003, p. 8).  
 
The TRC report explains:  
The Norgaard Principles were gleaned from a survey of the approaches followed by 
various state courts in dealing with what is known as the “political offence exception” 
in extradition proceedings. In terms of the “exception”, a state that has been requested 
to extradite an individual may refuse to do so where the crime for which the 
extradition is sought is political. It was thus necessary for states to formulate an 
approach to the question of whether a particular crime amounted to a political offence. 
The background principles, therefore, recorded the common features of the various 
states‟ approaches to the issue. (TRC, 2003, pp. 8-9)  
 
                                            
 
64
 The international abandonment of the principle of political offence exception, in the wake of the September 
11 2001 attacks on the New York World Trade Centre, represents the collapse of this fictive lacuna, which 
previously articulated law and anomie in a relation of exception, and evokes in this collapse a permanent state of 
exception where rule and exception have blurred without articulation.  In June 2002 a meeting of G8 Foreign 
Ministers recommended that in order to combat terrorism countries should, “exclude or reduce to the greatest 
possible extent any application of the political offence exception in responding to a request for mutual legal 
assistance concerning terrorist offences”.  (G8 Recommendations on Counter-Terrorism. Retrieved from: 
http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Site%20Map/compendium/Compendium/Declarations/G8%20Recommendations%
20on%20Counter%20Terrorism%202002.pdf) 
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The Norgaard principles were codified in Section 20 (3) of the TRC Act. The Act suggests 
that the Amnesty Committee take the following factors into account in determining what 
constitutes a political crime: 
• the motive of the person who committed the act; 
• the context in which the act took place; 
• the legal and factual nature of the act, including the gravity of the act; 
• the object or objective of the act, and in particular whether the act was 
primarily directed at a political opponent or against private property or 
individuals; 
• whether the act was committed in execution of an order of, or on behalf of, or 
with the approval of a political organization or the state; 
• the relationship between the act and the political objective pursued, and in 
particular the directness and proximity of the relationship and the 
proportionality of the act to the objective pursued. (cited in Bhargarva, 2002, 
p. 1312) 
 
 
Importantly, the definition of “the political” which Professor Norgaard had developed in the 
context of the Namibian elections sought to incorporate a number of different principles 
which had guided various states in giving juridical effect to the principle of political 
exception. However these efforts to include the full spectrum of “principles” developed in 
various legislative contexts around the globe ultimately exacerbated and reiterated the 
essential undecidibility of this classification. The multiplication of criteria which the 
Norgaard principles incorporated were not the result of a new comprehensiveness of legal 
description but reflected instead the struggle to contain in judicial prescription what was in 
fact on the boundaries of law.  
 
This was reflected in the South African context in the ambiguities of the indemnities granted 
to political offenders in the period preceding South Africa‟s first popular elections and most 
significantly in the amnesty processes of the TRC, whose efforts to grant amnesty to political 
offenders in terms of the principles of political offence exception developed by Professor 
Norgaard, revealed, despite significant efforts at judicial investigation and adjudication 
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within the processes of the Amnesty Committee, a multitude of inconsistencies and 
contradictions of decision (Bhargava, 2002; Foster, Haupt & De Beer, 2005; Sarkin, 2004; 
Simpson & Van Zyl, 1995).  
 
The various principles which Professor Norgaard sought to include in his definition of the 
political incorporated three central “tests” which had been utilised in various international 
legislative contexts to adjudicate the occurrence of “related” political offences. Importantly,  
related political offences are internationally legally classified as distinct from purely 
political offences, which are (i) exclusively directed against the state or a political 
organization and do not injure private persons, property or interests and (ii) “are 
not...accompanied by the commission of common crimes”...Related political offences 
are common crimes which are considered political offences because a political 
purpose was being pursued, or because the act had political consequences or was 
situated in a political context. (Bhargava, 2002, p. 1329) 
 
The three tests which have been developed internationally to attempt to determine the 
occurrence of “related” political offences in terms of extradition law are the political 
incidence test, the predominant motive test and the political objective test (Bhargava, 2002, p. 
1329). Professor Norgaard, in his classification of “the political”, in the Namibian context, 
sought to incorporate aspects of all of these tests.  
 
Thus,  
The political incidence test requires both that there be a political disturbance and that 
the act is part of and in furtherance of a political struggle. The predominant motive 
test requires that the crime be connected to a political objective, that the political 
nature of the crime outweighs the criminal aspect, and that the means used are either 
the only recourse available or proportionate to the desired political end. The political 
objective test only examines the specific nature of the act, without regard to the 
subjective motivation of the individual or whether the desired ends were political. 
(Bhargava, 2002, p. 1329) 
 
The Norgaard principles were initially introduced into South Africa at the inauguration of the 
negotiation process with the proposals of the working group set up in terms of the Groote 
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Schuur Minute, which recommended that in making decisions on the release of political 
prisoners “an adaptation of the Norgaard Principles be used” (TRC, 1998b, p. 51). Critically, 
the adaptation of the Norgaard Principles which the working group recommended be taken 
into account in this endeavour, reflected a wide range of criteria, implicitly informed by all 
three “tests” referred to above, including:  
aspects such as motive, context, the nature of the political objective, the legal and 
factual nature of the offence…the object of the offence and whether the act was 
committed in the execution of an order and with the approval of the organisation 
concerned. (TRC, 1998b, p. 51) 
 
This multiplicity of criteria were incorporated into South African legislation through the 
passage of the Indemnity Act of May 1990, which in conjunction with the November 1990 
Guidelines for Defining Political Offences in South Africa, enabled individuals who 
committed political offences before 8 October 1990 to receive temporary immunity or 
permanent indemnity (Sarkin, 2004, p. 39, own emphasis).  
 
Thus the exception of “political offence” on which the negotiation process ultimately turned 
was founded on a legislative classification of “the political”, which in its multiplicity of 
criteria revealed the irrevocable ambiguity of this political, and the consequent ambiguity of 
the relation of exception which the negotiation process was attempting to effect.  
 
Nevertheless this relation of exception was in fact critical to the negotiation process, which 
by suspending the application of the law to violence committed in instrumental relation to the 
“political” in the form of indemnity for “political offences”, sought to make a process of 
transition from past to present possible.  
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The TRC, Establishing an Instrumental Relationship with Violence Committed in Pursuit 
of Political Objectives 
 
The Act establishing the TRC stated that its objectives were to “promote national unity and 
reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which transcends the conflicts and divisions of the 
past”, through two key objectives: 
(a) establishing as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of 
the gross violations of human rights which were committed during the period from 
I March 1960 to the cut-off date, including the antecedents, circumstances, factors 
and context of such violations, as well as the perspectives of the victims and the 
motives and perspectives of the persons responsible for the commission of the 
violations, by conducting investigations and holding hearings;  
 
(b) facilitating the granting of amnesty to persons who make full disclosure of all the 
relevant facts relating to acts associated with a political objective and comply with 
the requirements of this Act. (TRC, 1998b, p. 55) 
 
In order to effect these objectives, three committees were established, the Human Rights 
Violations Committee, the Amnesty Committee and the Committee on Reparation and 
Rehabilitation. Over its lifetime, the Human Rights Violation Committee would take 
approximately 21 298 statements from “victims” of “gross human rights violations” and hold 
76 public hearings where a selection of these “victims” would recount their stories of 
violation (Ross, 2003, p. 13). The Amnesty Committee was established as a quasi-judicial 
institution to adjudicate the applications of those seeking amnesty for offences associated 
with a political objective. It was to eventually receive over 7000 applications for amnesty, 
only 1 674 of which were to be successful (Foster, Haupt & De Beer, 2005, p. 12). The 
Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation was tasked with the responsibility to, 
“provide…measures to be taken in order to grant reparation to victims of gross human rights 
violations” (TRC, 1998b, p. 171).  
 
Critically, in its efforts to promote “National Unity and Reconciliation” the TRC would not 
investigate apartheid as a structural phenomenon or a system of power, but would instead 
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establish a very specific type of relation with the past of “strife, conflict, untold suffering and 
injustice” (TRC, 1998b, p. 48), namely an instrumental relation with the biopolitical effects of 
power, the violence committed in pursuit of political objectives during the conflicts of the 
past. This particular relation with the biopolitical effects of power implicitly informed the 
entire negotiation process around the question of amnesty prior to the country‟s first 
democratic elections, that is, that some form of indemnity would be necessary for those who 
had committed acts of violence in pursuit of political objectives. It was merely the terms of 
this relation, the way in which it would be adjudicated and who had the authority to 
undertake this adjudication, that were in contention, leading eventually to the prescription in 
the Postamble to the Interim Constitution that amnesty would be granted for acts associated 
with a political objective.  
 
While the TRC was widely critiqued (Bonner & Nieftagodien, 2002; Mamdani, 1998; Posel, 
2002; Posel & Simpson, 2002a; Wilson, 2001) for its narrow focus on the violent effects of 
apartheid, rather than apartheid itself as a system of structural injustice, and was understood 
by the TRC itself as the consequence of the “limitations” of its mandate, which it sought to 
rectify through a series of institutional hearings, this particular relation with the violent 
effects of power was in fact critical for establishing the terms of the post-apartheid juridico-
political by attempting to capture, through the relation of exception, violence as the object, 
the “thing” of “politics”.  
 
The TRC was therefore criticised for establishing an “equivalence” between the violence 
committed by the agents of the former state and violence committed by those who resisted 
the system of apartheid, as a consequence of its focus merely on the effects of violence, 
which, it was argued, failed to locate violations in historical and political context (Mamdani, 
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1998, Wilson, 2001 ). However this principle of “equivalence” had in fact been established 
during the negotiation process, where it was agreed that indemnity would be granted to those 
who committed acts in pursuit of political objectives on both sides of the political divide. 
This was not, as commonly assumed, merely the consequence of an expedient “balancing 
act” required to negotiate South Africa‟s “delicate” transition, but implied a far more 
fundamental principle, namely the capturing of violence, perpetrated in whatever context, as 
the object of the juridico-political, a capturing through the relation of exception, which would 
maintain law‟s relation with anomie. 
 
Exposing the Relation Between Force and Law 
It was “truth”, the “uncovering” of gross violations of human rights and the “full disclosure” 
required for amnesty, that would mediate this relation of exception and establish a new norm 
of law in a context where under apartheid the “rule” and norm of law had been so 
fundamentally severed from the “force of law”. The TRC report‟s entire mandate chapter is 
framed by an explicit concern to expose this relation between force and law. It states: “special 
attention will be given to the role and contribution of two phenomena or factors in the 
shaping of this country‟s history, namely violence and law, and the relationship between 
them” (TRC, 1998b, p. 24). Critically, however, as Agamben argues, the idea of a “relation” 
between violence (the force of law) and law is essentially a “fictive categorisation”, which 
attempts to encompass law‟s own absence. Nevertheless this articulation, through the relation 
of exception between law and anomie, however fragile and ambiguous, is in fact critical to 
the functioning of the entire juridico-political “machine”. For law this empty space of the 
exception is its constitutive dimension (Agamben, 2005, p. 60). It is when the juridico-
political rule, which exists only in relation to the exception, for “the exception does not only 
confirm the rule; the rule as such lives off the exception alone” (Schmitt cited in Agamben, 
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1998, p. 16), is conflated with the exception in the suspension of juridico-political norms, that 
you have the type of legal violence which so characterised the apartheid state and which the 
new state was so concerned to disarticulate
65
.  
 
The TRC report, referring both to the “violence of the gun” and the “violence of the law”, 
stated: “Violence has been the single most determining factor in South African political 
history” (TRC, 1998b, p. 40). In exposing the nature of the relation between law and 
violence, this relation could putatively be sundered, rendering a juridico-political present 
freed from the stain of violence,  
Under apartheid, law which should have been a pillar of justice and social stability 
and a wall against violence and chaos, became instead an agent of injustice and social 
instability and chaos. Law was systematically reduced…to a continuation of violence 
through other means. (Asmal, Asmal & Suresh, 1996, p. 75)  
 
The TRC through its processes of truth revelation would thus “lay the foundation for the 
reestablishment of the rule of law” (Bhargava, 2002, p. 1309) on which the sovereignty of the 
new state based on “a monopoly over the legitimate use of force” (TRC, 1998b, p. 88), could 
be re-established.   
 
Adjudicating an instrumental relation with the biopolitical effects of power 
Critically, however, because the TRC could only understand this relation between law and 
violence in instrumental terms, what remained hidden was the complexity of the relation of 
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 As Benjamin wrote, “the tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the „state of exception‟ in which we live is 
the rule” (cited in Agamben, 2005, p. 57). It is this conflation between exception and rule which forms the 
principle of contiguity between the apartheid state under the conditions of the state of emergency and the Nazi 
regime, both of whom suspended but did not abolish the personal liberties contained in their constitutions, a 
suspension of juridical political norms, in which parliament became like law, merely an instrument of force, “the 
normative aspect of law…thus obliterated and contradicted with impunity by a governmental violence that, 
while ignoring international law externally and producing a permanent state of exception internally-nevertheless 
still claims to be applying the law”(Agamben, 1998, p. 132). Thus, “In this sense, modern totalitarianism can be 
defined as the establishment, by means of the state of exception, of a legal civil war that allows for the physical 
elimination not only of political adversaries but of entire categories of citizens who for some reason cannot be 
integrated into the political system”(Agamben, 2005, p. 2). 
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exception which actually underpinned the processes of the TRC. Rather than the linear 
relation between law and violence that the TRC sought to instantiate and arbitrate, this was an 
articulation of profound ambiguity at the limits of the juridico-political order. Nevertheless, it 
was the sovereign decision on these boundaries of the juridico-political order that the TRC 
was established to articulate, that would in fact found the sovereignty of the new state.  
 
The TRC was thus critically constituted around an attempt to administratively adjudicate the 
juridico-political in a relation of exception to the biopolitics of the past, defined as the 
violation of “bodily integrity rights” (TRC, 1998b, p. 64) perpetrated through the “gross 
human rights violations” of “killing, abduction, torture or severe ill-treatment” committed in 
pursuit of “political objectives” during the conflicts of the past (TRC, 1998b, p. 60). As a 
result,  
At HRV
66
 hearings cross-examination ascertained whether the person testifying was a 
victim of a politically motivated crime and therefore could be designated a “victim” 
with the rights to receive reparations. At amnesty hearings, practically the entire thrust 
of cross examination…was directed towards deciding whether there was a political 
objective to the violation. (Wilson, 2001, p. 81) 
 
The Ambiguity of the Political 
However, the nature of this “political” was to remain profoundly elusive throughout the 
processes of the TRC. As the Commission acknowledged in its report of 1998, “the political 
nature of specific acts was hard to define” (TRC, 1998b, p. 82) . The Commission understood 
the problems it experienced in its adjudication and classification of the political as a 
pragmatic quandary generated by the “complexity” of the conflicts of the past and the 
structural nature of apartheid, which “affected every sphere of society” (TRC, 1998b, p. 82), 
a pragmatic question, which, it argued at the end of the TRC process, could most 
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 Human Rights Violations Committee. 
 192 
 
satisfactorily be resolved through a broader classification that would “extend the ambit of an 
„an act associated with a political objective‟” (TRC, 2003, p. 91).  
 
The Amnesty Committee attempted to negotiate the “complexity” of the “political” through a 
process of quasi-judicial arbitration and hearings, which sought to establish on a balance of 
probabilities whether a violent act had been committed on behalf of or with the approval of a 
“publicly known political organisation” and was directed against “publicly known political 
opponents”. In the Human Rights Violation Committee this adjudication of the political took 
place through a process of codification and forensic verification called the “information 
management system”, whose goal was to make it possible for the Commission to make 
“findings” on the “political” nature of the violations reported to it (Buur, 2002; Wilson, 
2001). 
 
Operating in terms of a juridical understanding of power, where the origin and the violent 
effects of power are implacably separate, the TRC sought to instrumentally link and 
adjudicate the “politicality” of the violent act, by linking it to a “political objective”, which 
substantively relied on an adjudication of the “political motive” of the subject, an 
interrogation of subjecthood that could putatively offer a definitive reading of the “political” 
nature of the violent act.  
 
While some strategic acts of violence did indeed render themselves intelligible in these terms, 
the political motivation of the protagonists easily articulated in terms of a prior motivation to 
commit a violent act for strategic ends, there were many instances where in fact the authorial 
position of the agent in relation to the act was far more tenuous, institutionalized ideology 
and political action not necessarily maintaining a linear relationship which could be easily 
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demonstrated and arbitrated. The violence of the 1990s, which occurred substantially in non-
relation to law, exposed the theoretical aporia of this instrumental conception of violence, 
which could not conceive of the biopolitical nature of the power it was in fact tasked to 
adjudicate. As a consequence, while over half (5 695) of the total of 9 043 statements on 
killings received by the TRC‟s Human Rights Violations Committee concerned incidents 
which took place between 1990 and 1994, the TRC‟s report conceded that “the Commission 
failed to make significant breakthroughs in relation to violence in the 1990s” (TRC, 1998b, p. 
206). 
 
A “political motive”, an adjudication of subjecthood  
The locus of this mediation and the transition from biopolitical past to juridico-political 
present, was the “bodiless reality” (Foucault, 1977, p. 17) of the juridical subject and in 
particular, an adjudication of  “the extent to which the subject‟s will was involved in the 
crime” (p.17). It was these “shadows lurking behind the case” (p. 17), namely the political 
motive with which the act of violation was committed that would change the nature of the act 
itself, “the common crime”, that became, through an attribution of political motive, a 
“political offence”.  
 
The Postamble to the Interim Constitution included this principle in its injunction that 
amnesty would be granted for acts associated with a political objective. The legislation that 
founded the TRC involved a second move, which translated such acts into gross human rights 
violations. In terms of the definition of gross human rights violations, “political motive” 
became the locus of the adjudication of the “politicality” of the act, and the authenticity of the 
subject, both “victim” and “perpetrator”, as the intention of the protagonist of violence not 
only established the authenticity of this subject as a political agent, but in a dialectical move, 
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simultaneously created the authentic “victim” on the premise that “it is the intention and 
action of the perpetrator that creates the conditions of being a victim” (TRC, 1998b, p. 59). 
 
This attempt to adjudicate the “political” in terms of the subjecthood of its protagonists 
immediately ran aground in terms of multiple conceptual aporiae. The notion of “political 
motive” brought to bear the conception of a sovereign individual in an instrumental relation 
of agency to action. This conception of the sovereign self in an instrumental relation to the 
“political” is premised, as Feldman argues, on a mythical separation between the origin and 
site of enactment of power, conceived in terms of an individual‟s prior intention, which is 
linked directly to action as a manifestation of this “intent”. This conception masked the 
biopolitical nature of the fracture that the TRC was in fact established to articulate, namely 
the boundary between bare life and political life, zoē and bios, which did not concern an 
instrumental relation, but a relation of exception that would effect a biopolitical 
transformation of life in life. However, the TRC assumed that the adjudication of the 
“political” concerned an attribute or additional capacity – the political motive, which it 
struggled so much to systematically arbitrate and which subjects themselves battled to 
articulate as a “declared political motive” (Foster, Haupt & De Beer, 2005, p. 5). This search 
for an articulated political motive as a way in which to judge the “political” nature of conflict, 
completely avoided “the complexities of social causation, where individuals were caught up 
in structural processes that motivate and constrain their actions, in ways that may not be 
intelligible to the actors themselves” (Posel & Simpson, 2002a, p. 10). 
 
Consequently, of the total of 7 115 applications received by the Amnesty Committee, 3 559 
cases were rejected administratively because the Amnesty Committee found no evidence of 
political motive. Of the 1 626 amnesty cases that took the form of public hearings (Foster, 
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Haupt & De Beer, 2005, p. 24) and within the process of “verification” of the politicality of 
victim statements, multiple problems of decidability emerged, what one group of analysts 
called “grey areas” (Foster, Haupt & De Beer, 2005, p. 4). Thus many analysts were able to 
describe these ambiguities, noting, for example, “the considerable difficulty” presented to the 
Commission by the challenge of defining a “political crime” (Bhargava, 2002, p. 1304). 
However, because they shared the TRC‟s juridical conception of “the political” they were 
unable to fundamentally elucidate these ambiguities simply stating, for example, that “little 
purpose is served here in trying to resolve these issues” (Foster, Haupt, & De Beer, 2005, p. 
6) and concluding therefore that the Commission “failed to provide a viable definition of 
political crimes” (Bhargava, 2002, p. 1305). 
 
These ambiguities and “inconsistencies” critically concerned the various depletions of 
subjecthood that were required to instantiate an instrumental relation between a prior 
“political” motive and a violent effect, that excluded acts committed for “personal gain, 
personal malice, ill-will or spite towards the victim” (TRC, 2003, p. 18). This required 
subjects to demonstrate a singular motive and intent in instrumental relation to the 
multiplicity of criteria used by the TRC to define “the political”. The complexity of the 
process was further exacerbated by the ambiguity and fluidity of the interpretation of various 
criteria used to adjudicate “the political” within the operation of the Amnesty Committee.  
 
The adjudications of politicality in the Human Rights Violation Committee were similarly 
premised on the demonstration of an instrumental relation between act and author, 
paradigmatically illustrated by the expression, “who did what to whom”, which referred to 
the implementation of a positivist data processing methodology developed by the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science. In order to be able to demonstrate a direct linear 
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relationship between author and act, this approach codified data in terms of a “controlled 
vocabulary”, which delineated 48 distinct acts and three categories of persons – victim, 
perpetrators and witnesses (Wilson, 2001, p. 40). The work of the data processors was to 
break down the narratives of the violated into these separate acts and trace their relationship 
to the three types of subject in order to make it possible to create “neutral” signs of violation 
that could be quantified.  
 
In the Amnesty Committee this instrumental relation between author and act was mediated by 
an assumption of direct contiguity between formal political rationalities and the violent act. 
South African understandings of violence, as Andre du Toit (1993) points out, were 
significantly premised on the assumption of such relations of instrumental continuity between 
formal political rationalities and violent acts, which guided the ANC‟s understanding of 
political struggle, in terms of a “classically liberal, indeed Lockean, politics that ultimately 
justified violence – revolution even – in the name of bourgeois modernist rights” (Crais, 
2002, p. 140). These understandings were incorporated into the legislation and operation of 
the Truth Commission, which specifically premised the adjudication of the political in the 
Amnesty Committee on both the membership of a “known political organisation” of the 
amnesty applicant and the arbitration of whether this subject had acted in terms of the 
policies and practices of these organisations. Numerous analysts pointed out the 
inconsistencies and depletions that resulted from this “party political” adjudication, a 
“privileging” of party politics above other criteria included in the terms of the TRC 
legislation. This created difficulties “in determining party policies and what acts should be 
considered under those policies” (Bhargava, 2002, p. 1314), and required the TRC to “take 
party political policies at face value” (Wilson, 2001, p. 87).  
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Other authors focused on the way in which the “privileging” of political party cleavages 
obfuscated more complex lines of antagonism and did “more to mystify than to explain 
continuity and change in patterns of violence” (Simpson, 2002, p. 221), particularly those that 
underlay “horizontal” conflict between members of society, where “criminal” and “political” 
motivations were frequently “intertwined” (Foster, Haupt & De Beer, 2005, p. 12) or the 
distinctions between them “hazy” (Foster, Haupt & De Beer, 2005, p. 21). This distinction 
between political objective and common crime, Wilson argued, “hinged on a bipolar 
distinction between public ideology and private belief”, a “dualism” that was “fixed and 
authorised by TRC legislation” (Wilson, 2001, p. 84), leading Simpson to contend that 
“competing versions of whether specific acts were criminally or politically motivated, 
whether they were undertaken for personal reasons, such as revenge or pecuniary gain, or in 
the name of a known political organisation, were seldom conclusively or consistently 
adjudicated by the Amnesty Committee” (Simpson, 2002, pp. 236-237). 
 
Wilson quite rightly identified these distinctions between the “political” and the “criminal” as 
the critical boundary on which human rights are founded, arguing that “separating human 
rights and common crime is the first distinguishing act of all human rights institutions” 
(Wilson, 2001, p. 81), but he saw this as a purely pragmatic distinction essential to all human 
rights institutions, which was nevertheless “not wholly arbitrary”, although “often indistinct 
and ambiguous” (Wilson, 2001, p. 81, own emphasis). In identifying the symptoms of the 
exception in the ambiguity of these distinctions between the political and the criminal, what 
again remained implicit was the fundamental biopolitical fracture between political life and 
bare life, which this distinction attempted to mediate, and the relation of ban such a 
distinction articulates, which places the one who has been banned, friedlos, “the criminal”, on 
the boundaries of the juridico-political order.  
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These difficulties of adjudication of the political and non-political actor arose in a number of 
arenas, exposing the aporia of an instrumental arbitration of these complex boundaries, where 
for example “racism” was invoked as a political motive, which was not the stated public 
policy of any organisation but which had systematically informed the biopolitical 
classifications of the apartheid system, and was interpreted in the context of the TRC variably 
as either “personal malice” or in other cases as the legitimate basis of “politically motivated” 
violence. “Witchcraft”, which was invoked as political motivation, presented similar 
problems of adjudication around the distinction between “personal malice” and public 
political objective that “might have seemed to fall outside the requirement of having a 
political motive….yet on closer investigation…frequently masked profoundly political 
issues” (TRC, 1998b, p. 12). The actions of members of informal defensive structures or 
politicised gangs, or people involved in various forms of internalised conflict whose subject 
positions were so starkly enacted in the fluidity of praxis, presented similar problems of 
adjudication in terms of the TRC‟s framing of the singularity of an a priori subjecthood as 
“victim” or “perpetrator”, which meant that the Commission “had great difficulty with these 
cases” (TRC, 1998b, p. 77). 
 
The adjudication of the Moleleki execution itself within the context of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission also produced “great difficulties” and problems of decidability as 
the institution attempted to adjudicate the “political” nature of these actions in purely 
juridical terms, as the product of a prior “political” intention directly related to the policies of 
a political party. However, these were actions which had in fact taken place in non-relation to 
law, in a context of exception at the boundaries of the juridico-political order, a place of 
juridical void. Ultimately, therefore the nature of these actions, whether legislative or 
transgressive, human or divine, was in fact undecidable in law.
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CHAPTER SIX: THE MOLELEKI EXECUTION AND THE TRUTH AND 
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 
 
Introduction 
It is in terms of the principle of the biopolitical fracture that it is possible to begin to 
understand the complexities of juridical inscription encountered by the post-apartheid 
juridico-political order in its attempts to adjudicate the actions of the Moleleki protagonists 
within the contexts of the TRC and the subsequent courtroom processes. However, the 
significance of these early adjudications, which would establish the biopolitical principle on 
which the sovereignty of the post-apartheid state would be founded, remained implicit. Thus, 
the grounding of sovereignty in the “people” would require a continual mediation of the 
biopolitical fracture that sought to trace a threshold between “inside” and “outside” the 
political domain through a distinction between “authentic life and life lacking every political 
value” (Agamben, 1998, p. 132). The protagonists of the Moleleki execution were some of 
the earliest subjects of these ongoing processes of arbitration. 
 
Critically, the mediation of this biopolitical fracture, which defines inclusion and exclusion in 
the political community, is substantiated against the boundary of homo sacer, one who has 
been judged on account of a crime. It was in these terms that the struggles of juridico-
political ordering took place in Moleleki prior to the execution, and it was in these terms that 
the adjudication of the actions of the Moleleki protagonists implicitly took place, first within 
the context of the institution of the TRC (an adjudication of the “political”) and then within 
the context of the post-apartheid courtroom (an adjudication of the “criminal” at the 
boundaries of the “political”).  
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However, the biopolitical nature of the fracture that both institutions sought to mediate in 
relation to each other remained completely implicit and were instead assumed to concern a 
process of juridical classification and inscription that could take place through an appraisal of 
the subjectivity of the Moleleki protagonists, which would putatively establish an 
instrumental relation with a prior intention, either “political” in the assertion of a political 
motive or “criminal” in the admission of mens rea or criminal intent. These processes of 
adjudication were critically premised on an instrumental conception of agency as the direct 
product of a predetermined consciousness and identity. As Lwandile Sisilana writes, what the 
law understands as “human action” involves two elements, “intention and conduct” (Sisilana, 
1999, p. 303). Thus human action in law is constituted through the demonstration of the 
existence of these two bounded, separable elements and the establishment of an instrumental 
relation between them.  
 
While it was assumed that the two process within the TRC and the courtroom were 
significantly different, both institutions, in their attempts to inscribe the execution within the 
juridico-political order and their mutual efforts to give legal form and consequence to the 
actions which had led to the massacre, took the law “as their model and their code” 
(Agamben, 1998, p. 5). Within the context of the TRC, both SDU and ANCYL members 
contested this “legal” conception of the “political” as they unsuccessfully sought to articulate 
the biopolitical nature of the fracture which the conflict in Moleleki had attempted to 
negotiate. In this process they evoked the “criminal” rather than the party political opponent 
as the “originary figure” of the political relation. Such assertions, however, raised in a context 
of juridical instrumentality, evoked multiple problems of comprehension. 
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The problems of comprehension and decidability around the Moleleki execution were 
significantly exacerbated by the fact that the conduct which the TRC and the courtroom 
sought to adjudicate concerned actions that had taken place in a context of exception, a 
context of suspension of the juridico-political order, of both the law and the norm of law. 
These actions had occurred at the boundaries of the law, in a context of sovereign exception, 
and thus presented the post-apartheid institutions which attempted to adjudicate them with a 
limit concept as actions which stood outside the law. What law would apply to these acts 
committed during such a juridical vacuum? How could their nature be ascertained? 
Moreover, the execution in Moleleki concerned the killing of homo sacer, a figure who is 
exempted from both human and divine law. How could this figure now be retrieved for law?  
 
State of Necessity 
Critically, the arbitrations of the actions of the Moleleki protagonists, in the context of both 
the TRC and the courtroom, concerned a contestation around the existence and nature of the 
state of necessity “on which the exception is founded” (Agamben, 2005, p. 1) and which 
grounds the “right” to self-defence “in those urgent situations in which the protection of the 
community fails…when the community is in danger and the magisterial function breaks 
down” (Mommsen cited in Agamben, 2005, p. 43).  
 
Crucially, the state of necessity which establishes the right to self-defence exists in an 
ambiguous zone “at the limit between politics and law” (Agamben, 2005, p. 1), an “uncertain 
borderline, fringe, at the intersection of the legal and the political” (Fontana cited in 
Agamben, 2005, p. 1). It was exactly this limit which the processes of adjudication around 
the Moleleki execution sought to mediate. Located within these mediations was the principle 
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of sovereign decision on the exception, which is necessitated by the “impossibility” of 
ascertaining 
with complete clarity when a situation of necessity exists, nor can one spell out, with 
regard to content, what may take place in such a case when it is truly a matter of an 
extreme situation of necessity and of how it is to be eliminated. (Schmitt cited in 
Agamben, 2005, p. 55) 
 
What emerges in this context when juridical authority breaks down or is deliberately 
suspended is a form of power which is not juridical and is not vested in formal office. Instead 
it is a biopolitical power that exceeds formal office and in a context of exception is vested in 
every citizen regardless of rank. It therefore cannot subsequently be adjudicated in terms of 
the “proper” exercise of juridical authority mandated by legislative power.   
 
Agamben uses the paradoxical institution of Roman law, the iustitium, to “observe the state 
of exception in its paradigmatic form” (Agamben, 2005, p. 41). The iustitium suspended the 
law and created a juridical void, specifically in response to a political context of civil war or 
tumultus, through a senatus consultum ultimum (final decree of the Senate) which “called 
upon the consuls…in extreme cases, all citizens to take whatever measures they considered 
necessary for the salvation of the state” (Agamben, 2005, p. 41). Importantly, the iustitium  
put aside the restrictions of the law on the actions of those in formal office, in particular the 
prohibition against magistrates putting a Roman citizen to death without orders from the 
people (Agamben, 2005, p. 45). In this context of a suspension of the law, of a putting aside 
of legal restrictions on the actions of magistrates, consuls and governors, what emerged was 
not a form of dictatorship, a new form of office, but instead a power that was outside the law 
and inside every citizen, regardless of formal rank, which consequently “resists definition 
within the terms of the normal order” (Agamben, 2005, p. 43).  
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However, the efforts of the both the TRC and the courtroom to exercise this sovereign 
decision on the existence of the condition of necessity, ran aground in multiple aporiae, 
created by the assumption that the state of necessity and the “right” of self-defence which it 
generated, was an objective situation that could be legally adjudicated. SDU members 
claimed this situation of necessity as their defence in the proceedings of both the TRC and the 
courtroom, a situation which therefore “demanded violence” (O. Motlokwa, personal 
interview, 2001) and which all protagonists in the conflict in Moleleki in fact understood to 
be the circumstance at the time. As ANCYL and civic leader Lethusang Rikaba concurred, 
“According to the situation, anybody who attacked was regarded as an enemy” (TRC, 1998a, 
p. 682, own emphasis). 
 
However, the state of necessity in fact concerns an ambiguous zone between fact and law, an 
originary context that “cannot be regulated by previously established norms” but which at the 
same time “makes law”, and “itself constitutes a true and proper source of law” (Romano 
cited in Agamben, 2005, p. 27), as in the case of revolution, which is a state of fact that 
“cannot be regulated by those state powers that it tends to subvert and destroy” and is in this 
sense “anti-juridical even when it is just” (Romano cited in Agamben, 2005, p. 28). While 
revolution may be anti-juridical in relation to the positive law of the state it intends to 
subvert, it is nevertheless concerned with the generation of new norms of law (Agamben, 
2005, p. 29). This is a context therefore “where fact and law appear to become undecidable” 
(Agamben, 2005, p. 29).  
 
It was these ambiguities that the TRC and the courtroom struggled so much to negotiate as 
they attempted to adjudicate the actions of the protagonists of the Moleleki execution and 
inscribe this violence unleashed from law within the law again. However, if the power which 
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emerges in a context of exception, and which underlies the prerogative of “defence” in such 
circumstances, does not concern a juridical power exercised in terms of the mandate of 
formal office, but is an embodied power, how can such biopolitical power be adjudicated 
subsequently within the terms of the juridico-political order and what is the nature of this 
human praxis “that is wholly delivered over to a juridical void”? (Agamben, 2005, p. 49)  
As Agamben argues, these actions are in fact “radically removed from any juridical 
determination” (Agamben, 2005, p. 50) and cannot be given the conventional forms of law, 
whether “legislative, executive, or transgressive” (Agamben, 2005, p. 50). The TRC and the 
court proceedings which followed them thus grappled with this ambiguity of human action 
performed in a context of exception, which evoked the “impossibility…of clearly defining 
the legal consequences of those acts committed during the iustitium with the aim of saving 
the res publica” (Agamben, 2005, p. 49), critically, in terms of the Moleleki execution 
“whether the killing of an uncondemned Roman citizen was punishable or not” (Agamben, 
2005, p. 49).  
 
TRC Adjudication of the Moleleki Execution 
In 1998 13 members of the SDU in Moleleki Extension 2 applied to the TRC for amnesty for 
their involvement in what the Commission termed the “Katlehong massacre” in the hope that 
this amnesty application would release them from the legal consequences of their actions. 
Interestingly, however, the SDU members who applied to the TRC for amnesty included not 
only the seven SDU members who had been charged by the state at the end of 1997 but also a 
number of other SDU members who came forward, as a result of the efforts of the TRC‟s 
investigative unit.  
 
The applicants before the Amnesty Committee were listed as: 
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Michael  Armoed  1st  Appl icant  
(Am 5596/97)  
Michael  Langa Nkoma 2nd Appl icant  
(Am 7265/97)  
Mohale Oscar Motloka  3rd Appl icant  
(Am 3135/97)  
Petrus  Vusumuzi  Mthembu  4th Appl icant  
(Am 7350/97)  
Zola Nceba Michael  Sont i  5th Appl icant  
(Am 7177/97)  
Paulos  Matlalepule Shongwe  6th Appl icant  
(Am 7183/97)  
Tsekimyana Rodrick  Singo  7th Appl icant  
(Am 7179/97)  
Norman Sol ly Mashinini  8th Appl icant  
(Am 7081/97)  
Lefu Patr ick Mokoena  9th Appl icant  
(Am 7097/97)  
Thobi le Phi l l imon Luphindo  10th Appl icant  
(Am 7753/97)  
Joseph Moshe August  11th Appl icant  
(Am 7701/97)  
Bennet  Mnyaka Ndaba  12th Appl icant  
(Am 7051/97)  
Themba Chris topher  Mtshal i  13th  Appl icant  
(Am 7349/97)  
(TRC, 1998c, p. 1) 
 
According to Section 18 of the Act establishing the TRC, an amnesty application “could be 
made in respect of any act or omission that amounted to a delict
67
 or offence, provided that it 
had to have been associated with a political objective and was committed in the prescribed 
period” (TRC, 2003, p. 5), which fell “between 1 March 1960 and…10 May 1994” (TRC, 
2003, p. 8). The granting of amnesty was also contingent on the “full disclosure of all 
relevant facts relating to acts associated with a political objective” (Promotion of National 
Unity and Reconciliation Act, 1995). In adjudicating whether an offence was politically 
motivated, the TRC Act provided that, “unless the context otherwise indicates”, the act or 
                                            
 
67
Delict is a concept of civil law in which a willful wrong or an act of negligence gives rise to a legal obligation 
between parties even though there has been no contract between the parties. (Delict. Retrieved from Wikipedia: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delict). 
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delict for which amnesty was sought, in addition to being associated with a political 
objective, must also be shown to have been “planned, directed, commanded, ordered or 
committed” by: 
(d) any employee or member of a publicly known political organisation or liberation 
movement in the course and scope of his or her duties and within the scope of his or 
her express or implied authority directed against the State or any former state or any 
publicly known political organisation or liberation movement engaged in a political 
struggle …which was committed bona fide in furtherance of the said struggle  
(s 20(2), Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act). 
 
Whether an act was deemed to be an act “associated with a political objective” was to be 
adjudicated with regard to the following criteria: 
(a) The motive of the person who committed the act, omission or offence;  
(b)  the context in which the act, omission or offence took place, and in particular 
whether the act, omission or offence was committed in the course of or as part of a 
political uprising, disturbance or event, or in reaction thereto;  
(c)  the legal and factual nature of the act, omission or offence, including the gravity 
of the act, omission or offence;  
(d)  the object or objective of the act, omission or offence, and in particular whether 
the act, omission or offence was primarily directed at a political opponent or State 
property or personnel or against private property or individuals;  
(e)  whether the act, omission or offence was committed in the execution of an order 
of, or on behalf of, or with the approval of, the organisation, institution, liberation 
movement or body of which the person who committed the act was a member, an 
agent or a supporter and the relationship between the act, omission or offence and 
the political objective pursued, and in particular the directness and proximity of 
the relationship and the proportionality of the act, omission or offence to the 
objective pursued. The provisions explicitly excluded acts committed for 
“personal gain”, or “out of personal malice, ill-will or spite.” (s 20(3), Promotion 
of National Unity and Reconciliation Act) 
 
The actions of members of SDUs, operating on the boundaries of the juridico-political order 
in conditions of necessity, immediately provoked multiple problems of decidability for the 
Commission, which assumed, as did the ANC which initiated their formation, that the “right” 
to self-defence concerned a juridical right that could be legally adjudicated.  
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A Problem of Decidability, Adjudicating the “Right” to Self-defence 
The problems of decidability encountered by the Commission evoked those encountered by 
the legal theorist Mommsen who, while acknowledging the essentially extra-juridical nature 
of the “right” to self-defence, i.e. that “in a certain sense it stands outside of the law” and that 
it is a “right” evoked by an extra-juridical context, nevertheless insisted that “it is necessary 
to make the essence and application of this right of self-defence [juridically] intelligible” 
(Mommsen cited in Agamben, 2005, p. 43).  
 
However, it was exactly this “intelligibility” which eluded the post-apartheid institutional 
contexts that attempted to adjudicate the Moleleki execution, as they assumed that “self-
defence” denoted an instrumental power exercised in causal relation to an immediate and 
objectively identifiable threat. Instead the nature of the power that SDU members evoked 
when they spoke of their role in community defence was the type of power that emerges in 
the context of suspension of law, namely a “floating imperium”, which “resists definition in 
terms of the normal order” (Agamben, 2005, p. 43). Thus the Amnesty Committee found that 
“applications by former members of SDUs presented the Committee with formidable 
problems” (TRC, 2003, p. 41). The Amnesty Committee was only obliged to hold public 
hearings for amnesty applications that related to acts that amounted to “gross human rights 
violations”. While the activities of SDU members, like those involved in witchcraft activities, 
and the acts of violence of some members of the Azanian People‟s Liberation Army (APLA), 
appeared, “at first glance…to be common crimes” (TRC, 2003, p. 39), the Commission 
reported that, “it became evident that these matters could only be properly decided at public 
hearings where all the relevant circumstances could be fully canvassed” (TRC, 2003, p. 39).  
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Therefore the Amnesty Committee decided, “after intense discussions prior to the finalisation 
of SDU applications”, that it would hold public hearings for these matters, even though, 
“some…did not, strictly speaking, require a hearing” (TRC, 2003, p. 39). At these hearings, 
“the context of the conflict and the activities of the SDUs could be fully ventilated” (p. 43). 
Although, as we shall see, in terms of the adjudication of the Moleleki execution, the public 
hearings on this matter did create the opportunity for the “ventilation” of the context in which 
the execution took place, the Commissioners, faced with actions that occurred essentially in a 
juridical vacuum, in a context of necessity and biopolitical power, struggled to interpret the 
nature of the “context” that they were confronted with. Thus although “The hearings helped 
clarify the political background and context within which these offences occurred” (TRC, 
2003, p. 43), the Committee admitted that the various submissions from witnesses, non-
governmental organisations and political parties, while “generally helpful…did not always 
enable the Committee to reach an informed decision on every individual case” (TRC, 2003, 
p. 43). 
 
The “legality” of self-defence 
The Amnesty Committee faced several points of undecidibility in its adjudication of the acts 
of members of the SDU in Moleleki, as elsewhere. The first concerned the question of the 
“legality” of the right to self-defense. Thus while the TRC acknowledged the context of 
necessity that establishes the right to self-defence, it saw this “right” as a juridical claim, that 
could be legally adjudicated in order to ascertain the “legitimacy” of such actions, a 
“legitimacy” that once established would release the perpetrator from the legal consequences 
of their actions. Therefore, “a legitimate killing in self-defence still amounts to the 
deprivation of life and a violation of the right to life, but the law does not hold the perpetrator 
liable for the consequences of this conduct” (TRC, 1998b, p. 72).  
 209 
 
Crucially, however, as the TRC acknowledged,  
the legitimacy of self-defence is often difficult to establish...Amongst the most 
difficult issues the Commission faced in this regard were cases involving SDUs and 
SPUs
68…where it was usually not clear who was “innocent” (defending) and who was 
“guilty” (attacking). (TRC, 1998b, p. 88) 
 
Therefore, while the amnesty provisions that an act had to constitute a legal offence or delict, 
sought to affirm the law and legality as a norm, meaning that “there would be no Nuremberg-
type trials for the many human rights violations legally committed in the course of 
implementing apartheid” (TRC, 1998b, p. 52), it raised a critical ambiguity in terms of the 
amnesty applications of members of SDUs, which concerned the legal consequences of acts 
committed during the iustitium, with “the aim of saving the res publica” (Agamben, 2005, p. 
49). Paradoxically, those who could prove they had acted in “legitimate” self-defence had not 
acted illegally and therefore could not be said to have committed an act which amounted to 
an offence or delict, and were therefore not eligible to apply for amnesty in terms of TRC 
legislation.  
 
As the Amnesty Committee explained: 
not unnaturally, SDU members stated in their applications that they had acted in self-
defence. On a strict legal interpretation, such conduct is not unlawful and does not, 
therefore, amount to an offence. As one of the statutory requirements for amnesty is 
that the applicant‟s conduct must constitute an offence associated with a political 
objective, SDU applicants did not qualify for amnesty. (TRC, 2003, p. 42) 
 
The Moleleki applicants‟ legal representative argued that they carried out the execution 
because they feared for their lives after the killing of an SDU commander. In response, one of 
the TRC commissioners asked: 
if indeed…this was the perception that they were all going to be rounded up and 
killed, should that not be construed, at best for them, as a self-defensive – an act of 
                                            
 
68
 SPUs refer to Self Protection Units, which were informal defensive structures similar to SDUs established by 
the Inkatha Freedom Party, primarily in response to the formation of SDUs by the ANC.  
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self-defence, and therefore falling outside of the ambit of the Act, that it‟s not 
politically motivated, but motivated by the protection of their own lives? (TRC, 
1998a, p. 764) 
 
While “legitimate” self-defence was not an offence in South African law and therefore did 
not fall within the ambit of acts for which amnesty could be granted, SDU members in 
Moleleki as elsewhere articulated a more complex notion of “community defence” as the 
“motive” for their actions. This notion of community defence was articulated by SDU 
members in numerous hearings. The Moleleki protagonists unanimously articulated their 
motivation for their actions in terms of a duty of “protection” of a “defenseless community” 
(Dwane-Alpman, 1998). However, the TRC was unable to recognise the biopolitical nature of 
the power which this notion of community defence signified.  
 
Community defence and political objectives 
This obligation of community defence did not concern the individual defence of personal 
safety, which could be instrumentally and juridically adjudicated to ascertain the “legitimacy” 
of these actions as the TRC envisaged, but denoted a much broader mandate that concerned 
the dispensation that all citizens carry in a context of necessity when the juridico-political 
order has broken down or is suspended. As SDU member Oscar Motlokwa explained of the 
activities of SDU members, “the situation forced us” (TRC, 1998a, p. 171, own emphasis).  
ANCYL and civic leader Lethusang Rikaba made a similar argument in relation to the 
carrying of weapons by Youth League members: “They were eligible to use those guns 
according to the situation that existed in Katlehong” (TRC, 1998a, p. 662, own emphasis).  
This necessity of defence could not be given the instrumental forms of law as actions in 
pursuit of a strategic “political objective”. SDU members facing questioning from TRC 
commissioners regarding the “political objective” of their actions were not able to articulate 
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such instrumental intent. SDU member Michael Sonti applying for amnesty for the Moleleki 
execution explained to the TRC as follows: 
ADV MADASA:  Now, in relation to the offences which you have admitted. What 
was your political objective when you captured those people? 
MR SONTI:  There was nothing that I was going to gain in as far as that was 
concerned. It‟s just that all these incidents took place during the time of violence. In 
other words there wasn’t any objective that I was after or I will have…. we were 
protecting the community during the time of violence. (TRC, 1998a, p. 306, own 
emphasis)
69
 
 
SDU member Singo expressed similar incomprehension when asked to articulate a political 
objective for his actions:  
ADV MADASA: What was your political objective in killing them, in participating in 
their killing? 
MR SINGO: Sir, can you repeat your question, I don‟t understand what you mean by 
the political objective? 
ADV MADASA: What did you want to achieve by complying with Dondola‟s order 
[to kill the ANCYL members], what did you want to achieve? 
MR SINGO: I expected nothing, sir, when I carried out Dondola‟s order. (TRC, 
1998a, p. 426) 
 
Advocate Madasa, who represented the Moleleki protagonists, spuriously attempted to argue 
that this duty of defence did indeed constitute a juridical “political motive”, asserting that the 
Moleleki applicants‟ “conduct was definitely associated with a political objective, namely to 
defend the community” (TRC, 1998a, p. 763) and that this political objective to “defend the 
community” was part of “the mandate from the ANC”, which was “not only to kill the 
identifiable, the known enemy, which is perhaps the State and its agent and IVP [IFP], [but] 
was to eliminate…individuals within the community who were perceived to be harassing the 
community” (TRC, 1998a, p. 765). However, he was unable to demonstrate an instrumental 
                                            
 
69
 An SDU member from Katlehong who was applying for amnesty for the killing of an IFP member similarly 
attests to the dispensation that necessity carries with it, which does not concern an instrumental intent, “the 
death of Mr Nqobo is not my intention, but because of the situation prevailing at the time in the Katlehong 
community” (TRC, 1999,  p. 599, own emphasis). 
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link between the actions of SDU members and the political objectives of a “publicly known 
political organisation”. 
 
He instead evoked the ambiguity of the biopolitical fracture that articulates the margins of the 
political community against the boundary of bare life, namely those “perceived to be 
harassing” the community who were consequently seen by all protagonists in the conflict in 
Moleleki as the licit object of elimination. However, Madasa‟s paradoxical attempt to 
articulate this biopolitical fracture in juridical terms, made little sense in the context of the 
TRC proceedings, as stated by chairperson of the committee hearing the application: “The 
only issue is whether the conduct of the applicants, who are admittedly members of the SDU 
and members of the ANC, had any political objective…whether the killing of the deceased 
had the objective envisaged in the Act” (TRC, 1998a, p. 762).   
 
Thus, the difficulties which the Commission faced in its adjudication of self-defence within 
the context of the conflict of the 1990s, was not centrally about ascertaining the legitimacy of 
the various actions carried out during the course of this conflict, an adjudication of an 
instrumental relationship between act and author, that would allow the TRC to determine who 
was “innocent” and who “guilty” but instead concerned the ambiguity of the floating 
imperium, which emerges in the context of exception. As the report of the Amnesty 
Committee of the TRC stated in relation to the conflict of the 1990s:  
While it was possible to draw a sharp distinction between those involved in the 
clandestine military operations of MK
70
 and those engaged in other forms of protest in 
the pre-1990 era, such distinctions become far less clear in the early 1990s. During 
this period, the borders began to blur as MK operatives became involved in 
community SDU structures and activities and civilians were increasingly drawn into 
paramilitary activities. (TRC, 2003, p. 296) 
 
                                            
 
70
 Umkhonto we Sizwe, the armed wing of the ANC prior to its de-prohibition in 1990.  
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However, the TRC, operating within a paradigm of juridical instrumentality, was not able to 
recognise the nature of this authority, which emerges in a context of exception, and instead 
attempted to adjudicate the actions of SDU members within the amnesty process, by 
determining whether “orders” had been given to commit various acts of violence. 
Nevertheless, as the TRC acknowledged at the conclusion of its amnesty processes,  
It was clear… that it had not always been possible for SDU members to receive a 
specific order before launching an attack or operation. The areas in question were, 
moreover, gripped by large-scale, ongoing and indiscriminate violence where the 
maintenance of law and order had all but collapsed. Testimonies at the hearings 
depicted a grim picture of day-to-day survival as communities came under attack by 
clandestine forces, often operating with the tacit approval and even support of the 
security forces. The East Rand in the early 1990s offered a clear example of this, with 
young people testifying about their involvement in violent operations in defence of 
their communities. (TRC, 2003, p. 43)  
 
SDUs and the ANC 
Thus in attempting to adjudicate the actions of the participants in the Moleleki execution, the 
nature of the authority for their actions raised a number of significant ambiguities. While all 
SDU members in Moleleki were members of a “publicly known political organisation”, 
namely the ANC, the extent to which the acts of violence they committed could be construed 
to have been carried out “within the scope of his or her express or implied authority” (s 20(2), 
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act) as a member of the ANC, raised one of 
many complexities in the adjudication of their actions.  
 
In its attempts to adjudicate the Moleleki execution, the TRC operated in terms of a juridical 
conception of the “political” premised on a separation between an atemporal origin of power 
and its violent effects, which allows for a process of legitimation and rationalization by 
attempting to trace an instrumental link between formal political rationalities (the origin of 
power) and its violent effects (the offences or delicts carried out by those who applied to the 
Commission for amnesty). The TRC ran aground, however, in multiple problems of 
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decidability when confronted with the “manifestation” of violence of the Moleleki execution. 
This violence, as Van Zyl argued in relation to much of the violence which took place during 
the 1990s in South Africa, was “political in origin but not politically motivated” (Van Zyl, 
1990, pp. 1-2, own emphasis). 
 
Moreover, the ambiguous relation of SDUs to the ANC created significant difficulties in 
terms of determining an instrumental relation between the origin of power (formal political 
rationalities) and its violent effects in terms of an adjudication of the “political motive” of 
members of SDUs, in particular whether their actions could be linked to the formal political 
rationalities of the ANC. While SDU structures had initially been established under the 
auspices of the ANC, once established they were ostensibly accountable to the “local 
community”, purportedly represented by the national civic organisation, SANCO. Thus, as 
the ANC stated in its submission to the TRC, “the SDUs were established in communities 
under attack as a joint project between the ANC and the communities concerned” (African 
National Congress Statement to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Further 
Submissions and Responses, 1997). However, it also acknowledged that while “the units 
should have been controlled by the communities in which they operated…many communities 
were entirely destabilised by low intensity violence, and organised structures at grassroots 
levels were almost non-existent” (African National Congress Statement to the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, 1997).  
 
In this context the location of the political authority to which SDU members should refer in 
the exercise of their “duties” remained extremely ambiguous throughout the period of their 
operation. These ambiguities were deepened by the context of necessity in which SDU 
structures had been established, which concerned a “war situation” in which it was difficult if 
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not impossible to secure clear and ambiguous “orders” for actions committed in the context 
of ongoing conflict and violence. As SDU member Oscar Motlokwa explained, “if [the] 
commander was not there and the enemy was attacking, we had to take the initiative to 
defend the community and account later” (O. Motlokwa, personal interview, 2001, own 
emphasis). Thus as Thomson argues in relation to the law in such situations, “if there is…a 
sudden danger, regarding which there is no time for recourse to a higher authority, the very 
necessity carries a dispensation with it, for necessity is not subject to the law” (Thomson 
cited in Agamben, 2005, p. 25). In preparation for the hearing of the amnesty application of 
the Moleleki protagonists, the investigative unit of the TRC had sought formal confirmation 
from the ANC that the SDU members who had applied for amnesty were ANC party 
members. The response of the ANC essentially confirmed the dispensation that necessity 
carries with it in a “war situation”. However, the organisation also attempted to distance itself 
from juridical responsibility for these actions, which it argued would have had to have been 
exercised through a direct command: “No one has instructed them to do the killings because 
it was a war situation according to the information we got from the PWV office then” (P. 
Molekane, letter, January 19, 1998, own emphasis).  
 
Thus, while the SDU members in Moleleki articulated their defence at the TRC in terms of an 
extra-juridical power, there remained a critical ambiguity in this articulation, which also 
invoked a juridical claim to authority, namely that SDUs were fundamentally an initiative of 
the ANC and therefore were a critical part of the struggle for “rights” on the East Rand. As 
SDU member Michael Sonti explained, “I responded to the call of our political organisation, 
our political leadership, the ANC” (TRC, 1998a, p. 323). On the other hand, the practical 
nature of the link between the ANC and SDUs operating in areas where there was conflict 
was unclear. “In most cases, SDUs had some form of contact with ANC structures, albeit in 
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an ad hoc and unstructured way. Some existed in areas where there were no strong ANC 
branches that could provide political leadership” (TRC, 2003, p. 305, own emphasis). Even 
where there were strong political links between the ANC and SDUs, as in Thokoza township 
on the East Rand, this tended to occur at a local level and significantly, the existence of such 
“political control” did not “lessen the ferocity of the conflicts or the offensive character of the 
attacks carried out by the SDUs. Thus, despite political control the Tokoza SDUs engaged in 
extreme forms of violence” (TRC, 2003, p. 305, own emphasis). 
 
In Moleleki, despite the fact that both sets of protagonists in the conflict were ANC members, 
neither the SDU nor the ANCYL approached the ANC for assistance to help address the 
division between the organisations prior to the execution. Instead both parties turned to the 
civic organisation in the township as the appropriate authority to intervene in the conflict, 
despite the fact that its secretary general in Moleleki, Lethusang Rikaba, was actually partly 
the source of contention, making this a highly unlikely avenue for the successful resolution of 
the conflict. Oscar Motlokwa explained to the Commission: 
MR MAPOMA: When you had problems with the ANCYL before the incident itself 
happened, did you ever raise the matter with the ANC as an organisation of which you 
were a member? 
MR MOTLOKWA:  Sir, I told you already that the civic solved the problems because 
within the SDU, the SDU had members from different political organisations, PAC 
and ANC. (TRC, 1998a, p. 171) 
 
It was only after the execution had taken place that ANC headquarters sent a representative to 
defuse the situation. However, prior to the execution, “there were no [ANC] meetings, we 
were busy at all time because Katlehong was fighting” (TRC, 1998a, p. 171). Asked about 
“political guidance” from the ANC prior to the execution, Michael Sonti explained, “all the 
decisions that are made in ANC meetings we would obey, even though we did not get enough 
time or did not get clarity on the decisions made or the code of conduct what we are supposed 
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to do as the members of the ANC” (TRC, 1998a, p. 317). It was this lack of a code of conduct 
that Oscar argued had led to the emergence of “Kangaroo Courts”71 in Moleleki, “because of 
certain reasons we did not have a code of conduct the situation forced us… That is why most 
of the time the Kangaroo Court was in operation… It was not the ANC policy to have 
Kangaroo Courts” (TRC, 1998a, p. 172).  
 
Instead as Oscar explained, the Moleleki SDU‟s primary link to the ANC was the informal 
weapons training provided to SDU “operators”72 such as himself by a former member of 
Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), Julius Gadebe (TRC, 1998a, p. 127). Although an MK member 
may have trained Oscar in the use of weapons, this did not extend to the provision of 
weapons by the ANC: “the ANC did not give us guns” although the “sectional committee of 
the ANC” “was aware” that the SDU had guns (TRC, 1998a, p. 129).  
 
The TRC amnesty report on the ANC and “allied organisations” therefore states that 
“SDUs…can claim some level of practical and moral authorisation from the ANC” (TRC, 
2003, p. 108). However, the nature and extent of this “practical and moral authorisation” 
remained unclear both at the time that SDUs actually operated and during the subsequent 
adjudication of the actions of their members during the processes of the TRC. The TRC 
amnesty report noted that during the period in which SDUs operated, although “the ANC 
kept its distance from the command and control of most of the SDUs, it was forced to 
intervene in several instances when SDU structures drifted into criminality or internecine 
                                            
 
71
 (idiomatic) A judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, or a group which conducts such proceedings, which is 
without proper authority, abusive, or otherwise unjust. (Kangaroo Court from Wikitionary: 
http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/kangaroo_court ). The term “kangaroo court” may have been popularized during 
the California Gold Rush of 1849. The first recorded usage is from 1853 in a Texas context. It comes from the 
notion of justice proceeding “by leaps” (Kangaroo Court. Retrieved from Wikipedia: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kangaroo_court).  
 
72
 Members of SDUs who were trained and authorised to use guns. 
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conflicts (TRC, 2003, p. 305), as occurred in Moleleki. In the context of the amnesty process 
of the TRC, the ANC in its “Statement of Responsibility” to the TRC73, in which senior ANC 
leaders collectively took responsibility for the armed actions of members of the organisation, 
appeared to indicate that the organisation was taking direct juridical responsibility for SDUs 
within the context of the amnesty process: 
Due to the circumstances which prevailed in the townships, in the early 1990s as a 
result of third force activities, the leadership of the ANC established and, in some 
instances encouraged the establishment of self-defence units (SDUs), which played a 
critical role in the defence of defenceless communities. In the event, and to the extent 
that any of the activities of any of the abovementioned institutions and structures 
including the SDUs could in any manner whatsoever be regarded as the kinds of acts 
or omissions or offences envisaged in the Promotion of National Unity and 
Reconciliation Act, we collectively take full responsibility therefore applying for 
amnesty in respect thereof… [AM5780/97] (TRC, 2003, p. 272) 
 
In practice the extent to which the ANC as a political organisation did take juridical 
responsibility for the actions of SDU members was less consistent. The TRC Amnesty 
Committee therefore found that an instrumental relationship between the ANC and SDUs 
could only be concretely demonstrated by the limited supply of weapons to some SDU 
structures by the ANC: “It is probably in the supply of weaponry by MHQ74 that the strongest 
case for a link between the ANC and SDUs can be made” (TRC, 2003, p. 272). 
 
Therefore, although in its establishment of SDUs the ANC had argued that they should be 
accountable to the national civic organisation, SANCO, in the context of the amnesty 
processes of the TRC the actions of SDU members were adjudicated in terms of the extent to 
which they were an instrumental reflection of the political objectives of the ANC and were in 
                                            
 
73
 This collective amnesty application was at first granted by the Amnesty Committee but was later overturned 
by the Supreme Court because individual ANC leaders had not specified the particular violations for which they 
were taking responsibility. 
74
 Military Headquarters of the ANC‟s armed formation, Umkhonto we Sizwe. 
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fact exercised under the direct command of that organisation. Thus, as stated by the TRC 
evidence leader in the Moleleki hearings,  
the [amnesty] committee needs to look into the actions, were those actions geared in 
furtherance of the political struggle waged by the ANC?...my emphasis is on the 
command that was given. I‟m saying, Chairperson, that the command that was given 
is not a command which came from a publicly known political organisation, that is 
the ANC. (TRC, 2003, p. 303, own emphasis)  
 
These ambiguities reflected the difficulties faced by the ANC in its early attempts to 
juridically inscribe this “right” to self-defence at the time of the internal strife of the 1990s 
after it had agreed to suspend the armed struggle in terms of the Pretoria Minute signed with 
the National Party government in August 1990. This occurred a month after what 
subsequently came to be known as the Sebokeng massacre, which launched what was to be a 
bloody four-year civil conflict. Faced with a massive escalation of violence across the 
country and increasingly, in response, a spontaneously organised groundswell of defensive 
activities around the country, the ANC sought to contain this violence, which was “loosed 
from law”. As SACP leader Jeremy Cronin argued at the time, “communities will 
spontaneously resort to arms to defend themselves and…it is better for political organisations 
to exert some kind of control over these activities – rather than press for disarmament” 
(quoted in Koch, 1992). ANC spokesperson Siphiwe Nyanda argued that “the ANC‟s 
involvement is a bid to direct the process so that these things don‟t degenerate into something 
ugly” (quoted in Sole, 1991). 
 
Critically the way in which the ANC attempted to inscribe this floating imperium was in 
terms of a juridical notion of self-defence. The ANC‟s key policy document on SDUs For the 
Sake of our Lives! (1991), authored by South African Communist Party leader Jeremy 
Cronin, was the most systematic articulation of this juridical right. The document asserts,  
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Our people have the moral right to state: We do not intend to attack anybody but we 
demand the right to protect our lives, our families, our homes and communities. We 
are forced to create defence units for the sake of our lives. (Cronin, 1991, p. 5)  
 
Therefore in the light of the suspension of the armed struggle, the ANC sought to reassure its 
constituency of its continued support for their “right” of self-defence. Although this “right” 
could no longer be exercised through the formal structure of the ANC‟s armed formation, 
Umkhonto we Sizwe, it would now be exercised through the formation of SDUs. For the 
Sake of our Lives! explains, “At present, in the light of the Groote Schuur and Pretoria 
Minutes, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) alone cannot undertake the task of our people‟s defence, 
although this is a right we need to forcefully demand and struggle for” (Cronin, 1991, p. 4).  
 
This juridical “right” was allegedly a “non-partisan” right that belonged to all protagonists in 
the conflict, a right which had already reportedly been acknowledged on a partisan basis by 
the apartheid government, which had lifted a ban on “traditional weapons” as IFP members 
mobilised to attack townships and also refused to act against the Afrikaner 
Weerstandsbeweeging (AWB
75
) “self-protection” commandos. Consequently, the SDUs 
established by the ANC would ostensibly not “be affiliated to any political party or 
movement but [would] be a protective force which serves the community as a whole” 
(Cronin, 1991). Nor would they in their initial conceptualisation be directly armed by the 
ANC, although the ANC did eventually start to supply SDUs with small amounts of arms as 
the conflict intensified and SDU members used illegal means to acquire arms. However, at 
the start of the conflict the ANC emphasised the importance of the principle of the right to 
self-defence. ANC spokesperson Gill Marcus argued therefore: “We are not talking about 
                                            
 
75
 A rightwing organisation established in 1973 under the leadership of Eugene Terreblanche to agitate for a 
„homeland‟ for the “Boer volk” (people). (Retrieved from Afrikaner Weerstands Beweeging, AWB information: 
http://www.awb.co.za/inligting_e.htm) The AWB were involved in a considerable degree of violence during the 
period of negotiations including several bomb attacks in the days before the first popular elections took place in 
1994.  
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arming our people but about their right to self-defence…” (quoted by Own Correspondent, 
Sowetan, November 1990). 
 
The “community” to which SDUs were purportedly accountable was a “community” 
represented through SANCO, the civic organisation operating in townships, ostensibly open 
to members of all political parties but which clearly could only represent the interests of a 
small section of “the community” in a context of ongoing conflict, which had already 
balkanised areas of conflict into geographical zones of homogenous political affinity. 
 
As the ANC later acknowledged in its testimony to the TRC,   
There was a basic assumption, which again may also have been wrong…which was 
that there would be in these communities local political structures, local structures of 
civil society strong enough to be able to constitute these committees that would then 
take charge of the self-protection units…it‟s clear that we should perhaps have 
reviewed the matter of that control but we continued to proceed as though you could 
as ANC armed (sic) the units and surrender them to these local civil and political 
structures to control….there was a carry through of a particular concept of self-
protection units which was perhaps then not founded on reality with regard to the 
control and so on within those communities. (African National Congress Political 
Party Recall, 1997, Day 2) 
 
Homo Sacer, Mediating the Boundaries of the Community 
In evoking the “community” as the key referent for the authority of SDUs, the ANC was in 
fact evoking the ambiguity of the exception which articulates the boundaries of the juridico-
political order. In a context where the juridico-political order had essentially been suspended, 
the “community” to which the ANC referred did not reflect a community that could be 
juridically or electorally represented; instead it could only denote the fundamental ambiguity 
of the biopolitical fracture, mediated in terms of the relation of exception. The mediation of 
this biopolitical fracture, which defines inclusion and exclusion in the political community, is 
substantiated against the boundary of homo sacer, leading the protagonists in the Moleleki 
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execution to evoke the “criminal” rather than the party political opponent as the “originary 
figure” of the political relation. 
 
For the TRC in its adjudication of the political motive of the Moleleki applicants, the fact that 
their actions, by their own account, had not been directed at a “political opponent” as defined 
in the TRC legislation but against people whom they perceived to be “criminal”, played a 
defining role in the decision that the actions of the SDU members in Moleleki had not been 
politically motivated. The chairperson of the Amnesty Committee hearing the Moleleki 
application questioned SDU applicant Oscar Motlokwa in this regard, evoking in his line of 
questioning the enlightenment notion of a “transcendental” political subject who exists prior 
to action (Feldman, 1991, p. 4). This was a notion on which the conception of intention, 
which informed the TRC‟s adjudication of political motive, was heavily reliant, i.e. the extent 
to which the actions of political protagonists could be said to have been carried out in terms 
of their political intention as particular types of political subjects, adjudicated in terms of 
their membership of political organisations. However, the protagonists in Moleleki, both 
ANCYL members and SDU members, articulated a different type of subjecthood, one that is 
embodied in praxis, rather than as a product of a pre-existing political consciousness. As 
ANCYL and civic leader Lethusang Rikaba argued, “anybody who attacked was regarded as 
an enemy” (TRC, 1998a, p. 682, own emphasis). SDU member Oscar Motlokwa similarly 
articulated the “political objective” of the SDU as the protection of “the community against 
an enemy”, defined not in terms of organisational affiliation but in terms of praxis that 
subordinated juridical identity,  
MR MADASA:  So the Youth League, you perceived them as an enemy within you?  
MR MOTLOKWA:  The way they acted, that is so. (TRC, 1998a, p. 167, own 
emphasis).  
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It was the actions of ANCYL members that made their political party membership irrelevant 
and rendered them as homines sacri, “criminals”:  
CHAIRPERSON:  At the time when these persons were killed you believed that they 
were members of the ANCYL? 
MR MOTLOKWA:  I believed that they were criminals Sir. 
CHAIRPERSON:  You did not believe that they were members of the ANCYL? 
MR MOTLOKWA:  We did not believe that they [were] members of the ANCYL 
according to what they were doing. 
CHAIRPERSON:  But did these persons who were killed hold themselves out as 
members of the ANCYL? 
MR MOTLOKWA:  That is correct Sir. 
CHAIRPERSON:  But insofar as you are concerned you were killing criminals?  
MR MOTLOKWA:  According to their actions yes, they were criminals. (TRC, 
1998a, pp. 194-195, own emphasis) 
 
These assertions of criminality by the SDU would lead the Amnesty Committee to conclude 
in its decision on the Moleleki execution: 
All the applicants testified that they regarded the members of the ANCYL as 
criminals who were harassing the community in Moleleki section. They also testified 
that the deceased were killed because they were a gang of criminals… 
 
On the applicants‟ version, therefore, the deceased were killed, not because of their 
membership in a political organisation, but because they were a gang of criminals 
who had killed Blanko in particular. (TRC, 1998c, pp. 8-9, own emphasis) 
 
In their evocation of the “criminal” rather than the party political opponent as the figure of 
the original political relation, all protagonists in the conflict in Moleleki were evoking the 
ambiguity of the biopolitical fracture that mediates the boundaries of “community” in terms 
of the figure of homo sacer. This “community” was evoked by all protagonists in Moleleki as 
the source of authority for a variety of decisions to commit acts of violence rather than an 
“order” or command from a specific leader. It was this “community” that leaders also drew 
their authority from when they gave “instructions” to carry out various acts of violence. This 
“community” was not organised as a representative juridical authority but was simply 
embodied by fluctuating groups of “community” members who gathered in various meetings 
in the township of Moleleki as tensions escalated in the months prior to the execution and 
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who congregated even more fluidly at various sites of death during the course of the night 
prior to the execution.  
 
A number of writers have noted the centrality of “community” to African conceptions and 
practices of justice:  
punishment and the resolution of disputes will lay emphasis upon law as expressing 
the will and traditions of the community. There is no distinction between legal and 
moral issues…The person at the bar of judgment is there, in principle, as a whole 
man, bringing with him his status, occupation, and the entire history of all his social 
relations. Justice is substantive and is directed to a particular case in a particular social 
context and not to the creation of a general rule or precedent. Punishment, as Foucault 
has stressed, is a social drama, symbolising the awesome power of the group over the 
individual – there is a sharp dichotomy of reconciliation and outlawry” (Hund and 
Kotu-Rammopo, 1983, p. 201, original emphasis).  
 
Crais similarly notes:  
Typically infractions involved as much the person directly involved as the community 
of which he or she was a member. Thus people could be found guilty of offences they 
themselves did not commit…the central issue revolved around the restoration of 
balance within the community, less personal culpability or the restoration to the 
individual of the harm done to them. (Crais, 2002, p. 86)  
 
Schärf and Ngcokoto also write that  
populist notions of democratic justice tend to be characterised by a frank acceptance 
that the decisions in collective tribunals, courts, street committees…or whatever they 
are called, should express the moral/political will of the most powerful collectivity 
within the particular constituency at a particular time. (Shärf & Ngcokoto, 1990, p. 
343). 
 
However, the evocation of this “community” provoked significant problems of 
comprehension for the TRC in its adjudication of the Moleleki execution. Who was this 
“community” that was invoked so readily by all protagonists, where could it be found, how 
did it make and communicate its decisions to authorise violence? 
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As the TRC could only recognise a juridical form of authority, where decisions would be 
taken and communicated in terms of the mandate of this representative office, the nature of 
the authority claimed by protagonists in the conflict raised considerable confusion in the 
interaction between the officials of the TRC and the protagonists from Moleleki who gave 
evidence to the Amnesty Committee as this authority evoked an auctoritas that is realised in 
the person of the actor rather than through the mandate of representative office. 
 
For example, in his evidence to the Amnesty Committee, SDU member Oscar Motlokwa 
evoked the “community” as the source of authority for SDU actions, such as the 9pm curfew 
that the organisation had imposed on the township. He claimed: “All members of the 
community took that decision…the community took a decision that as from 9 o‟clock people 
should not roam in the street” (TRC, 1998a, p. 130, own emphasis). In response TRC 
Commissioners attempted to make material and hence intelligible this concept of community:  
MR MALAN: Could I again just ask a question here just to clarify for me. The 
community that were taking all these decisions, were they meeting regularly? How 
did you interact with what you‟re referring to all through your evidence as the 
community?”  
MR MOTLOKWA:  As I said before, we would meet with the community if we 
encounter problems. We would tell the sectional committee and the sectional 
committee would call the community to explain our problems. 
MR MOTATA:  But I suppose Mr Motlokwa, before you could tell the community 
what your problems are or problems which you encounter, there should have been a 
meeting...what did the community which you are referring to do so that your 
formation could come into existence? 
MR MOTLOKWA:  May you please repeat your question Sir? (TRC, 1998a, p. 130, 
own emphasis) 
 
In the context of the unravelling of juridical authority that occurred during the night after the 
death of civic activist Bulelwa, the fluidity of the location of this “community”, claimed by 
all protagonists in the conflict as the source of the authority for their actions, caused 
considerable confusion for the Commission, who sought the instantiation of a juridically 
represented “community”, fixed in time and space.  
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The nature of the authority for the decisions that were taken to authorise the key incidents of 
violence that took place during the night following the killing of young civic activist Bulelwa 
Zwane, therefore evoked a radical problem of understanding for the Commission, firstly in 
terms of the killing of SDU leader Blanko and then, in response to this killing, the decision to 
round up and later to kill ANCYL members allegedly involved in the killing of Blanko. Thus 
Lethusang Rikaba, who acknowledged his role in Blanko‟s killing at both the TRC hearings 
and the courtroom proceedings that followed, evoked the authority of a “community” of 
approximately 50 to 70 residents who had gathered in Block C of the township after the 
killing of Bulelwa, as the source of the sanction for the killing of Blanko. 
 
However, TRC commissioners and advocates who interrogated Lethusang regarding the 
nature of this authority, sought in vain to find evidence of a juridical mandate for this killing 
and to understand the nature of the “meeting” itself, which was not addressed by a 
community leader but had simply gathered in response to the “screams” of grief of Bulelwa‟s 
friend and fellow civic member, Alfred Buthelezi. It was in the context of this spontaneous 
gathering that Lethusang drew the authority to “hunt down” members of the SDU allegedly 
involved in the killing of Bulelwa and in other incidents of violence in the township. 
However, this authority did not flow from the “deliberations” of a juridically representative 
leadership or authority, nor was it expressed in terms of a juridical mandate, but was instead 
embodied and realised in the very persons of the members of the “community” who had 
gathered in response to Bulelwa‟s death. Lethusang could no more understand the juridical 
nature of the authority that the Commission required him to articulate than the Commission 
could understand the biopolitical authority he invoked: 
MR MOTATA:  Whilst gathered at this tuck shop or Spaza shop you deliberated with 
the community what next to do, isn‟t it so? 
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MR LEKABE (sic): The community pronounced its dissatisfaction – they said enough 
is enough. I did not address them. 
MR MOTATA:  I want to understand, Mr Lekabe, that at that stage nobody knew 
who killed Bulelwa. How did you arrive at the decision that you should now round up 
the members of the SDU and start with the top structure, probably Blanko.  
MR LEKABE : Chairperson I explained already that the community was dissatisfied 
of the activities of the SDU in Mololeke, they took a decision that enough was 
enough, they were not going to wait for yet another incident. (TRC, 1998a, p. 681, 
own emphasis) 
 
MR MOTATA: What I want to find out from you… how did you come to a 
conclusion or decision by the community that you should go for the SDU and Blanko 
in this instance? 
MR LEKABE: My lord, I explained that the community said enough was enough and 
the allegations that members of the community, the leaders of the community, were 
supposed to be killed was already flying. I think I explained that my lord. 
MR MOTATA:  Yes, my brother, I heard that one but you are not answering my 
question. 
MR LEKABE: Maybe I do not understand your question. (TRC, 1998a, p. 682, own 
emphasis) 
 
The context of “community” evoked in relation to the later abduction and “presentation” of 
ANCYL members to this “community” before the decision to kill them, posed similar 
problems of comprehension for another advocate involved in the juridical interrogation of the 
Moleleki protagonists,  
MR MADASA:  When you say you took them [ANCYL members] to the community, 
what do you mean by that? Where was the community where you took them to?” 
MR MOTLOKWA:  At about 7 o‟clock in the morning there was a community 
meeting to discuss the incident of the previous day, then the community lost control 
and they said these children must be killed. (TRC, 1998a, p. 154, own emphasis) 
 
The “decision” to kill ANCYL members who had been rounded up and captured in response 
to the killing of Blanko evoked similar ambiguities. TRC commissioners attempted to 
identify and fix the “location” of the decision to kill the ANCYL members in time and space 
in order to ascertain the extent to which this decision reflected the mandate of a juridically 
represented community. Thus Advocate Madasa sought to clarify from SDU member Oscar 
Motlokwa, “Where was the killing ordered, was it a meeting or what was the situation when 
these three ordered the killing?  What was going on at that time?” (TRC, 1998a, p. 156, own 
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emphasis). Advocate Mapoma sought to identify the time at which the order had taken place 
in order to ascertain its relation to a juridical mandate: “Now this decision to kill them 
[ANCYL members], when exactly was it communicated to you...” (TRC, 1998a, p. 182, own 
emphasis) 
 
The “orders” for the killing were in fact given by SDU commander Njebe Ndondolo in a 
shadowy zone on the boundaries of a “meeting” in the “yard” of SDU leader Blanko. This 
meeting was actually a spontaneous gathering of people, who had congregated throughout the 
night in response to Blanko‟s killing. The meeting became more formalised as it was 
eventually addressed by civic leader Machinini at approximately 7am. The killings were 
“ordered” on the boundaries of this meeting in the early hours of the morning. According to 
Oscar Motlokwa “after the meeting of the community Ntjebe called the members of the SDU 
aside and he said Manyala commanded him that these people [ANCYL members] must be 
killed” (TRC, 1998a, p. 156). SDU leader Njebe Ndondolo explicitly drew authority from the 
“meeting” in Blanko‟s yard and the anger of the crowd gathered there, but as Oscar 
Motlokwa explained, did not act in terms of a juridical mandate openly articulated in the 
context of the public meeting: 
CHAIRPERSON:  Who came with the suggestion that these nine people that were 
caught had to be killed? 
MR MOTLOKWA:  I already mentioned that Ntjebe Ndondolo issued out an order 
which was given to him by Manyala. 
CHAIRPERSON:  Did he announce that at the meeting? 
MR MOTLOKWA:  No, he did not announce that in the meeting, he told us as 
members of the SDU. 
CHAIRPERSON:  What happened at the meeting, what was the meeting about? 
MR MOTLOKWA:  I said the vice chairperson addressed the meeting, the vice 
chairperson of the – the zonal vice chairperson. The issue on the table was the 
situation around Moleleki and the death of the two people [Bulelwa and Blanko]. He 
was addressing the meeting as the leader, he did not take out such an order at the 
meeting.  Because you know, if people are angry you can‟t control their emotions, 
they just decided that these people must be killed and he called us aside as members 
of the SDU. It is there where he took out an order. 
 229 
 
MR MOTATA:  What interests me Mr Motlokwa, you were present at this meeting 
where the community was outraged by the happenings of the previous night, that is 
the deaths of Bulelwa and Blanko. Were you present in that meeting? 
MR MOTLOKWA:  I was present Sir. 
MR MOTATA:  This meeting as we know by now was addressed by Mr Machinini, 
would I still be correct? 
MR MOTLOKWA:  That is correct. 
MR MOTATA:  Now, whilst the community is there and Machinini is addressing the 
community, you being present with some members of the SDU‟s, did the community 
itself in your presence take a decision about the fate of the nine? 
MR MOTLOKWA:  The community was talking that they should be killed. No 
decision was taken by the community or the chairperson in agreement with the 
community that they should be killed, people were just saying it out of their own 
feelings. (TRC, 1998a, pp. 156-157, own emphasis) 
 
 
While Machinini did not explicitly order or sanction the killing of the ANCYL members, the 
ambiguity of the boundary between what was formally authorised in terms of an overt 
juridical mandate, and what actions drew implicit authority from the angry crowd gathered at 
Blanko‟s home, was made clear by the fact that civic leader Machinini arrived to address the 
meeting at Blanko‟s home in the company of Katlehong SDU commander Mzaapindile 
Ntsingola (known as “Manyala”) and Moleleki SDU commander Njebe Ndondolo, who 
would later issue the order that the youths should be killed.  
 
Therefore, the extent to which this “community” had or had not been part of the decision to 
kill the youths, in terms of a juridically expressed mandate, could not be interpreted in terms 
of the juridical authority the Commission attempted to extract from the testimony of SDU 
applicants. Instead they invoked the biopolitical authority of the “community”, on the basis of 
whose “feelings” and “views” SDU leaders Njebe Ndondolo and “Manyala” purportedly 
issued the “order” to kill the captured ANCYL members:  
MR MAPOMA:  In that meeting which was chaired by Machinini, was there any 
resolution taken that the youth be killed? 
MR MOTLOKWA:  I said that Machinini did not pronounce the death of these 
people, he was actually addressing the issue of stability in Moleleki, that crime must 
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be stopped. And the people, the community, raised their views, they said they must be 
killed but the Chairperson of that meeting did not agree to that decision. 
MR MAPOMA:  So out of those views which were given by some people in the 
meeting, then an instruction from the SDU leadership came to you that they be killed, 
is that what I understand? 
MR MOTLOKWA:  That is correct. (TRC, 1998a, p. 182, own emphasis) 
 
In a juridical conception of the “community”, it was only the juridical representative of this 
“community”, namely civic leader Machinini, who, in the eyes of the TRC, had the legitimate 
mandate to authorise actions on behalf of this “community”. 
MR MAPOMA:  Now Machinini, let me get Machinini‟s role, was he chairing this 
meeting or was he addressing as a speaker in the meeting? 
MR MOTLOKWA:  He was chairing the meeting Sir. 
MR MAPOMA:  Now in the process of chairing the meeting there are some decisions 
which are taken and the chairperson conveys those decisions to the meeting, is that 
not correct? 
MR MOTLOKWA:  In general that is the procedure. 
MR MAPOMA:  Yes. Now in this particular instance, is there any stage where 
Machinini announced that it is resolved by the community that these youths who were 
captured must be killed? 
MR MOTLOKWA:  No, Sir, he never said that, he never announced that. 
MR MAPOMA:  Will I be understanding it correctly if I say that it was never a 
decision of the community that the youths be killed? 
MR MOTLOKWA:  A decision was not taken by the chairman of the meeting that 
those youths be killed, an order was issued out by the commander of the SDU that 
these youths be killed. 
MR MAPOMA:  Thank you, through you Mr Chairperson. Now how, in your 
opinion, did the meeting resolve the issue of the captured youths, what should be done 
about them?  
MR MOTLOKWA:  Some members of the community wanted these youths to be 
killed. I have already said that Machinini addressed the issue of stopping crime in 
Moleleki, the order came from the commander. (TRC, 1998a, p. 183) 
 
Thus, the fact that SDU member Oscar Motlokwa explicitly did not invoke a juridical 
authority in attempting to explain the mandate for the killings but instead invoked a 
biopolitical authority embodied by the angry residents gathered at the site of the Blanko‟s 
killing, led the TRC to reject the legitimacy of the claim that the actions taken by the SDU 
were “authorised” by the “community”, and therefore could have been “politically 
motivated”, as this motivation could not be deduced from a juridical authorisation.  
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MR MAPOMA: ... how do you say that it was politically motivated to kill those 
people? 
MR MOTLOKWA:  The task of the SDU was to defend the community. 
MR MAPOMA:  Yes. But the community had an opportunity to decide what it is that 
has to be done about these youths and it did not resolve that these youths must be 
killed. How do you explain this one? 
MR MOTLOKWA:  Chairperson, if we speak of the SDU and the civic, these are 
similar organisations but an order is not issued out in front of everybody, it must be 
directed to members of the SDU. Even members of the community who wanted to be 
part of the killing, Ntjebe did not allow them to take part in the killing because he 
only wanted members of the SDU. 
MR MAPOMA:  So the killing of the youths was an instruction which came from 
neither the community nor the ANC? 
MR MOTLOKWA:  I said the order was from Ndondolo. 
MR MAPOMA:  Thank you Mr Chairperson, those are my questions. (TRC, 1998a, p. 
184) 
 
Therefore, in a context of floating imperium, commissioners struggled to understand the 
location of this “community” claimed as the source of authority for violent actions, which 
denoted not a stable juridical entity, but an embodied polis. Clifton Crais has noted in this 
regard that “Western forms of cognition…had an important spatial component that, at a 
minimum, required the existence of stable political boundaries or jurisdictional units” (Crais, 
2002, p. 71). On the other hand,  
The common pre-colonial tradition of political process had entailed the existence of 
multiple and overlapping political domains and the creation of unadministered areas 
on the borders of chiefdoms, a complex map of power in which boundaries more or 
less remained in permanent flux. This tradition rested on the basis of principles that 
fundamentally, indeed, radically differed from those upon which colonial rule rested. 
(Crais, 2002, p. 76) 
 
In fact, this Western cognition, which premised the boundaries of the “imagined nation” 
(Anderson, 1991) on a geographic outline, constructed a fiction of neutrality, of essentiality, 
and in this fiction, was able to conceal the essential politicality of this “nation”, the essential 
ambiguity of this jurisdictional unit. This was a politicality which the fluidity of 
“community” articulated by the protagonists of the Moleleki execution made explicit. It 
therefore represented not a “pre-modern” traditionalism, but in fact, shared an essential 
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semantic and conceptual ambiguity with the Western juridico-political order that sought its 
adjudication. 
What was evoked therefore by these processes of inscription of the Moleleki execution within 
the context of the TRC was the ambiguity of human action in a context of exception, which 
led to a mutual problem of comprehension, a radical problem of understanding between SDU 
members and the TRC. While the TRC sought a juridical “explanation” from the protagonists 
of the execution, an explicitly articulated political motive, what they elicited from the 
amnesty applicants was an invocation of “community”, a biopolitical “explanation”, which 
evoked the criminal as the boundary of the “political”. However, the TRC, operating in terms 
of a juridical understanding of the political, could not interpret the biopolitics of the Moleleki 
execution as political action. In the classification of the actions of the Moleleki protagonists 
as criminal actions, the TRC sought to re-establish the political as the juridico-political, a 
political freed from the stain of violence. Paradoxically, however, implicit in the 
classification of the actions of the SDU members involved in the execution as criminal was a 
fundamental biopolitical principle that seeks to define the boundaries of the political in terms 
of a distinction between “authentic life and life lacking every political value” (Agamben, 
1998, p. 132). 
 233 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN: FIXING THE LIMITS OF THE LAW, THE MOLELEKI 
EXECUTION AND THE COURT TRIAL 
 
Introduction 
In having established that the Moleleki killings had not been “instructed” by a juridical 
representative of a “known political party”, namely the ANC, the Amnesty Committee 
refused the Moleleki protagonists amnesty for their actions. The criminal proceedings, which 
had been suspended for the duration of the amnesty process, were reinstated, leading to the 
trial of seven members of the SDU in Moleleki, four of whom, Zola Sonti, Michael Armoed, 
Oscar Motlokwa and Michael Nkomo, had testified at the Truth and Reconciliation Hearings. 
Whereas during the amnesty proceedings, most applicants, excluding Michael Sonti, had 
admitted culpability for the killings, even providing detailed descriptions of the killings, in 
the context of the court proceedings, all seven accused denied responsibility for the 
execution. A newspaper report at the conclusion of the court case noted:  
A six-year long wait for justice by four Katlehong women came to an end this week 
when the Johannesburg High Court finally convicted five men of the deaths of their 
sons. The wait was especially painful as the accused had confessed to the crimes 
before the TRC, but denied all when the matter came to trial. (Mbhele, 1999) 
 
According to the court judgement Siviwe Malcoms Ngama (accused 2), Michael Armoed 
(accused 3) and Bethwell Tabiso Ntoma (accused 4), relied on “alibi defences”76, while Zola 
Michael Nceba Sonti (accused 1), Petros Mtembu (accused 5), Langa Michael Nkomo 
(accused 6) and Oscar Noqola Motlokwa (accused 7), “admitted being present at the scene of 
Bulelwa‟s body and adjacent areas, but denie[d] any material involvement or participation in 
                                            
 
76
 Bethwell Ntoma argued that he was in the former “homeland” of the Transkei at the time of the execution. He 
was acquitted due to lack of evidence and on the basis of the credibility of his alibi.  Ngama claimed that on the 
night of 6 December 1993 he worked night-shift at the South African Breweries and therefore that he was not 
present at the time the ANCYL members were rounded up and killed. The court rejected his alibi and found him 
guilty of “associating himself” with the common plan or purpose to round up and kill the nine ANCYL 
members who were executed, as well as with the death of ANCYL leader Isaac Motloung, who was killed 
separately after being abducted by SDU leader “Manyala”.  
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the offences” (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 1773). Zola Sonti and Michael Nkomo 
admitted to having “partaken in the rounding up of the [ANCYL] youths but deny any 
involvement in their killing” (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 1773).  
 
The adjudication of the actions of the Moleleki protagonists in the context of the courtroom, 
as in the processes of the TRC, raised a number of ambiguities which concerned the 
difficulties of attempting to determine the legal consequences and indeed the nature of 
actions, which had taken place in a juridical void, in a context of necessity, at the boundary 
between fact and law, the legal and the political.  
 
The assumption that the arbitration of these actions concerned merely the juridical, therefore, 
caused further complications in terms of the attempt to adjudicate the actions of the Moleleki 
protagonists as “criminal”. While criminal law in general requires the demonstration of a 
direct instrumental relation between the criminal intent of the actor (mens rea) and the actions 
of this actor, the collective nature of the actions which had led to the Moleleki execution 
meant that such an instrumental adjudication simply could not be made. Despite this, in the 
effort to weld life to law, and inscribe this anomie within the juridico-political order, the 
judge in the Moleleki case used the doctrine of common purpose to attempt to establish the 
criminality of the actions of the Moleleki protagonists. While “under South African law 
murder requires the accused to have done something which he foresaw might lead to death 
and which in fact did [which is] a causal requirement” (Parker, 1996, p. 79), the common 
purpose rule significantly expanded the basis of liability for murder in contexts where more 
than one individual was involved. Critically, it did away with the requirement that there had 
to be a causal connection between the acts of each individual and the eventual consequence 
of murder. This was a development, which Parker describes as a reinterpretation of the law, 
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“in order to facilitate convictions in crowd murders” (Parker, 1996, p. 78) in a context of 
rising political tensions.  
 
The Common Purpose Rule 
However, the common purpose rule had in fact been on the South African statute books since 
the late 19
th
 century and was originally imported from English law via the Native Territories‟ 
Penal Code to incorporate crimes in which more than one party was involved
77
. The basic 
principle was that “where two or more people associate in a joint unlawful enterprise, each 
will be responsible for acts of his fellows which fall within their common design or object” 
(Snyman, 1989 cited in Davis, 1990, p. 135). In its earliest interpretations, the common 
purpose rule was narrowly applied in terms of the application of the principle of a specific 
mandate
78
 for unlawful actions, in terms of which criminal liability could be established. In a 
judgement in 1917 where a case had been brought against a Boer rebel officer by a farmer 
because some of the rebel officer‟s troops had allegedly stolen cattle and damaged the fences 
of the farmer, the judge ruled that “a common purpose to rebel did not encompass the actions 
of rebel troops who had acted without orders and whose deeds could not be said to form part 
of the mandate that might be read into a rebellion” (Parker, 1996, p. 82).  
                                            
 
77
 Section 78 of this Code provided that: 
 
if several persons form a common intention to prosecute any unlawful purpose, and to assist each other 
therein, each of them is party to every offence committed by any one of them in the prosecution of such 
common purpose, the commission of which offence was, or ought to have been known to be a probably 
consequence of the prosecution of such purpose (Rabie cited in Davis, 1990, p. 139). 
 
78
 In terms of the principle of common purpose by mandate, “where A agrees with B to commit an offence, she 
will be liable therefore even if it cannot be shown that she acted upon such agreement and therefore causally 
contributed to the commission of the offence, if B having committed the offence, is liable for it”(Unterhalter, 
1988, p. 674). However, in the case of common purpose by mandate, the critical principle that limits liability is 
the principle of agreement i.e., “a person‟s subjective consent to be bound by the acts of another”(Unterhalter, 
1988, p. 674). Unterhalter argues in terms of the notion of the sovereign self, “the law shall only attribute the 
acts of B to A only if A had voluntarily assumed responsibility for B‟s actions...[this]is a necessary entailment 
of the criminal law‟s profound commitment to the separateness of persons. Blame attaches to individuals in 
virtue of their actions because each person is sovereign over his actions and thus responsible for them” 
(Unterhalter, 1988, p. 674).  
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However, the common purpose rule was used intermittently over the next seventy years to 
secure convictions for murder in cases where crowds had been involved. Over this period, the 
basis for criminal liability in terms of the common purpose rule was gradually, if subtly, 
expanded, particularly in response to crowd murders, where “evidence of crowd crimes is 
normally unsatisfactory: witnesses see the result of what has happened but rarely the details 
of who does what” (Parker, 1996, p. 85). A significant decision by the Appellate Division as 
early as the 1940s held that it would no longer be necessary to prove a “previous conspiracy” 
to develop a common purpose or plan to murder; the courts would now recognise that such a 
plan could “spontaneously” crystallise, “it was enough for people to have acted with common 
intent on the spur of the moment”, even if “this co-operation has commenced on an impulse 
without any prior consultation or arrangement” (R v Mkize cited in Parker, 1996, p. 86). The 
expanded liability implied by the adoption of the notion of a “spontaneously” generated 
common purpose meant that subsequently it would make it possible to impute to various 
members of a crowd an association with a “common purpose” to kill, whether or not they had 
with prior knowledge voluntarily and consciously consented to be party to such a killing and 
notwithstanding the fact that they may have been participating in the activities of a crowd for 
a variety of other reasons. This evidentiary change thus “permitted evidence of this 
spontaneous common purpose to be read into the multitude of disconnected actions that 
accompany crowd behaviour” (Parker, 1996, p. 86)  
 
It was during the 1980s, against the backdrop of rising civil unrest in South Africa, that the 
basis of criminal liability in terms of the principle of common purpose would be dramatically 
expanded to completely do away with the causal link which would normally be required to 
prove liability for murder. In 1982 Judges Hoexter and Botha argued that it was a “fallacy” to 
suggest that proof of causation was necessary. Instead, “the criminal act of an accused in a 
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common purpose murder consisted, not in an act which is causally linked with the death of 
the deceased, but solely in an act by which he associates himself with the common purpose to 
kill” (S v. Khosa, 1982 cited in Parker, 1996, p. 94, own emphasis). Thus what Botha did was 
to replace causation with active association, therefore cutting “through the evidential 
problems of crowd violence” (Parker, 1996, p. 95). However, as Parker points out, because an 
accused performs an act of association,  
it does not...follow that he thereby associated himself with the crime, because the law 
insists that the criminal act and the fault or mental element are distinct. Both must be 
proved…whereas an act of association must be proved on an objective basis…to 
prove the mental element it must be shown that the individual accused actually did or 
must have subjectively known what was happening and thereby associated himself 
with the crime. (Parker, 1996, p. 95)  
 
The application of these principles in the context of the case that came to be known as that of 
the “Sharpeville Six” (S v Safatsa 1988 (1) SA 868 (A)), led to a guilty verdict and the 
imposition of the death sentence on six members of a crowd who had participated in a march 
to the home of the deputy mayor of the town council of Lekoa during protests against rent 
increases in the Vaal Triangle
79
. This case caused enormous local and international 
controversy, particularly in terms of the application of a sentence of capital punishment for a 
guilty verdict obtained on highly contestable grounds. However, it was a derivation of the 
principles of this judgement, which abandoned the requirement of causation, that the court in 
the Moleleki case invoked nearly a decade later in securing the conviction of the Moleleki 
accused.  
                                            
 
79
 The formerly “white” towns of Vereeniging, Vanderbijlpark and Sasolburg in the Vaal Triangle were 
bordered by six black townships, which from 1984 fell under the auspices of the Lekoa municipal authority. The 
Lekoa council was established in accordance with the provisions of the Black Local Authorities Act of 1982. 
The municipal area of Lekoa was divided into 39 wards and the council was elected in a 14,7% poll in 1983. 
Economic rentals (i.e. rentals which were expected to fund the township‟s administration and services) were 
introduced in the Vaal Triangle area in 1984 by the Lekoa Council, much against the wishes of residents. The 
new local authority raised tariffs for rents and services in September 1984, which prompted violent protests. 
(Sharpeville. Retrieved from South African Townships: 
http://www.saweb.co.za/townships/township/gauteng/sharpvil.html) 
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The judgement in the case of the Sharpeville Six, drawing on the earlier judgement of 
Hoexter and Botha, which rejected the necessity to prove a causal link between the act and 
the actor in common purpose murder cases, went further by appearing to ignore the principle 
whereby it was necessary to provide evidence of the mens rea or intent of each of the accused 
to “associate” with a common purpose to kill, in favour of a reference to the “intent” of the 
“mob” of which the accused formed part and from whom their intent could purportedly be 
derived.  
 
Although the six individuals prosecuted for involvement in a common purpose to kill the 
deputy mayor could all be proved to have committed a variety of acts of violence during the 
course of the march, Judge Botha acknowledged that there was “no proven causal link 
between the actions of the accused and the death of the deceased” (Unterhalter, 1988, p. 671). 
Nevertheless Judge Botha argued that proof of an active association with the common 
purpose of the “mob” was enough to convict the accused: 
The individual acts of each of the six accused convicted of murder manifested an 
active association with the acts of the mob which caused the death of the deceased. 
These accused shared a common purpose with the crowd to kill the deceased and each 
of them had the requisite dolus
80
 in respect of his death. Consequently the acts of the 
mob which caused the deceased‟s death must be imputed to each of these accused. 
(Botha cited in Unterhalter, 1988, p. 672)  
 
Critically, in his ruling, Judge Botha did away with the obligation to prove mens rea or a 
subjective intent on the part of each of the accused to have killed the deputy mayor. This was 
simply “imputed” from the common purpose of the “mob”. Thus David Unterhalter argued 
that the judgment could not be legally upheld as a result of its attribution of blame to a “mob” 
or group mind:  
                                            
 
80
 Criminal intent 
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Blameworthiness is a concept attaching to individuals, not abstractions. We judge 
individual actions. These actions have their origin in the beliefs of and intentions of 
individuals and cannot be the product of a collective mind or entity. So too we 
understand responsibility as the respect owed to the sovereignty of the individual’s 
will and not as undifferentiated collective guilt.” (Unterhalter, 1988, p. 677, own 
emphasis) 
 
If blame attaches to a “mob”, then, 
with whom can a person enter into a common purpose? In Safatsa
81
 reference is made 
to the “accused sharing a common purpose to kill the deceased with the mob as a 
whole”…such description presupposes an identity of interest between each member of 
the „mob‟ and the „mob‟ itself. But what is this collective persona, „the mob‟? From 
the point of view of the criminal law, the mob is an irrelevant abstraction… 
(Unterhalter, 1988, p. 676)  
 
While in the Moleleki case blame was not attributed to a “mob”, nevertheless in the light of 
the fact that there was so little direct causal evidence, all the five accused who were found 
guilty, were not found guilty of directly causing the deaths of the youths who were executed, 
but of making common cause with those who did.  
 
The identity of the perpetrators of the Moleleki execution was never revealed by the court 
proceedings although the testimony of the Moleleki protagonists at the TRC had made 
explicit their direct involvement in the execution. Nevertheless in the effort to yoke this 
violence to law, the court was compelled to stretch and make malleable this law, which 
continually sought, if no longer a direct causal relation then at least a relation of some 
instrumentality between the actions of the accused and the final result, namely the killing of 
the ANCYL members. However, the evidence to hand, in a context of exception and ongoing 
violence, did not lend itself easily to the forms and conventional precepts of law.  
Ten months later, while the Sharpeville case was still on appeal, another case of appeal for a 
conviction of murder on the basis of common purpose, S v Mgedzi, came before the courts 
                                            
 
81
 Safatsa refers to the case of the “Sharpeville Six” referred to above (S v Safatsa 1988). 
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and in giving judgement, Justice Botha, drawing on principles already identified by a 
Professor Whiting, sought to restrict the ambit of liability in common purpose murders by 
elucidating “certain additional requirements” which had to be proved by the prosecution,  
in order for a participant in a common purpose leading to the death of another to be 
guilty of murder of that person: (a) presence at the scene of the violence; namely for 
every crime there is an actus reus, or the physical act that constitutes the crime, and 
the mens rea, or the mental element of varying standards that is held by the 
perpetrator. (b) awareness of the assault. (c) intention to make common cause with 
those who were actually perpetrating the assault. (d) manifestation of a sharing of a 
common purpose with the perpetrators of the assault by performing “some act of 
association with the conduct of others” and the possession of the requisite mens rea. 
(Burchell, 1997, p. 132)  
 
While, as Unterhalter argues, this account was useful in explicating what South African 
courts had understood as “active association”, “these requirements do not provide a 
compelling normative basis for attributing the acts of one person to another” (Unterhalter, 
1988, p. 675). 
Applying the Common Purpose Rule to the Moleleki Execution 
Nevertheless, it was this judgment which was to guide Justice Boruchowitz in his application 
of the common purpose doctrine to the actions of the Moleleki accused. In contrast to the 
findings of the TRC that the Moleleki protagonists had acted in spontaneous revenge to the 
killing of civic activist Bulelwa and SDU leader Blanko and had no foresight in terms of their 
actions, i.e. a prior political intention in terms of which they carried out their actions, the 
judgment of the court, in seeking to adduce a criminal intent, found the opposite, namely that 
SDU members had acted together with significant prior planning and criminal intent. The 
court found therefore that “the rounding up and killing of the youths was executed in 
furtherance of a plan or common purpose by SDU members” (The State v. Michael Sonti, 
1999, p. 1768). Critically, the “reason the state relies heavily on the doctrine of common 
purpose as enunciated in S v Mgedzi and others (1989 SA 687A at 705F-706B)” was that 
while “there is some evidence that certain of the accused contributed causally to the deaths of 
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the deceased… that evidence is insufficient to render all of the accused criminally 
responsible” (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 1772). 
 
The reason for the lack of causal evidence was the fact that only two ANCYL members, 
Vuyani Tshabalala and Albert Mangane, survived the execution and were able to directly 
testify as to who was involved in the killings. However, the court found that,  
little weight can be attached to Mangane‟s evidence. It was apparent to the court that 
Mangane suffers from a mental disability. He spoke in a slow stilted fashion and was 
unable to recall dates, places and times. No psychiatric evidence was led to indicate 
whether his disability arises from the fact that he was attacked in the incident. (The 
State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 1862)  
 
When Albert was asked questions in relation to his account of the execution, he appeared to 
be unable to answer any of the questions regarding who had captured him, or whom he had 
been captured with: “MR FERREIRA: …did you recognize any of those persons that had 
been arrested [i.e. ANCYL members]…? (SILENCE)” (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 
471), and of the people who captured him: “Are any of those persons here sir? (SILENCE)” 
(The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 471). This led the court to comment, “I would like it 
noted for the record, that the witness is silent…we have had long silences concerning these 
questions that you have put” (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 469), and later: “I would 
again record that there was, when you asked your question, do you know these people, there 
was a silence” (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 469). The Court also made note of 
Albert‟s physical demeanor during his testimony, as Albert complained of a headache:  
COURT: Is he in pain your client, Mr Sawyer?...Is he in a position to proceed…Well 
if he has a headache or can‟t concentrate we can perhaps assist him with, does he 
want to stand down a few moments? Because I see he has got his head back? (The 
State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 473) 
 
Albert himself explained, “This injury or injuries affected my head or brain…my mind or 
brain is not functioning well, I have also been chased away from school because my mind is 
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not functioning well” (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 475). While he could not 
remember “these other things”82 such as the names of people, “the things which happened to 
me do not go away from my thoughts” 83 (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 477). 
 
In the absence of a coherent account from Albert,  
what the court has is the single evidence of Tshabalala as to who was present in the 
veld at the time of the shooting. At the time of the shooting matters were chaotic and 
Tshabalala must have been subject to extreme stress. It stands to reason that he would 
not have had the best opportunity to make a proper observation. (The State v. Michael 
Sonti, 1999, p. 1807) 
 
 
Merely recalling the execution caused Vuyani to break down in court:  
 
VUYANI TSHABALA: They fired my lord and I also heard the sound of big firearms 
and there was a big noise. My lord may we stop at this moment my lord? 
COURT: Yes, I noticed that the witness is extremely upset.  
COURT: Yes, we will adjourn at this point so that the witness can compose 
himself…(The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 220) 
 
The court consequently found, in relation to Tshabalala‟s evidence,  
 
Tshabalala‟s evidence is not entirely without blemish. In evaluating his evidence the 
court is mindful of the fact that Tshabalala was deeply traumatised by the incident, he 
was seriously injured and was lucky to escape with his life. (The State v. Michael 
Sonti, 1999, p. 1809) 
 
Most importantly, Tshabalala‟s evidence with regard to who was involved in taking the group 
from the shack where the ANCYL members were incarcerated to the veld where they were 
executed differed from that of another ANCYL member, who was released just before the 
execution and hid in a toilet where he watched the execution take place. Vuyani also made 
other apparent errors in identifying exactly who was involved in which events during the 
lead-up to the execution and mistakenly identified Michael Sonti as carrying a gun, while all 
other witnesses stated that he had carried a large spear.   
                                            
 
82
 Hierdie ander dinge kan hy nie onthou nie. 
83
Die dinge wat aan my gebeur het gaan nie weg van my gedagte af. 
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In the light of this lack of direct causal evidence, the judge relied on the testimony of a 
number of witnesses whose evidence it used to establish, in terms of the principles outlined 
by the S v Mgedzi judgment, the presence of the accused at various sites of violence prior to 
the execution, actions which “manifested” an active association with a common purpose to 
kill the youths, awareness that the youths would actually be killed and an intention to make 
common cause with those who intended to kill the youths.  
 
In order to establish these different elements, the court used the evidence of various witnesses 
to establish the presence of the accused at various sites during the process of the abduction of 
the youths. Accused 1, Michael Sonti, was implicated by seven witnesses in several of the 
events preceding the execution, including the stabbing of two people, Alfred Zulu and 
ANCYL member Jabulani Nxumalo. He was also implicated in the rounding-up of various 
youths, their “presentation” at the body of Bulelwa, their incarceration at the first shack 
where the youths were held and their eventual removal to a second shack from where they 
were taken into the veld to be killed. However, the court could not establish Sonti‟s actual 
presence at the site of the execution. What it did find is that the “accused was instrumental in 
the preparations for the removal of the youths from the first to the second shack” (The State 
v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 1813, own emphasis). However, it was not possible to implicate 
Sonti directly in the actual removal of the youths from the second shack to the veld. Despite 
this, the court found that “accused 1 was seen in the company of the youths shortly prior to 
their being killed. This suggests that he was present at the killing or handed the youth over to 
their killers” (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 1816). On this basis and on the basis of his 
identification by witnesses at various sites of violence prior to the execution, the court was 
able to conclude that “accused 1 actively and knowingly participated in the plan to kidnap 
and kill the ANC Youth League members who had been rounded up” (The State v. Michael 
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Sonti, 1999, p. 1815, own emphasis). Mens rea was deduced from the following: “accused 1 
at no stage sought to distance himself from what was happening. He clearly had no concern 
for the physical welfare of the youths” (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 1816). In relation 
to accused 2, Malcoms Ngama, the court found him guilty of an active association with a 
common purpose to kill the ANCYL members on the basis of two conversations attested to 
by witnesses, one outside the first shack where the youths were held, where he was overheard 
discussing the need to move the youths to conceal their presence from the Internal Stability 
Unit and a second interaction with Jabulani Nxumalo outside the second shack where he told 
Jabulani that “they had been looking for him for a long time and they were going to follow, 
they referring to the youths who had been apprehended, were going to follow the other people 
that had already died” (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p.1828). According to the court, 
evidence that accused 2 had been carrying a particular kind of weapon called a tshomentshos 
had, “a ring of truth about it” (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 1835) and provided further 
evidence, for the court, of an association with a common purpose to kill the youths. With 
regard to accused 3, Michael Armoed, the court found that  
although the evidence implicating accused 3 in the killing of the deceased is 
inconclusive the court is satisfied that he actively participated in the plan to round up 
and kill the youths, he knowingly facilitated the killing of the youths and acted as an 
accomplice in respect of their murders. (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 1855)  
 
In relation to accused 6, Michael Nkomo, the court found him guilty of an association with a 
common purpose to kill the ANCYL members on the basis of evidence that the weapon he 
carried could have been used in the killing.  
Although the court can make no finding that accused 6 participated directly in the 
killing of the youths it is clear from the type of injuries sustained by the various 
deceased that the type of axe or weapon carried by accused 6 could well have been 
used. (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 1873) 
 
With regards to accused 7, the court made a similarly ambiguous finding:  
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Although the state has not proved that accused 7 personally participated in the killing 
of the youths…the court is satisfied that he knowingly assisted in the rounding up of 
the youths and facilitating their killing. At minimum he permitted the youths to be 
handed over to persons who he knew and foresaw would kill the youths. (The State v. 
Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 1899) 
 
 
Despite the evidence of the ways in which the various accused had allegedly “manifested” an 
active association with a common purpose to kill the youths, the court “could make no 
finding as to precisely when the plan or common purpose was originated or formed” (The 
State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 1772), nor was there any “direct evidence of an agreement 
between the accused to kidnap and kill the youths” (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 
1773). Thus this common purpose was deduced from the actions of the accused during the 
course of events on the night of the killings, rather than direct evidence that such a plan had 
actually been at any point consciously formulated.  
 
In fact there had been “agreement” between the accused in terms of a direct mandate to firstly 
abduct the ANCYL members and then later a separate mandate to kill the youths, which was 
revealed by the SDU members‟ testimony at the TRC. This notion of a direct mandate was 
the basis on which the earliest interpretations of the common purpose rule relied. According 
to evidence led at the TRC, the first direct mandate to abduct the youths responsible for the 
killing of SDU leader Blanko, came from SDU leader Sugar Ramabele directly after Blanko‟s 
killing. Ramabele, according to testimony at both the TRC and the court proceedings, 
instructed SDU members that those who were involved in this killing should be “fetched” 
(The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 1819). This order to “fetch” the youths was separate 
from a later mandate to kill the youths in terms of an “order” given by SDU commander 
Njebe Ndondolo in the context of a large meeting of township residents at Blanko‟s home in 
the early hours of the morning. While the judge was not in possession of information about 
the second order from Ndondolo, as the accused concealed this information in an attempt to 
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protect themselves from conviction, he rejected the assertion by some of the accused that they 
had “rounded up” the youths who were later executed in response to an instruction from 
Sugar Ramabele, in favour of his hypothesis that a prior plan existed to kill the youths. 
 
As in the TRC process, the nature of the authority for the abductions (none of the accused 
admitted involvement in the killing of the youths) was at issue. Dismissing the assertion by 
certain of the accused that the abduction of the youths was a spontaneous response to the 
death of Blanko, Justice Boruchowitz instead found that the “death of Blanko, in the court‟s 
view, appears to have been a pretext for the rounding up of the youths, and to put the plan [to 
abduct and kill the youths] into operation” (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 1822). He 
also rejected the assertion by certain of the accused that the “rounding up” of the ANCYL 
members had occurred as a result of an order given by SDU commander Sugar Ramabele 
shortly after Blanko‟s death.  
These accused suggest that the decision to round up the youths was a spontaneous one 
which arose after, and as a consequence of Blanko‟s death. The facts and probabilities 
indicate otherwise and that the plan or common purpose in fact originated, or was in 
existence prior to the attack on Blanko. (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 1772, 
own emphasis) 
 
The “facts and probabilities” which “indicated otherwise” primarily concerned the fact that 
SDU members could, according to the court, not have known who to “round up” if they truly 
sought to find the perpetrators of Blanko‟s murder, as they already knew from SDU member 
Oscar Motlokwa that ANCYL and civic leader Lethusang Rikaba and ANCYL leader Isaac 
Motloung were directly involved in Blanko‟s killing. Of the large crowd who had been 
present at the time in addition to the two identified perpetrators, which individuals could be 
legitimately identified and held accountable for his killing? 
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Advocate Ferreira, in cross-examining Michael Sonti, sought to clarify the process through 
which those who had been captured had been identified as the perpetrators of the killing, but 
encountered an irresolvable ambiguity in seeking to find an instrumental relation between 
those who were captured and the killing of Blanko. Michael Sonti instead evoked an 
amorphous “community” as referent in both identifying who the perpetrators of Blanko‟s 
killing were as well as the source of authority for the order to capture the youths who were 
eventually executed.  
MR FERREIRA: But sir what I don‟t understand is, apart from Lethusang Rikaba and 
Wips, how did the SDUs including yourself, know who to catch?  
MICHAEL SONTI: Nobody knew who the people were to be arrested.  
MR FERREIRA: So how could Sugar‟s instructions be complied with? 
MICHAEL SONTI: Oscar had already explained at that stage that there were two 
people but besides the two people, there were many other people who had attacked 
Blanko.  
MR FERRERIA: Am I correct in stating that Oscar stated that it was members of the 
ANC Youth League? 
MICHAEL SONTI: I would agree and also not agree that it is so. 
MR FERRIERA: What do you mean by that sir? 
MICHAEL SONTI: The reason that makes me to say that, it is because he had 
explained that there were also adults or elderly people.  
MR FERREIRA: So am I correct in saying that Oscar stated that it was members of 
the ANC Youth League as well as older people? 
MICHAEL SONTI: I stated that it was said even elderly people were there but it was 
not exactly the word that was used. The word that was used was, the community… 
(The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 1356, own emphasis) 
 
And later,  
MR FERREIRA: Sir what I don‟t understand is, you must help me is, you have all 
these different groups going in different directions…And the only information that 
you have at your disposal is that there was, two of the perpetrators were Rikaba and 
Wips, is that correct? 
MICHAEL SONTI: Yes it is so. 
MR FERREIRA: So would I be correct in stating that then you would have had to 
apprehend the ANC Youth League members because you only had two names? 
MICHAEL SONTI: I do not know my lord where we would have apprehended those 
members of the ANC Youth League because they were being sought after.  
MR FERREIRA: So I am going to review your answer and you must please try and 
explain your answer to me because it makes absolutely no sense.  
MICHAEL SONTI: I do not know where we would have apprehended those members 
of the Youth League because they were sought after. 
MR FERREIRA: That is your answer sir. I don‟t understand it.  
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MICHAEL SONTI: Let me explain it this way my lord. I did explain my lord that the 
message came from Sugar Ramabela, he said we should look for the perpetrators of 
this incident or crime, even though two names of people were given. What I am 
explaining is that it was not only two people who had attacked Blanko… 
MR FERREIRA: Yes, yes, before we continue there, let us clear this up first. Because 
you knew that, because it was known that Wips was a member of the ANC Youth 
League, and Rikaba as well, it was then decided to apprehend the ANC Youth League 
members? 
MICHAEL SONTI: Could you please repeat the question, I have not quite understood 
it? (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, pp. 1358-1359, own emphasis) 
 
 
The state advocate encountered similar ambiguities when he questioned Petros Mtembu about 
who was to be captured on the basis of Sugar‟s order at Blanko‟s home:  
 
PETROS MTEMBU: It was at that stage when Ramabela said the culprits should be 
sought after and found.  
MR FERREIRA: What did you understand by this? 
PETROS MTEMBU: That they should be sought after and found? 
MR FERREIRA: When you say “they” who are you referring to? 
PETROS MTEMBU: The people who committed the offence. 
MR FERREIRA: In other words members of the ANC Youth League? 
PETROS MTEMBU: Even though you say it that way it was not only members of the 
ANC. 
MR FERREIRA: Who else was it then? 
PETROS MTEMBU: It was not only the youth, there were adults as well… 
MR FERREIRA: Sir I want an answer as to how you knew as which people to go and 
catch. 
PETROS MTEMBU: The ones I knew were the ones whose names were mentioned 
[by Oscar Motlokwa] (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, pp. 1534-1535) 
 
As the advocate in the court proceedings attempted to interpret the mandate for the “rounding 
up” process in juridical terms as directed against members of the ANCYL, Michael Sonti 
instead evoked the biopolitical fracture, that is substantiated against homo sacer, a subject 
who is constituted in praxis rather than in terms of a pre-existing juridical identity.  
MICHAEL SONTI: Here is another thing my lord that I would like to put straight, I 
would say my lord we were not looking for people but we were looking for criminals, 
thugs or those who had committed crime.  
MR FERREIRA: So you don‟t consider those persons that committed the crime, the 
thugs, as people? 
MICHAEL SONTI: They are people my lord but the whole thing is that what they 
have done. (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 1362, own emphasis) 
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As ambiguous as who should be captured was whom the instruction to go and capture was 
directed at, a direct juridical mandate to SDU members or, as Michael Sonti attempted to 
explain, a generalised mandate to members of the “community” to exercise their authority in 
terms of a floating imperium in a context of exception:  
MR FERREIRA: But Sugar was the commander of the self-defence unit, is that 
correct? 
MICHAEL SONTI: He was a deputy. 
MR FERREIRA: But you would agree with me that he was in a position of 
leadership? 
MICHAEL SONTI: Yes it is so. 
MR FERREIRA: And he was one of the leaders of the self-defence units? 
MICHAEL SONTI: Yes it is so.  
MR FERREIRA: So is it not correct that the instructions that he was giving, was to 
the self-defence units? 
MICHAEL SONTI: I would explain it this way that even though Sugar Ramabela was 
someone with whom we used to go about with, but at that stage he was explaining to 
each and everybody who was present at time, at the scene of the incident.  
MR FERREIRA: Let me ask you this first, what is the function of the self-defence 
units? 
MICHAEL SONTI: At that time the duty of the self-defence unit was to protect the 
community that was not protected.  
MR FERREIRA: Will I be correct in stating that they were policemen, in inverted 
commas, of the community? 
MICHAEL SONTI: Yes I do agree with you.  
MR FERREIRA: So is it correct then if I state that the instructions were principally or 
mainly aimed at members of the self-defence unit? 
MICHAEL SONTI: Let me explain it this way before I answer the question my lord. 
The members of the self-defence unit were not people who were chosen. Let me put it 
this way, the whole community in that place or area, was protecting themselves. In 
other words my lord in short, I am explaining it this way that any person who was a 
man, was a member of the self-defence unit. (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 
1356-1357, own emphasis) 
 
SDU member Langa Michael Nkomo similarly argued:  
 
LANGA NKOMO: Then Sugar Ramabela took out an order that people should go 
out, to go and look for Lethusang Rikaba and Wips and the group who was with them 
when they attacked Blanko. 
MR FERREIRA: Surely this order was given to the SDUs by Sugar Ramabela who 
was the deputy of the SDUs? 
LANGA NKOMO: It could be so but he was giving that order to each and every 
person who was there, even to the community itself. (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, 
p. 1632, own emphasis) 
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The court faced similar difficulties in attempting to distinguish between SDU members and 
the “community” in relation to the testimony of Bethwell Ntoma. Speaking of the gathering 
at Bulelwa‟s body, Bethwell‟s evocation of the duty of defence as an obligation of all male 
members of the “community” rather than a formal mandate as a member of a juridically 
recognisable organisational formation, provoked incomprehension on the part of the advocate 
questioning him:  
 
MR FERREIRA: So now Tsepo and Njebe have left and you stayed there behind with 
the community and other SDU members, is that correct? 
BETHWELL NTOMA: What I explained was, I was there with the community. 
MR FERREIRA: So you are saying that there were no SDUs there? 
BETHWELL NTOMO: The SDU member who was present, that I know was myself. 
MR FERREIRA: Now let us get this straight sir, you say that there were, that you 
were there with the community? 
BETHWELL NTOMO: Yes. 
MR FERREIRA: So apart from yourself, there were no other SDUs? 
BETHWELL NTOMO: Maybe they were there, let me say they were there.  
MR FERREIRA: Sir were they there or were they not there, what is it? You have got 
to choose.  
BETHWELL NTOMO: Let me please you, I will say they were there. 
MR FERREIRA: How do you know they were there sir? 
BETHWELL NTOMO: In short I am going to say any male person who was a 
resident of Moluleke (sic), was automatically an SDU member.  
MR FERREIRA: Sir if what you are saying is correct, then why is there the need to 
distinguish between SDU members and members of the community? 
BETHWELL NTOMO: There is nowhere where I distinguished. (The State v. 
Michael Sonti, 1999, pp. 1522-1523) 
 
 
While the court itself in the application of the common purpose doctrine had abandoned the 
principles of direct causality and instrumentality, it insisted on these in terms of the conduct 
of SDU members. Thus the assertion by some of the accused that there had been a general 
instruction by Sugar Ramabele that the persons responsible for Blanko‟s death should be 
“rounded up” was rejected as “improbable” on the basis that two individuals who were 
responsible for Blanko‟s death had already been identified by Oscar Motlokwa. How then, 
the court asked, could the accused know who to apprehend, unless this “rounding up” process 
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was in fact the result of a prior plan to target ANCYL members specifically? As the court 
stated in relation to the evidence of accused 1, Michael Sonti:  
When pressed to explain how it was possible to properly carry out Ramabela‟s 
instruction [to find out who the perpetrators of the killing were] accused 1 conceded 
that it would not have been possible to have rounded up unidentified persons and that 
in fact Sugar Ramabela had stated that the ANCYL members had to be rounded up. 
(The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 1798) 
   
The claim by several of the accused that the youths had been “rounded up” in order to 
“present” them to the “community” for a decision as to their fate was met with the same 
incomprehension and dismissal as at the amnesty hearings of the TRC, as neither institution 
could recognise the biopolitical nature of the authority invoked by this reference to “the 
community”.  
 
Michael Sonti thus attempted to articulate the authority for his “fetching” of ANCYL leader 
Lethusang Rikaba for presentation to the “community” gathered at the site of Bulelwa‟s 
body, in terms of a community embodied by Sugar Ramabela. The court, however, could not 
interpret the nature of this auctoritas or biopolitical authority: 
MICHAEL SONTI: I had already explained the reasons why he [Lethusang Rikaba], 
why I wanted him or what the reasons were that he was wanted by the community. 
MR FERREIRA: …How can you say he was wanted by the community? You have 
now said it twice, how can you say that? 
MICHAEL SONTI: I have already explained my lord that everything that happened at 
the place where we were staying, we were protecting the community.  
MR FERREIRA: But surely the instruction came from Sugar Ramabela, not the 
community? 
MICHAEL SONTI: Yes my lord it is so, but Sugar Ramabela is still part of the 
community. (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, pp. 1364-1365) 
 
Nor could it interpret the biopolitical “presentation” of people to the “community”, which 
concerned an embodiment in the presence of this community, rather than a juridical presence 
that would have involved logos or language:  
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MICHAEL SONTI: …I showed him [Lethusang Rikaba], or referred him to Sugar 
Ramabela. After we had taken Mr Rikaba with we met certain other members of the 
self-defence unit at a corner of block E and D my lord. Those members were going 
with another boy. (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 1369) 
 
MR FERREIRA: Sir you say that the SDU were part of the community, you made a 
definite distinction between the boy and the group of SDU. Now my question is on 
what basis did you make that distinction? 
MICHAEL SONTI: I made that distinction between the SDU members and this boy 
because this boy and Lethusang Rikaba were shown to the community. The self-
defence unit are the people who showed them up to the community.  
MR FERREIRA: Sir can you just repeat that please.  
MICHAEL SONTI: I say my lord, I say as this man were walking with this boy and 
me walking with Rikaba we arrived simultaneously at the body of Bulelwa where 
there were people who were standing guard over the body of Bulelwa. Sugar 
Ramabela was also present there. I was there when they were shown to the 
community and Sugar Ramabela…  
MR FERREIRA: Sir now this just doesn‟t make sense if one looks at your 
evidence…You said you showed, your words were along the line that you 
showed…Rikaba and this boy were shown to the community, what do you mean by 
that? (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, pp. 1370-1371, own emphasis) 
 
Another ambiguity arose in relation to the nature of the instruction that Sugar Ramabela 
issued to the “community” gathered at the site of Blanko‟s killing, namely, whether it 
constituted a mandate to kill those who were to be captured. Michael Sonti again evoked the 
authority of the community in terms of any further decision regarding what was to be done 
with those who were captured and was again met with disbelief:  
MR FERREIRA: Did Sugar Ramabela say what was to happen with the perpetrators 
of those heinous crime, to Bulelwa and Blanko? 
MICHAEL SONTI: That was left in the hands of the self-defence unit leaders as well 
as the leaders of the community… (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 1415) 
 
MR FERRERIA: Sir, what were you supposed to do, once you had apprehended these 
persons or these killers, what were you supposed to do with them? 
MICHAEL SONTI: I have already explained that they were brought to the 
community at the body of Bulelwa.  
MR FERREIRA: Why did you take them to the body of Bulelwa? 
MICHAEL SONTI: …I just want to put it straight my lord, the reason was also that 
the leaders of the community as well as the leaders of the self-defence unit, should get 
an opportunity to ask what was happening… (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 
1416) 
 
 253 
 
The fact that the abducted youth were never handed over to the police or any community 
structure that the court recognised, and were instead deliberately concealed from the police 
when they came to remove the body of Bulelwa, provided further evidence for the court that 
this reference to “community” was a spurious attempt by the accused to avoid taking 
responsibility for a prior decision to kill the youths.  
 
Michael Sonti gave a familiar explanation regarding lack of trust in the police as the reason 
the youth were not handed over to them,  
MR LUVUNU: Why were the boys not given to the Internal Stability Unit? 
MICHAEL SONTI: My lord I would say according to my knowledge at that stage in 
the whole of Kalerus (sic) the whole of the stability unit was not trusted (The State v. 
Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 1434).  
 
The court found that,  
while some of the accused contend that the youths were unlawfully apprehended 
because they were responsible for the deaths of Blanko and Bulelwa, none of the 
youths were handed over to the police to community structures to enable the law to 
take its course. The fact that the youths were not handed over to the authorities, and 
that their deaths ensued shortly after their apprehension gives rise to the inference that 
the intention of those who had apprehended them was to kill them. (The State v. 
Michael Sonti, 1999, pp. 1771-1772, own emphasis) 
 
However, in the absence of any direct evidence of an agreement between the accused to kill 
the youths, the court inferred this plan or common purpose from an eclectic mix of factors, 
which spoke to the difficulties of deducing such a plan from an array of actions and activities 
committed during the chaotic context of events which unfolded during the night following 
Bulelwa‟s murder. Parker warns of the “danger” in such circumstances of “muddying” the 
distinction between the “hindsight enjoyed by the judge and the foresight available to the 
accused” (Parker, 1996, p. 86), which provides the requisite mens rea. Thus “those in a large 
group rarely know what others are doing or want to happen. In retrospect it is easy for a court 
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so minded to declare that everyone knew that what did happen was going to happen” (Parker, 
1996, p. 86).  
 
In the Moleleki case, the judge “inferred” the existence of a common purpose to kill from 
several factors. One was that all those killed were ANCYL members. Another was that “most 
of the youths were treated in the same way is indicative of a plan or common purpose” (The 
State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 1770). The judge also argued that in the light of evidence 
from both sets of protagonists in the conflict in Moleleki that each had been informed of the 
possibility of an imminent attack on them by the other party, immediately prior to abduction 
and killing of ANCYL members, that the SDU “would not have acted supinely but would 
have embarked on some action against ANCYL members to thwart an attack” (The State v. 
Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 1822). In fact it was ANCYL members who first launched an attack 
on the SDU by killing SDU leader Blanko in response to the death of civic activist Bulelwa. 
Civic and ANCYL leader Lethusang Rikaba acknowledged his personal involvement in this 
killing to the TRC but later invoked his privilege not to disclose the details of his 
involvement in the events surrounding Blanko‟s death in court, where he appeared as a state 
witness.  
As the court explained,  
According to the witness, Lethusang Rikaba, a meeting of the members of the 
community was held after the death of Bulelwa when a decision was taken to, as he 
termed it, “hunt down” the members of the SDU which operated in Block E. Between 
the hours of 02:00 to 03:00 on 7 December 1993 an attack was launched on Malusi 
Jackson Keyana, known as Blanko. Blanko was a leader of the SDUs. He was shot at 
his house in Block E and his house burnt and razed to the ground. The attack on 
Blanko was followed by the abduction of ANC Youth League members [by SDU 
members]. (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, pp. 1766-1767) 
 
Subsequently,  
During cross-examination, Rikaba was asked questions concerning the killing of 
Blanko but declined to answer same on the ground that his answers were privileged 
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and might incriminate him. After argument I upheld the privilege (The State v. 
Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 1779) 
 
In Western jurisprudence it would usually be required that the basis of liability of the accused 
would be decided individually and hence such evidence of planned attacks on the ANCYL 
and the SDU as corporate entities would not be relevant. However the common purpose rule 
and the way in which it had been developed in the South African context, allowed the judge 
to pursue a corporate basis of responsibility and ironically in doing this he implicitly 
recognised the biopolitical nature of the power which emerges in a context of exception.  
 
The other factors from which the court deduced the existence of a “common purpose” 
primarily involved the “means” through which the crimes were allegedly committed, namely 
evidence of a “list” allegedly identifying who was to be eliminated, the fact that the 
“rounding up process was completed speedily and efficiently” and “all of the abductees were 
taken to a predetermined place” and the possession of “heavy duty” rope that was later found 
at the site of the execution and “could not have been obtained in the early hours of 7 
December 1993” (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, pp. 1769-1770). In addition there was 
evidence that “those who participated in the rounding up process carried an array of 
weapons” and “the undisputed medical evidence” showed that the wounds sustained by the 
deceased were “consistent with the use of such weapons” (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, 
p. 1770). 
 
However, evidence of these various means, whether a rope, a list, or the possession of a 
weapon, is not adequate in and of itself to prove the existence of a common purpose to use 
these various means to commit a killing, nor does it provide evidence that every person in 
possession of a rope, a list or even a weapon, was party to or aware of a common purpose to 
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kill the abducted youths. Thus, SDU members, who were usually armed, and would have 
been even more likely to be armed in the light of the events which unfolded after Bulelwa‟s 
death, could not automatically be deduced to be carrying these weapons with a specific intent 
to kill the youths. In fact the evidence led at the TRC, that SDU members carried out the 
killings in response to a second order from SDU commander Ndondolo, indicates that their 
original intent, based on Sugar Ramabele‟s initial orders, was indeed to “round up” and 
capture the youths they believed might be involved in Blanko‟s death.  
 
However, it is highly likely that this initial “intent” changed during the course of the night in 
response to the escalating conflict, finally culminating in the large emotionally charged 
gathering in Blanko‟s yard during the early hours of the meeting, which was the context in 
which the “order” for the killing of the captured youth was given by Ndondolo. In the court‟s 
endeavour to deduce a single, uninterrupted, common intent among several people over 
period of more than 24 hours, what was exposed was the paradox of attempting to impose a 
critical precept of Western jurisprudence, namely mens rea as a reified construct, a 
manifestation of subjectivity fixed prior to action and unchanged over time, in order to create 
the “myth” of sustained intentionalities that are so important to maintain law‟s relation to life, 
through the construction of a fictive relation between a prior origin of power (intention) and 
its violent effects.  
 
The weakness of the hold of law on life was evidenced by the judge‟s reliance as evidence of 
intention on a series of threatening remarks made by some SDU members to some ANCYL 
members, which ostensibly demonstrated that all SDU members foresaw that the youth 
would die and therefore possessed the requisite mens rea in terms of a common purpose to 
kill the youths. These included statements by different SDU members that the youths should 
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“smoke their last cigarette”, that “their mothers should buy coffins” and that they were 
“going to follow the other people that died” (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 1771). 
Other factors which the court proposed as indicating that there was a plan or common 
purpose to kill the youths were a variety of incidents of violence that occurred during the 
“rounding up” process, such as the stabbing and shooting of Alfred Zulu, who had attempted 
to escape after being abducted, the drowning of ANCYL leader Isaac Motloung and the 
stabbing of ANCYL member Jabulani Nxumalo.  
 
However, the killing of Alfred Zulu, while certainly providing evidence of a direct intent to 
kill on the part of SDU member Oscar Motlokwa, who shot dead Alfred at point blank range, 
did not provide evidence that Oscar intended to kill the other youths who were abducted in 
the same way, or that there was a common purpose among other members of the SDU who 
had abducted youths after Blanko‟s death, to kill them in a similar fashion.  
 
No evidence was led with regard to a similar intent to kill ANCYL leader Isaac Motloung. 
Isaac, nicknamed “Wips”, was abducted separately by SDU leader “Manyala” and later found 
drowned in a stream. Despite the lack of any direct evidence implicating any of the accused 
in Isaac Motloung‟s death, the court found that his death formed part of the “common 
purpose” to abduct and kill the deceased youth by the SDU members. The court found that all 
the SDU members, barring those whom it acquitted, were guilty of being part of a common 
purpose to kill Isaac Motloung. With regard to accused 1, Michael Sonti, the court found that 
while Isaac had been apprehended separately,  
there are sufficient indications on the evidence that Wips‟ death fell within the ambit 
of the plan or common purpose to round up and kill the youths. Although accused 1 
has not been found to have directly participated in his killing, or to be directly 
causally connected thereto, he nonetheless, on his own evidence, intended to 
apprehend Wips, who was the leader of the ANCYL and associated himself actively 
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in the plan to round him up. (The State v. Michael Sonti, 1999, p. 1824, own 
emphasis) 
 
Wips and Lethusang Rikaba were both identified by Oscar Motlokwa, Blanko‟s neighbour 
and fellow SDU member, as being directly involved in the killing of Blanko, and he shared 
this information with other SDU members at the site of Blanko‟s killing, so there is no doubt 
that when Sugar Ramabele issued an “order” that “the people” responsible for Blanko‟s death 
should be “fetched”, it would indeed be the “intent” of SDU members to “apprehend” Wips. 
However, in the absence of any causal evidence whatsoever, linking the accused to Wips‟ 
death, either in terms of actions, manifest intent, or even identificatory evidence placing them 
at or near the scene of his death, the already enormously flexible basis for liability implicit in 
the common purpose rule was stretched beyond credulity thus exposing the fallacy of 
attempting to incorporate within the law the anomic violence of the exception, which spoke 
not to a “common purpose”, a juridical intent that could located in time and space, but a 
manifestation of biopolitical power that blurs praxis and logos.  
 
Thus what was produced by the adjudication of the Moleleki execution within the context of 
the courtroom was another problem of comprehension, a radical problem of understanding, as 
the court attempted to incorporate within law the actions of the Moleleki protagonists in 
terms of a notion of a prior collective intent. The SDU members instead invoked the 
“spontaneity” of their actions in the context of the anger of the “community”. As during the 
TRC process, the court struggled to understand the nature of this “community” and the ways 
in which it authorised action. These explanations, which evoked the community as the source 
of authority for actions, were incomprehensible to the court and were rejected as cynical 
falsifications, intended to obfuscate the criminal intent of the protagonists. While the 
conviction of some of the SDU members involved in the execution was intended to establish 
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a new norm of law, in fact what it exposed was the irrevocable ambiguity of human action in 
a context of exception, whose nature, is fundamentally irresolvable.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION, THE EXCEPTION, A RADICAL PROBLEM 
OF UNDERSTANDING 
 
This thesis began by presenting the Moleleki execution as a radical problem of 
understanding. How was it possible to make sense of this atrocious act of violence? However, 
the Moleleki execution was not an isolated incident. During the period leading up to South 
Africa‟s first popular elections, approximately 16 000 people died in ongoing conflict, many 
in just as horrific circumstances. How, then is it possible to understand the nature of the 
power that emerged during this period, in particular its “excess” of violence? This thesis has 
sought to explore the radical problem of understanding posed by the Moleleki execution, 
within two historical junctures, the period in which the execution took place during South 
Africa‟s negotiated transition and the post-apartheid period where the execution became the 
subject of significant efforts to inscribe its violence within the law.  
 
What has emerged through these investigations is that the radical problem of understanding 
and the mutability of the “truth” that was produced around the execution critically concerned 
the ambiguity of the exception in which the execution took place and the misrecognition of 
this condition of exception, both in the pre- and post-apartheid contexts, as a juridical 
problematic, in which violence was conceived of as a implacable “exception” to the proper 
functioning of juridical power, a consequence of a lacuna in law, a breakdown or distortion of 
a normatively conceptualised sovereignty.  
 
In fact the exception concerned something entirely different, namely the boundaries of the 
juridico-political order, an ambiguous site of articulation between juridico-political and 
biopolitical power, law and life – the “hidden nucleus” of sovereign power (Agamben, 1998, 
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p. 6). The sovereign decision on the exception is the original political structure in terms of 
which what is inside and what is outside the juridico-political order acquire their meaning. 
Therefore what is at issue in the sovereign exception is the very condition of possibility of 
juridical order, its initial conditions of constitution.  
 
Thus while it was assumed that what was being witnessed during the period of negotiations 
was a breakdown or distortion of state sovereignty in a context of transition, in fact what was 
revealed was an exposure of sovereignty at the boundaries of the juridico-political order as 
the form of the state crumbled and the juridical order was essentially suspended during the 
negotiation process. Therefore the violence of the negotiation period was not a “paradox”, an 
extraordinary exception to the proper functioning of juridical order but instead concerned the 
initial conditions of constitution of this order in the transition from authoritarian to 
democratic governance. As Schmitt argues, “the exception appears in its absolute form when 
it is a question of creating a situation in which juridical rules can be valid…there is no rule 
applicable to chaos. Order must be established for juridical order to make sense” (Schmitt 
cited in Agamben, 2005, p. 16).  
 
It was in the course of exactly such an originary struggle for sovereign exception in a context 
of national exception that the Moleleki execution took place. Invoked in this struggle was the 
principle of the exception that opens up the space in which juridical order can be applied, a 
principle that would create the conditions of possibility for the post-apartheid juridical order.  
 
However, the boundary of sovereign exception which would open up the space for juridical 
order proved elusive, permeable, and irrevocably ambiguous. The originary struggle for 
juridical order between the SDU and ANCYL in Moleleki as the blocks of the new settlement 
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were being laid out took place in a context of anomic violence, unleashed on the East Rand 
by the national context of exception. In this context, the struggle between the SDU and the 
ANCYL sought a violent tying of juridical order (Ordnung) to territory to expiate the 
ambiguity of the exception, and irrevocably define the boundaries of juridical order in the 
township. This attempt to localise what was essentially unlocalisable, namely the exception, 
and grant it a visible and permanent expression, led to the atrocity of the execution in the 
violent localisation of exception in the bodies of the Moleleki dead.  
 
The radical problem of understanding faced by analysts and the juridico-political institutions 
of the post-apartheid state in attempting to interpret the nature of the power that emerged in 
this context of exception, thus concerned not only a juridical conception of power but the 
nature of the exception itself, which “defies general codification” (Schmitt cited in Agamben, 
2005, p. 15), and consists essentially in a lacuna, a juridical void created by the suspension of 
the juridical order. How then could this empty space be interpreted and the actions of the 
protagonists of the Moleleki execution, which took place in this context of exception, be 
adjudicated?  
 
The ambiguity of the exception was manifested in the multiplication of explanations of the 
conflict during the negotiation period, where analysts working within a juridical conception 
of power assumed that a causal relation could be traced between an “original” site of power 
and its violent effects. However, the multiplication of explanations of the conflict which this 
line of enquiry produced, spoke to the aporia of this line of investigation, which was merely 
able to describe the fleeting articulations of power in terms of a particular manifestation of 
ethnicity, generational cleavage or economic division. It could not elucidate the why of 
power, the articulation of juridico-political and biopolitical power at the boundaries of the 
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juridicio-political order. Thus analysts working within a long philisophico-political tradition, 
in which violence was conceived as a transparent instrument that could be put to the service 
of political ends, assumed that the basis of the sovereign state‟s authority was its ability to 
monopolise the means of violence. They could not separate out sovereignty from the state 
form and its putative ability to monopolise the means of violence. The eruption of sovereign 
power at the boundaries of the juridico-political order, the functions and purposes of which 
could not easily be ascertained or linked to an “intelligible public cause” (A. du Toit, 1993, p. 
6), therefore defied comprehension in juridico-political terms, constituting a radical problem 
of understanding for analysts at the time.  
 
Critically the violence that emerges in this context does not concern an instrumental relation 
between a juridical origin of power and its violent effects, a separation of the origin and 
effects of power, which is in fact, as Nietzsche argued, a mythological structure, but concerns 
what Benjamin has called a “manifestation of violence” (Benjamin cited in Agamben, 2005, 
p. 62), violence which is not a means to an end but stands in relation to its own mediality. 
The mythic nature of the relation between the origin and effect of violence is made 
particularly explicit in a context of exception, where the norm of law is suspended and what 
is exposed is the “force of law”, which floats as an indeterminate element that can be claimed 
by all protagonists, either the state or its opposition. Importantly, this force of law exists in 
non-relation to law, it is not a means, whether legitimate or illegitimate, to an end, whether 
just or unjust, it is instead a “pure” anomie (Benjamin cited in Agamben, 2005, p. 61). It is 
the struggle to capture this anomie, to make it the “thing” of politics, that is, as Agamben 
argues, the ultimate stakes for Western politics (Agamben, 2005, pp. 59-60).  
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These struggles to capture the “pure violence” of the exception in the efforts to inscribe the 
Moleleki execution within the juridico-institutional contexts of the TRC and the courtroom, 
exposed the complexity of this capturing of pure violence, which denoted, not a 
straightforward process of juridical classification and adjudication as these institutions 
assumed, but the uncertainty of the exception which articulates a relation between law and 
life. Thus both the TRC and courtroom grappled with the ambiguity of human action in a 
context of exception, whose nature is unclear and which evokes the impossibility of defining 
the legal consequences of acts committed during the exception.  
 
The nature of the authority which emerges in this context does not concern the authority 
invested through representative office, as the post-apartheid institutions which adjudicated 
the execution assumed, but a floating imperium, which is invested in all citizens regardless of 
rank, a biopolitical power embodied in the person of the actor, which resists “definition 
within the terms of the normal order” (Agamben, 2005, p. 43). It therefore cannot 
subsequently be adjudicated in terms of the “proper” exercise of juridical authority mandated 
by legislative power. Nevertheless the post-apartheid juridical institutions sought to 
understand the nature of the actions relating to the Moleleki execution in terms of a notion of 
juridical intent, a prior origin of power, which could purportedly be arbitrated in instrumental 
relation to the violent effect, through an adjudication of the subjectivity of the Moleleki 
protagonists, either a political intent in the context of the TRC or a criminal intent within the 
courtroom processes. In the multiple problems of decidability which both these institutions 
encountered during their adjudication of the execution, the ambiguity of the exception and the 
attempt to inscribe it within the juridical political order was exposed, reproducing, in the 
post-apartheid context, the radical problem of understanding produced by a purely juridical 
conception of power.  
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These processes of re-inscription therefore traversed both the period of juridico-political 
exception in which the execution took place and the period subsequent to the inauguration of 
the post-apartheid state and shared, paradoxically, an essential contiguity in their efforts to 
recapture this “pure” violence leashed from law, within the law again. 
 
However, while the pre- and post-apartheid processes of inscription around the execution 
shared an essential contiguity in their efforts to capture this violence as the object of the 
juridico-political, the process of inscription in the post-apartheid period was critically 
concerned with the establishment of the sovereignty of the new state in terms of a new norm 
of law, the norm of “human rights”, which sought define the boundaries of the juridico-
political present, in terms of the “exception” of the violence of the past.  
 
Paradoxically, however, despite the explicit intention to constitute the present “political” as 
the juridico-political in opposition to the biopolitics of the past, the norm of human rights in 
fact introduces a critical biopolitical principle into the functioning of modern nation states. 
The Declaration of the Rights of Man was the instrument of transformation from the dynastic 
system in which sovereignty was vested in the prince to the modern nation state in which 
sovereignty is vested in the “people” who are protected by a set of inalienable rights. 
However, while purportedly making birth the only criteria for the protection of the regime of 
rights, what remained implicit was that political rights or the rights of “active citizenship” 
would only be allowed to certain people, specifically “excluding (among others), women, 
children, foreigners, the insane, minors and those condemned to punishment” (Agamben, 
1998, p. 130).  
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These people would have no influence on public matters and would not be considered 
citizens. Therefore the “Rights of Man” emerge as a biopolitical status that is acquired within 
the context of the political community. Thus the shifting of sovereignty from the prince to the 
people creates an essential ambiguity, how to determine the limits of the political 
community? This has led to a constant need to define the boundaries of the political 
community in terms of a distinction between “authentic life and life lacking every political 
value” (Agamben, 1998, p. 132). 
 
Therefore, while it was assumed that the transfer of sovereignty to the people through the 
country‟s first democratic elections was a purely juridical phenomenon, which would 
establish a juridical political in opposition to the biopolitics of the past, what remained 
implicit was the biopolitical nature of the relation of exception that would constitute this 
present political, through “the biopolitical fracture in terms of which, the human species [is 
constituted] into a body politic”, through a fundamental split, “which defines the boundary of 
the political community in terms of a distinction between „bare life‟ (people) and political life 
(People)” (Agamben, 2000, p. 30.1-2, original emphasis). Critically, however, this split is 
profoundly ambiguous, and has to constantly redefine itself in terms of a series of exclusions 
which demarcate its boundaries.  
 
The TRC was established to respond to this “highest political task”(Agamben, 1998, p. 130), 
namely to articulate the biopolitical fracture and delineate the People in whom sovereignty 
would be vested in order to establish a post-apartheid “nationhood”. However, the TRC 
misrecognised the nature of the exception it was established to articulate, assuming that it 
concerned the instantiation and arbitration of an instrumental relation with the biopolitical 
past. This would occur through a legislative process that would adjudicate this relation by 
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granting amnesty for those who had committed acts in pursuit of “political objectives” on all 
sides of the political conflict as well as administratively deciding who had been the victims of 
such gross human rights violations. 
 
In this adjudication, the relationship between the juridical origin of power and its violent 
effects could putatively be sundered, making an exception of the biopolitics of the past. 
However, the ambiguities of this endeavour, which could not recognise the biopolitical nature 
of the relation that the Commission was implicitly established to articulate, created multiple 
problems of decidability in attempting to determine an instrumental relation between a prior 
source of power and its violent effects in order to render a political present free from the stain 
of violence. This finally led the Commission to acknowledge the difficulties of such a 
juridical classification of the political when it stated in its report that “the political nature of 
specific acts was hard to define” (TRC, 1998b, p. 82). 
 
The limits of this juridical conception of the political were particularly exposed by actions 
like the Moleleki execution, which had taken place in a context of exception. Thus, the 
protagonists of the Moleleki execution implicitly articulated the nature of the conflict in 
Moleleki in terms of the biopolitical fracture, in which the boundaries of the political 
community are substantiated against the originary figure of the political relation, homo sacer, 
one who has been judged on account of a crime and who stands in a relation of exception to 
the juridico-political order. However this invocation by the Moleleki applicants of the 
“criminal” rather than the juridico-political opponent, and the “community” rather than a 
juridical mandate as the source of the authority for their actions, led to the TRC to conclude 
that the execution had not been politically motivated and therefore was not political in nature.  
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In contrast to the TRC, which had found a lack of prior political intent in a coherently 
articulated political motive, the adjudication of the Moleleki execution in the context of the 
courtroom found significant prior intention in a common plan or purpose to commit the 
execution among the Moleleki protagonists, which spoke to the ambiguity of the adjudication 
of actions committed during the exception and the mutability of the “truth” that such 
adjudications produce, when it concerns actions that occurred in a juridical void at the 
boundaries of the juridico-political order.  
 
The complete abandonment of the principle of causality in the court proceedings where the 
judge used the doctrine of common purpose to adjudicate the actions of the Moleleki 
protagonists, therefore spoke to the “impossibility” of adjudicating actions which have 
occurred in a context of exception in juridical terms, and of attaching legal consequences to 
actions which had occurred outside law, as a manifestation rather than an effect of a prior 
source of power. Thus while five of the Moleleki accused were sentenced to life terms of 
imprisonment as a result of the court trial, in using the doctrine of common purpose the judge 
implicitly acknowledged the difficulty of welding life to law, of incorporating the political in 
law. However, bound by the aporia of a juridical conception of power, which could not 
conceive of a realm outside law, the Moleleki execution was left to remain, essentially, a 
radical problem of understanding.  
 
Thus, what this thesis has to conclude as a result of its interrogation of the Moleleki 
execution as a moment of sovereign decision that evoked the struggle to create the conditions 
of possibility of post-apartheid juridical order, is that contrary to popular wisdom, the 
sovereignty of the post-apartheid state was not established merely through the exercise of 
juridical “choice” at the ballot box, but was in fact was a much more fundamental process, 
which concerned the sovereign decision that articulates the boundaries of the juridico-
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political order, in terms of a set of biopolitical inclusions and exclusions. However, as the 
processes of inscription around the Moleleki execution made clear, what this thesis also has 
to record is that, despite the exposure of the “hidden nucleus” of sovereign power during the 
founding moments of South Africa‟s democracy, this exposure of sovereignty would remain 
fundamentally misrecognised, dismissed as an “archaic aberration” which, it was assumed, 
would not recur in a post-apartheid juridico-political order, putatively freed from the stain of 
violence. These obfuscations of the source of power of the post-apartheid state and the basis 
of its sovereignty in a domain of the “political” that is not usurped by the realm of law have 
reproduced a dangerous blindness to these initial conditions of constitution of the current 
juridical order. In this conception, the violence of sovereign decision and the realm of 
exception - Hobbes‟ “state of nature”, in which man is wolf to men - slips below visibility 
under the form of the post-apartheid state, to lurk ominously unnoticed, waiting to be exposed 
when the forms of this state decay.   
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